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CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE w ... .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
~nvrmu Clfllurl!lf tfrt 'Jllnfub ~hdeg 
~zurfti:ttgLtn. ~. <!f. 20,?'1~ 
May 28, 1981 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: Iranian Hostage Agreement 
At lunch Byron, Bill, John and I discussed the Iranian 
Hostage Agreement. It was thought helpful to obtain a copy 
of the First Circuit opinion and the briefs in that case. I 
called Chief Judge Coffin who referred me to Judge McGowan of 
the D.C. Circuit where another of these cases is pending. 
Judge McGowan sent me the enclosed copies of the First Circuit 
opinions and also the copy enclosed of a judgment order enter-
ed in the D.C. case. The opinion of the D.C. Circuit is to 





To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Peter Byrne 
Re: No. 80-2078, Dames & Moore v. Regan (Sec'y), Iran Agreement 
Case 
'iS'a"te: 06/10/81 
Summary: Petr requests the Court to grant cert in 
this case before judgment by the CA9. Petr argues that the 
.. aw:a • 
President lacked authority to nullify judicial attachments and 
suspend claims against the government of Iran and its 
~
instrumentality. 
Facts and Proceedings Below: Petr filed this action 
on April 28, 1981 in the DC to enjoin the United States from 
interfering in enforcing a judgment in an underlying suit by 
petr against Iran, and for a declaration that the Iranian 
Hostage Agreement, known as the Algerian Declarations, and 
implementing regulations were void insofar as they purported to 
authorize such interference because they were beyond the 
constitutional and statutory powers of the President. The DC 
( 
~c. 
granted the motion of the United States to dismiss for failure  
to state a claim under Rule 12 (b) (6). It is this ruling that .,1.0 ~
petrs seek to have reviewed here. 
tt;_~ 
It is helpful to recall the chronology of the 
relevant public events when describing the maturing of petr's 
claim. The Iranian revolutionaries seized American diplomats as 
hostages on November 4, 1979. On November 14, President Carter 
in response issued a Presidential Order: 1) declaring a 
"national emergency" within the meaning of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 u.s.c. § 1701; 2) 
2. 
"blocking" all assets of Iran and its instrumentalities within 
the jurisdiction of the United States; and, 3) delegating his 
powers to the Sec'y of the Treasury to issue regulations 
implementing the blocking order. That same day, the Sec'y ~ 
issued regulation prohibiting, absent a license or 
........... :w:r""'t 
authorization, attachments, injunctions, or judgments against 
the Iranian property. Petrs commenced their underlying action -
against Iran, and gained a prejudgment attachment against 
Iranian assets, pursuant to a revocable license, on December 
20, 1979. 
On January 19, 1981, Iran released the hostages ~  
to an agreement with the United States (the fo ~ pursuant 
Declarations of Algeria). The agreement states as a purpose to  
settle and terminate all claims between the Government of each 
nation and the nationals of the other. To acheive this goal, 
1/ \\ I /• 
the parties established an Iran-U~ted States Claims Tribunal, , ~~ 
which will, with certain exceptions, arbitrate claims; its ~rh 
judgments shall be binding and enforcable in the courts of any~ 
ation. The ~t~s~det;,_took to "terminate" legal ~
P:;?cee~ d~mesti,Q_,courts against Iran and its 




instrument a 1 i t i e s , .:;,:o_"~n:.:u:..:l:.::.:.i :.~~~-"....:a:.:l:.:l;_a;;,.;;.t.;;;t.;;;a;.;c;.;;.h;.:;m.e .. nt s , ~nd _w 
liti ation. The United States must also 
transfer by July 19, 1981 all Iranian assets held in U.S. 
banks. $1 Billion will go directly into an account to be used  
to fund awards by the Tribunal; Iran agreed to maintain a • 
balance of $500 million in the account until all awards are 
3. 
satisfied. The same day, President Carter issued executive 
orders implementing the agreement. These orders revoked all 
licenses permitting persons to exercise any "right, power or 
privilege" against Iranian assets, "nullified" all non-Iranian ~ 
interests acquired in the assets after the blocking order went
into effect, and ordered all those holding blocked assets to ~1-t,. ·- ~-
.. ~~ transfer them to the Federal Reserve Bank in New York [th1s 1s 
~leu,-~ 
due on June 19]. On February 24, President Reagan "ratified" 
the January 19 orders, "suspended" all "claims which may be 
presented to the [Tribunal]," and provided that they "shall 
have no legal effect in any action now pending in any court of 
the United States." Notwithstanding all this, the DC granted -petr summary judgment on its underlying claims against Iran in 
the amount of $3.8 million on Februaruy 18. 
In summary, petr intiated its underlying claims and 
gained pre-judgment attachment against Iran after the entry of 
the blocking order on November 14, 1979. The DC has now vacated} .bL I 
petr's attachment:_:nd held, in essence, that the United States ~~ 
,, 
has the power to transfer the ass·ets on July 19. 
State of Law: CAl, Chas. T Main Inc. v. Khuzestan 
Water & Power Authority, No. 80-10 27 (May 22, 1981) (Campbell, 
Coffin; Breyer, concurring), and CADC, American Int'l Group, 
Inc. v. Iran, (decided May 22, 1981; opinion issued June 5, 
1981) (McGowan, Mikva, Jameson [DJ]), have both held in --comprehensive opinions that 1) the President has statutory 




attachments on Iranian assets entered after the date of the 
blocking order: 2) the President has inherent authority to 
settle the claims of American nationals against foreign 
governments in reaching important agreements with those 
governments: 3) any takings claims by creditors are premature. 
Apparently no DC's have held otherwise. I will state in su~y ~ 
the grounds of the CAl and CADC holdings. l l::v'A...~~.$ 
1) The I~EPA en~~e ent, in times of JM ~ 
national emergency, to prevent or prohibit the transfer of the j 
assets of a foreign governemnt, direct or compel the transfer 
or withdrawal of such assets, and nullify any rights acquired 
in them. 50 u.s.c. § 1702 (a) (1). Here, the President did not 
wipe out existing judicial liens retroactively, but only 
attachments gained subject to the limitations of the blocking ---- -~- - -
order. When the President acts pursuant to explicit statutory -
authorization, he exerc-ises all the power of the United States 
regarding foreign affairs. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343U.S. 579,635-638 (1952)(Jackson, J., concurring). 
A similar blocking order was upheld under the President's power ~ 
under the predecessor Trading With The Enemy Act in Orvis v. 
Brownell, 345 u.s. 183 (1953). 
suspend claims 
of nationals against foreign governments. In United States v. 
Pink, 315 u.s. 203 (1942), the Court upheld the settlement of 
such claims pursuant to an agreement recognizing the USSR. The 
President has made such settlements throughout the history of 
5. 
the country without disapproval by Congress. If effective, the 
President's settlement is binding on a federal court. See 
United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103 (1801). The 
passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976(FSIA), 
which allows courts to entertain commercial suits against 
foreign sovereigns on commercial claims without interposition 
of the executive, does not abrogate the President's power to 
act in a national emergency. 
3) Takings claims are premature because it is not 
clear that the Tribunal will give less value for the claims 
. I 
1f wz.J.L -
than petrs could obtain gaining unsecured judgments against 
Iran in the federal courts. No taking was acheived by the mere 
nullification of attachments gained after the blocking order 
was entered. 
are Contentions: Petr argues that the decisions below 
;k.,~~ incorrect. It claims that the President has bargained away 
their legal rights to gain release of the hostages. It argues 
that the President has neither statutory nor inherent power to 
achieve these "settlements." None of the cases relied on below ] 
involve a "giveaway" of claims held by American nationals. Pink 
involved only a marshalling of assets for American creditors. 
Schooner Peggy involved a formal treaty ratified by Congress. 
What the President has done is interfere with the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the federal courts, as conferred by the FSIA. 
The history of Presidential settlements of national's claims 
against foreign sovereigns is irrelevant to this case occuring 
~_,1~4~. 
6. 
after passage of FSIA in 1976. Prior to passage of that Act 
such claims could only be satisfied by international agreement; 
if the President did not act there would be no recovery, so his 
settlement had to bind the parties. The estimated American 
claims against Iran far exceed the $1 Billion security account; 
they are estimated to total $3 or $4 Billion. 
The United States has yet to file today, but will 
su£port the~ited ~eJn and urge the following accelerated 
briefing schedule: briefs by June 19; reply briefs by June 23; 
oral argument on June 25. Iran has filed a motion to intervene; 
it supports the petn and the briefing scedule. Numerous major 
banks presently holding Iranian assets and fearful of being 
subjected to conflicting obligation, have filed an amicus 
brief urging the Court to hear this case on an expedited basis. 
These parties all state that there are numerous cases pending 
and a uniform and final decision is desireable. 
Discussion: In looking into this case, I have been 
suprised to find that petr's arguments on the merits are quite 
weak. There seems little real argument to the ~Pint that the 
;;::ident ~tory authority under the IEEPA to transfer 
the assets and nullify post blocking order attachment orders. 
Petr offers only a strained attempt to narrow the sweeping 
grant of authority under IEEPA by reference to indirect 
legislative history. The more diffcult question is whether the 
President may suspend the claims pending in federal courts. 
This is not a major loss to petrs because federal court 
·.· 
7. 
judgments will be worth little when the assets are gone. While 
the cases tend to support the President's power as part of an 
international agreement to settle claims by requiring they be 
submitted to arbitration this case does go somewhat beyond the 
precedents in the sweeping nature of the claim preclusion. It . .,..,~...-.....---- ......... 
goes far beyond in the amount of money involved. - - ~-------------
! would be tempted to merely affirm the judgement 
below with a brief per curiam. However, given the political 
importance of the issue plenary consideration may be 
desireable. This will allow the Court more carefully to weigh 
and state the President's inherent power to settle claims. At 
this time of year, a full hearing may be no less budensome that 
the preparation of a per curiam. 
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL 
TELEPHONE . ( 202 ) 857-1000 
TELEX : 8Q8Z 5 
CABLE ADDRESS . LADY COURT, W S H 
The Honorable Francis J. Lorson, 
Chief Deputy Clerk, 
Supreme Court of the United States, 
1 First Street, N.E., 
Room 22B, 
Washington, D.C. 20543. 
.JUN l 0 1981 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
SUP2EME COURT, U.S. 
II'!§ !J§z~~nia (! Gten/H: 
~lmv. !d.' rt, ,!()()()6' 
125 BROAD STREET. NEW YOR K 10 004 
ZSO PARK AVENUE . NEW YO RK 10177 
17. AVENUE M ATIGNON , 75008 PAR IS 
Zl IRON MON G ER LANE , LONDON ECZV 8 .J B 
June 10, 1981 
Re: Dames & Moore v. Donald T. Regan and the 
United States of America, No. 80-2078 
Dear Mr. Lorson: 
Enclosed for filing are 40 copies of a motion for 
leave to file a brief and brief amici curiae. Although this 
is being filed as a motion, in accordance with your tele-
phone conversation with Mr. Mark Zirnrnett, this letter con-
firms that we have obtained the consent of the respondents 
to the filing of the enclosed brief. Counsel for petitioner 
has consented to the filing of the brief insofar as it sup-
ports the petition for certiorari, but does not agree with 
our position supporting the respondents' motion for expedite d 
consideration of the petition. 
I enclose nine extra copies of this letter should 
it be appropriate to circulate to the Conference. 




SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
RECEIVED 
JUN 1 0 1981 
OFFICE OF TH 
~EME cou~r:~~~ 
October Term 1980 
DAMES & MOORE, a partnership, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
DONALD T. REGAN, THE SECRETARY 
OF THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA, and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Respondents. 
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Before Judgment 
MOTION TO INTERVENE AS RESPONDENT AND BRIEF IN 
ACQUIESCENCE TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT 
On the brief: 
John B. Beaty 
James A. Stenger 
Thomas D. Silverstein 
Thomas G. Shack, Jr. 
Raymond J. Kimball 
Gregory de Sousa 
Christine Cook Nettesheim 
ABOUREZK, SHACK & MENDENHALL, P.C. 
1129 Twentieth Street, N.W. 
washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 293-5900 
Counsel for Intervenor 
Islamic Republic of Iran 
Elihu Inselbuch 
E. Paul Kanefsky 
GILBERT, SEGALL & YOUNG 
430 Park Avenue 
New York, New York 10022 
( 212) 644-4000 
Counsel for Intervenor 
Atomic Energy Organization of 




SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
October Term 1980 
DAMES & MOORE, a partnership, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
DONALD T. REGAN, THE SECRETARY 
OF THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA, and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Respondents. 
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Before Judgment 
MOTION TO -INTERVENE -AS -RESPONDENT 
The Islamic Republic of Iran (the "Government of Iran") 
and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran the ("AEOI") hereby 
move this Court to intervene as respondents in this matter as a 
matter of right and to file the accompanying brief acquiesing in 
the petition for writ of certiorari before judgment. 
The Government of Iran and AEOI fully satisfy the 
criteria of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) for intervention as a matter 
of right. The Government of Iran has a direct interest in this 
case, because outstanding orders of attachment have been levied 
against its assets and those of other Iranian entities in the 
amount of some $3.5 million and because a summary judgment in 
the amount of $3,788,930.79 was issued against the Government of 
Iran in the underlying action. Similarly, AEOI has an interest 
in this case because the summary judgment was entered jointly 
against AEOI. 
In addition to its direct interest in the outcome of 
' 
this case, the Government of Iran has a unique interest, not 
adequately represented by Secretary Regan or the United States, 
emanating from the Declaration of the Democratic and Popular 
Republic of Algeria, adhered to by the United states and Iran on 
January 19, 1981 (the "General Declaration"). While the United 
States is obligated by the General Declaration (General 
Principle B and •t6-9) to return to Iran by July 19, 1981, the 
assets which are subject to petitioner's prejudgment 
attachments, that interest is not identical to that of the 
Government of Iran. The United States' interest can fairly be 
characterized as one of discharging its obligations under an 
international accord which is binding on domestic courts. 
Should, however, the United States fail to effect the 
timely return of the Government of Iran's assets, a claim by 
Iran can be lodged with the Iran-United States Arbitral 
Tribunal, established by the Declaration of the Democratic and 
Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims 
of the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, also 
adhered to on January 19, 1981 ("the Claims Declaration"). 
General Declration, !17; Claims Declaration, Article II, t3. It 
is the Government of Iran's assets which are not freely mobile 
and which are not subject to the Government of Iran's access or 
use, pending vacation of these prejudgment attachments. Thus, 
the Government of Iran's interest can fairly be characterized as 
an immediate ownership interest, which is not represented by the 
existing parties and it is of vital concern to the Government of 
Iran that all prejudgment attachments, preliminary injunctions, 
or other provisional restraints on its financial assets be 
nullified, as required by the General Declaration, in advance of 
July 19, 1981, in order to permit their return to Iran in 
accordance with the General Declaration. 
- 2 -
Finally, both the Government of ~ran and AEOI have an 
interest distinct from that of Secretary Regan and the United 
States in this matter, because the summary judgment against the 
Government of Iran and AEOI was entered unlawfully after the 
Algerian Declarations were adhered to and ratified by President 
Reagan and after Executive orders and regulations were promul-
gated which prohibited all further judicial proceedings with 
respect to Iranian assets. The disposition of the summary judg-
ment impacts directly on the Government of Iran and AEOI and 
only indirectly on the United States, which is obligated to 
nullify all judgments against the Government of Iran and Iranian 
entities pursuant to General Principle B of the General Declar-
ation. 
Counsel for the Government of Iran are authorized to 
state that the United States does not oppose this motion. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Government of Iran and 
AEOI respectfully request that this motion be granted and that 
the accompanying brief be accepted for filing. 
On the brief: 
John B. Beaty 
James A. Stenger 
Thomas D. Silverstein 
June 10, 1981 
Respectfully s~bmi t ted') 
~c .... y 
Thomas G. Shack, Jr. 
Raymond J. Kimball 
Gregory de Sousa 
Christine Cook Nettesheim 
ABOUREZK, SHACK & MENDENHALL, P.C. 
1129 Twentieth Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 293-5900 
Counsel for Intervenor 
Islamic Republic of Iran 
Elihu Inselbuch 
E. Paul Kanefsky 
GILBERT, SEGALL & YOUNG 
430 Park Avenue 
New York, New York 10022 
(212) 644-4000 
Counsel for Intervenor 
Atomic Energy Organization of 
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No. 80-2078 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
October Term 1980 
DAMES & MOORE, a partnership, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
DONALD T. REGAN, THE SECRETARY 
OF THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA, and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Respondents. 
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Before Judgment 
BRIEF IN ACQUIESCENCE TO PETITION 
FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT 
QOESTION PRESENTED 
Whether issues concerning the validity of implementa-
tion of the Algerian Declarations by Executive orders and 
federal regulations require immediate settlement in this Court. 
STATEMENT 
Intervenors the Islamic Republic of Iran (the 
"Government of Iran") and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran 
(the "AEOI") hereby acquiesce in the petition for writ of 
certiorari and in the schedule for expedited briefing and 
argument proposed this date by Secretary Regan and the United 
States. 
This case merits urgent consideration because it is 
representative of the hundreds of cases against the Government 
of Iran and Iranian entities involving prejudgment attachments 
issued on or after November 14, 1979, res~raining the mobility 
of Iranian assets that the United States is obligated to return 
to Iran by July 19, 1981. In addition, this case involves a 
summary judgment against intervenors entered in violation of 
executive orders and regulations. 
Petitioner Dames & Moore obtained prejudgment attach-
ments of some $3.5 million in funds of the Government of Iran in 
the Central District of California on December 20, 1979; January 
4, 1980; February 4, 1980; and May 12, 1980. Authorization for 
hese prejudgment attachments was conferred by a revocable 
license. 31 C.P.R. §§535.418, 535.504, 535.805 (1980). 
On January 19, 1981, the United States adhered to two 
Declarations of the Government of Algeria.~/ The General Declar-
ation provides for the termination of the litigation in the 
United States courts and the nullification of judicial process, 
including attachments and judgments. The United States specific-
ally agreed: 
To terminate all legal proceedings in the 
United States courts involving claims of 
United States persons and institutions 
against Iran and its enterprises, to · nullify 
all · attachments · and · judgments · obtained 
therein, [and] to prohibit further litigation 
based on such claims ..•• 
General Declaration, General Principle B (emphasis added). 
In addition to, and independently of, the above commit-
ment, the General Declaration requires the return of all Iranian 
assets within United States jurisdiction. General Declaration, 
General Principle A. Paragraphs 4 through 9 of the General 
Declaration obligate the United States by July 19, 1981, 
~I These are the "Declaration of the Government of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria," Jan. 19, 
1981 (the "General Declaration") and the "Declaration 
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government 
of the United States of America and the Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran," Jan. 19, 1981. 
- 2 -
to "bring about the transfer" of to "arrange for the transfer" 
of all Iranian assets.:/ The General Declaration established a 
security account to be funded from the returned assets in the 
initial amount of $1 billion and subsequently maintained by Iran 
so that the amount is not less that $500 million. General 
Declaration, ,7. 
In furtherance of the United States' obligations under 
the Algerian Declarations, Executive orders were issued on 
January 19 and February 4, 1981, as implemented by Treasury 
regulations, which, inter alia, revoke the license for prejudg-
ment attachments, direct the transfer of assets to the Federal 
Reserve Bank for retransfer as directed by the Secretary of the 
Treasury, and prohibit further judicial proceedings concerning 
Iranian assets. Exec. Order Nos. 12,277-12,280, 46 Fed. Reg. 
7,915-7,922 (Jan. 23, 1981); Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. 
Reg. 14,111 (Feb. 26, 1981); 46 Fed. Reg. 14,333-14,336 (1981) 
(to codified as 31 C.F.R. §§535.212, 535.213, 535.214, 535.218, 
535.222, 535.504). 
Although 
been prohibited, obtained a 
~vernmen of Iran and AEOI in the 
amount of $3,788,930.79, plus interest. 
Thereafter, on April 28, 1981, petitioner filed its 
injunctive action seeking to prevent respondents from enforcing 
the regulations requiring transfer of the attached assets. The 
district court on May 28, 1981, dismissed the complaint, vacated 
all the prejudgment attachments, stayed execution on the summary 
judgment, and stayed the vacation of the attachments until 
July 19, 1981. Petitioner noticed its appeal from the dismissal 
of its complaint and the vacation of attachments to the Ninth 
Circuit on June 3, 1981; on June 4, 
~I The commitments to transfer assets in ••4-9 of the 
General Declaration are conditioned upon certain 
events, all of which have occurred. 
- 3 -
1980, the Treasury issued regulations tha~ revoked a policy of 
not seeking to impose criminal and civil sanctions on holders of 
Iranian property who failed to comply with its ordered transfer 
and directed that all Iranian funds, securities, or deposits be 
transferred to the Federal Reserve Bank by June 19, 1981, 46 
Fed. Reg. 30,341 (1981) (to be codified as 31 C.F.R. §§535.213, 
535.214, 535.221); 31 C.F.R. §535.701 (1980); compare 46 Fed. 
Reg. 14,335 (1981) (to be codified as 31 C.F.R. §535.221). 
Petitioner applied to the district court on June 5, 1981, for an 
order restraining enforcement of these regulations; on June 8, 
the district court enjoined the transfer of assets subject to 
petitioner's attachments pending the appeal in the Ninth 
Circuit and restricted its stay of execution on the summary 
judgment to only in stay pending appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ISSUES OF THE EXECUTIVE'S AUTHORITY TO VACATE 
PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENTS OF IRANIAN ASSETS AND THE 
EXECUTIVE'S OBLIGATION TO NULLIFY THE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT REQUIRE -IMMEDIATE -SETTLEMENT - IN -THIS -COURT. 
Intervenors acquiesce in the petition insofar as it 
seeks immediate and expedited review of the Executive's author-
ity to nullify prejudgment attachments of Iranian assets, 
pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 
U.S.C. §§1701-1706 (Supp. III 1979), as a matter of imperative 
public importance that justifies a deviation from normal 
appellate practice and requires immediate settlement in this 
Court, within the contemplation of Sup. Ct. R. 18.~/ The 
Algerian Declarations are international accords which are 
binding on the United States as a matter of both international 
~I Intervenors will support the grant of certiorari in a 
case naming as defendants the Government of Iran, alone 
or in connection with other Iranian entities, which is 
representative of the nationwide cases with provisional 
restraints of Iranian assets issued on or after 
November 14, 1979. 
- 4 -
and domestic law. They mandate the retur~ of Iran's assets held 
by United States banks and other persons by July 19, 1981, the 
termination of legal proceedings, and the nullification of sum-
mary judgments. To that end, the Executive has issued executive 
orders and regulations, the enforcement of which petitioners 
seek to frustrate and the legality and constitutionality of 
which petitioners ask this Court to address in advance of the 
July 19th deadline. Because this case involves the obligations 
to transfer assets and to terminate legal proceedings which must 
be finally discharged within 40 days, and because the prejudg-
ment attachment is representative of over 200 cases with provi-
sional restraints on Iranian assets, the petition demonstrates 
imperative public importance that justifies this Court's 
consideration of the issues on appeal before judgment by the 
court of appeals. Immediate settlement of these issues is 
necessary to provide uniform treatment by the courts throughout 
the country which must address and rule on these issues within 
the next month. The standards of Sup. Ct. R. 18 are unquestion-
ably met. 
II. THIS MATTER SHOULD BE HEARD ON THE EXPEDITED 
BRIEFING - SCHEDULE - PROPOSED - BY - RESPONDENTS~ · 
Petitioner has invoked this Court's jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 u.s.c. §1254(1} (1976}; Rule 18 conditions the 
grant of certiorari before judgment on a showing that the issues 
on appeal require "immediate settlement in this Court." Thus, 
if petitioner asks this Court to hear its appeal before the 
Ninth Circuit has an opportunity to offer an intermediate 
ruling, petitioner must not only show the need for immediate 
review, which intervenors concede, but also facilitate immediate 
review by the Court. Nonetheless, petitioner has not proposed 
an expedited briefing schedule, which would allow for resolution 
of this appeal by the Court prior to July 19, 1981, or by any 
- 5 -
date in the near future. It is responden~s who have proposed an 
expedited briefing schedule, and intervenors urge this Court to 
adopt that schedule as reasonably calculated to facilitate 
immediate resolution by this Court and - more critically -
resolution by July 19, 1981. 
Accordingly, intervenors join in respondents' request 
that the Court require simultaneous opening briefs by June 19, 
1981; simultaneous reply briefs by June 23, 1981; and oral 
argument on June 25, 1981. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, intervenors request that the 
petition be granted and that the Court adopt the briefing 
schedule proposed by respondents. 
On the brief: 
John B. Beaty 
James A. Stenger 
Thomas D. Silverstein 
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briefing schedule. 
The Gov ernment has proposed that the Court require 
the parties to file opening briefs by June 19, 1981, reply 
briefs on June 23, 1981 and hold oral argument on June 25, 
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1981. This schedule is unreasonable in light of the 
significant constitutional issues presented that deserve the 
deliberate and detailed attention of both the litigants and 
the Court. For the same reason, we strongly oppose the 
Government's suggestion that this case be decided summarily. 
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ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT 
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESPONDENTS 
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States and 
the Secretary of the Treasury, urges the Court to grant the 
petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment to the United 
\ ~ \ 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case. 
The district court's decision upholds the authority of the 
President to revoke licenses for attachments of assets in which 
Iran has an interest, to order the transfer of these assets in 
compliance with the terms of the Agreement with Iran, and to 
suspend claims against Iran that may be presented to the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal. The district court's decision 
therefore is consistent with holdings of the Co~rts of Appeals 
for the First and District of Columbia Circuits, the only two 
courts of appeals to have ruled on these questions. Although the 
district court's decision in this case is correct and there is no 
! 
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conflict among the circuits on the question presented in the 
petition, we request the court to review these questions under 
the extraordinary procedure of certiorari before judgment because 
of the absence of binding precedent in other circuits --
particularly the Second Circuit -- that similarly establishes the 
authority of the President to require the transfer of Iranian 
assets held by domestic banking institutions in those circuits by 
the July 19, 1981, deadline provided in the Agreement with 
Iran. A decision by this Court prior to July 19 will furnish 
the orderly disposition of the more 
elsewhere that involve claims against the Government 
of Iran and its instrumentalities and controlled entities. 
l.a. On December 19, 1979, petitioner filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the Central District of 
California against the Government of Iran, the Atomic Energy 
Organization of Iran, and a number of Iranian banks that, 
petitioner asserts (Pet. 5), had been nationalized by the 
Government of Iran. Dames & Moore v. Atomic Energy Organization 
of Iran, et al., No. 79-04918 LEW (Px) (C.D. Cal.). Petitioner 
alleged that it was a party to a written contract with the Atomic 
Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), under which it was to conduct 
certain site studies for a proposed nuclear power plant in Iran. 
l_) The contract was terminated by AEOI on June 30, 1979, for 
the convenience of AEOI, as provided in the contract. In its 
complaint against the Iranian defendants, petitioner alleged that 
1 / Actually, the complaint states that the party to the 
contract was a wholly owned subsidiary of petitioner, Dames & 
Moore International, S. R. 1., and that this entity had assigned 
its entire interest under the contract to petitioner. For 
convenience, we will regard petitioner as the party to the 
contract. 
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it was owed $3,436,694.30 for services performed under the 
contract prior to the date of termination. 
The contract with AEOI provided that if any dispute arising 
thereunder could not be resolved by agreement between the 
parties, the dispute would be submitted to conciliation~ and, 
if neither party was satisfied with the results of conciliation, 
"the matter shall be decided finally by resort to the courts of 
Iran" (Pet. 7 n.2). In its complaint in the action against the 
Iranian defendants, petitioner alleged that it had sought a 
meeting with AEOI for purposes of final settlement of all matters 
relating to the contract but that AEOI "has continually postponed 
said mee~ing and obviously does not intend that it take place" 
(Complaint, ~27). 
b. In its suit against the Iranian defendants, petitioner 
sought to recover the $3,436,694.30 that was allegedly owing, 
plus interest, on breach of contract and related theories. The 
district court issued orders of attachments directed against 
property of the defendants, and property of certain bank 
defendants was thereby attached to secure any judgment that might 
be entered against them. __ 3_1 On January 27, 1981, petitioner 
moved for summary judgment against AEOI and the Government of 
Iran (but not the Iranian banks). The motion was accompanied by 
affidavits attesting to the amount owing under the contract and with a 
request pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) to prohibit AEOI 
2 I Each party had the right to appoint one conciliator, with a 
third conciliator to be appointed by the Plan and Budget 
Organization of the Government of Iran. Pet. 7 n.2. 
3 I Although we have not seen documents itemizing the attached 
assets, we have been informed by counsel for petitioner that some 
of the assets on which attachments were obtained are held by 
domestic banking institutions and are therefore assets that must 
be transferred by July 19, 1981. 
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and the Government of Iran from introducing any evidence in 
opposition to petitioner's motion for summary judgment as a 
sanction for AEOI's failure to comply with petitioner's discovery 
requests. 
On February 18, 1981, the district court granted 
petitioner's motion for summary judgment against AEOI and the 
Government of Iran for the amount claimed under the contract, 
plus interest. AEOI and the Government of Iran filed a notice of 
appeal from this judgment on March 20, 1981. Petitioner 
attempted to execute on this judgment by obtaining writs of 
garnishment and execution in state court in the State of 
Washington, and a sheriff's sale of Iranian property was noticed 
in Washington to satisfy the judgment (Pet. 5-6; Pet. App. 15-
18)._1_} However, by order of May 28, 1981, as amended by order 
of June 8, the district court stayed execution of the judgment 
pending the appeal of that judgment by AEOI and the Government of 
Iran (Pet. App. 106-107). On May 28, 1981, the district court 
also ordered that all pre-judgment attachments obtained in the 
suit against the Iranian defendants be vacated and that further 
proceedings against the bank defendants be stayed (id. at 107). 
2. On April 28, 1981, petitioner filed the instant suit for 
declaratory and injunctive relief against the United States and 
the Secretary of the Treasury, seeking to prevent enforcement of 
the Executive Orders and Treasury Department regulations 
implementing the Agreement with Iran in a way that would 
adversely affect its separate action against the Iranian 
defendants (Pet. App. 1-12). ~hose Executive Orders and 
4 / Petitioner did not obtain a pre-judgment attachment of 
assets of the Government of Iran or AEOI, the two defendants 
against whom judgments were entered. 
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regulations generally revoke licenses for attachments of Iranian 
property, prevent the acQuisition of any interest in such 
property and order the transfer of the property as reQuired by 
the Agreement and Executive Orders, and suspend claims that may 
be presented to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (Executive 
Orders 12277-12281, 12294 (Pet. App. 36-54); 31 C.F.R. 535.201 
(1980); 31 C.F.R. 535.213 et seQ., as amended (Pet. App. 55-
86). Petitioner contended that these Executive Orders and 
regulations are unconstitutional to the extent that they affect 
its final judgment against the Government of Iran and AEOI, 
petitioner's execution on that judgment in the State of 
Washington, petitioner's pre-judgment attachments of assets of 
the Iranian bank defendants, and petitioner's ability to continue 
to litigate against the bank defendants, against whom judgment 
had not been entered (Pet. App. 7-11). 
By order dated May 28, 1981, the district court denied 
petitioner's motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed 
petitioner's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted (Pet. App. 106-107). By order dated June 
8, 1981, the district court stated that its orders denying a 
preliminary injunction and dismissing the complaint were based on 
the arguments presented by the government in its motion to 
dismiss and its memorandum in support of that motion (Pet. App. 
161). The government's motion to dismiss and the memorandum in 
up~ the district court, are 
reproduced at Pet. App. 88-105. 
On June 3, 1981, petitioner filed a notice of appeal from 
the order denying a preliminary injunction and dismissing the 
complaint (Pet. App. 163-164), and the appeal has been docketed 
in the court of appeals (id. at 162). On June 8, 1981, the 
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district court entered an injunction pending appeal preventing 
the federal government from requiring the transfer of Iranian 
property that is subject to any writ of attachment, garnish-ment, 
judgment, levy or lien issued by any court in favor of petitioner 
(Pet. App. 167-168). Petitioner now seeks certiorari before 
judgment to review the decision of the district court. 
3. The decision of the district court in this case, which 
is based on the government's arguments in support of its motion 
to dismiss, is plainly correct. It is also consistent with the 
decisions of the First and District of Columbia Circuits, __ 5_1 the 
only courts of appeals that have addressed the President's 
authority to revoke licenses for post-blocking order attachments 
of Iranian assets, to order the transfer of Iranian assets, and 
to provide for suspension of claims that may be referred to the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. See Chas. T. Main Int'l, 
Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, No. 80-1027 (1st Cir. 
May 22, 1981); American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran, No. 80-1779 (D.C. Cir. May 22, 1981) (opinion filed June 5, 
1981) . _§___/ Decisions of the district courts -- including two -
others in the Ninth Circuit --also have unanimously sustained 
______._;;> 
the authority of the President to revoke licenses for post-
to order the transfer of property 
that had been subject to such attachments. See Security Pacific 
National Bank, et al. v. Government and State of Iran, No. CV 79-
j 5 I None of the losing parties in the First or District of Columbia cases has thQS far sought review in this CoQrt or announced its intention to do so. 
6 I Copies of these opinions are attached as appendices to this 
memorandum. 
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4661-RJK (C.D. Cal. April 30, 1981)._]_} Blount Brothers Corp. 
v. Government of Iran, Civ. Action No. C79-l4424 (W.D. Wash. May 
7, 1981); Unidyne Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 80-1029-
A (E.D. Va. Mar. 30, 1981).~ And, finally, the Ninth Circuit 
has denied a stay pending appeal in the Blount Brothers case of 
an order vacating an attachment, thereby allowing that attachment 
to lapse ._2_} 
Ordinarily, in view of these consistent and plainly correct 
rulings of the lower courts sustaining the President's 
authority,lO I we would not acquiesce in certiorari (particularly 
certiorari before judgment) in a case raising these same 
issues. The government sought to sustain the President's 
authority in the lower courts, as has been done thus far, and 
7 I An appeal has been taken by the claimant in one of these 
fOUr consolidated cases, and the government has moved to 
intervene in the court of appeals ~nd for summary affirmance. 
8 I Copies of these district court opinions were furnished to 
the Court by petitioner in Electronic Data Systems, Iran v. The 
Social Security Organization of Iran, No. 80-2035, cert. deniea 
(June 8, 1981). 
9 I The Ninth Circuit cited the "broad executive powers" 
conferred by the International Economic Emergency Powers Act, 50 
u.s.c. (Supp. III) 1701 et ~· The district court order 
vacating the attachment in Blount Brothers became effective on 
June 6, 1981, when the claimant did not seek further review in 
this Court. 
10 I In its op1n1on of June 7, 1981, the district court in 
Electronic Data Systems, Iran v. The Social Security Organization 
of Iran, et al., No. CA3-79-218-F (N.D. Tex.), concluded that the 
President does not have authority to suspend claims that may be 
referred to arbitration. The district court conceded that there 
was ''ample precedent" for the Executive to settle such claims 
when United States courts recognized a broad doctrine of immunity 
of foreign sovereigns from suit (op. 13), but concluded 
essentially that this power had been implicitly divested by 
passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (op. 13-14, 20-
24). That conclusion is in error. See note 14, infra. 
Moreover, in EDS, the claim had been reduced to judgment before 
the United States entered into the Agreement with Iran, and the 
district court relied in part on the existence of that judgment 
(op. 24). 
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thereby, it was hoped, to eliminate the necessity for review by 
this Court except by way of denial of a petition for certiorari 
or denial of applications for stays of orders vacating 
attachments. However, at the present time, there has still been 
no decision on these questions by the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit. The absence of controlling precedent in that 
circuit is particularly significant, because there are more than 
150 cases involving claims against Iran pending in the Southern 
District of New York, and the largest portion of the financial 
assets held by domestic banking institutions that must be 
transferred by July 19 are in that circuit. On June 5, 1981, 
following promulgation of the latest Treasury regulations, the 
Department of Justice has requested all district courts --
including the Southern District of New York -- where Iranian 
asset cases are pending that these courts vacate orders of 
attachment prior to June 19, 1981. That date is the date on 
which the Department of the Treasury indicated that it would seek 
civil and criminal sanctions against banks that did not transfer 
financial assets to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as 
required by the regulations.ll_) Similarly, on June 9, 1981, the 
government filed a motion in the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit requesting that court to vacate attachments in the 96 
consolidated cases pending there without waiting for further 
proceedings by the district court on remand. See New England 
Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission 
Co., Nos. 790, 1049-1144, 1145-1224, 1225-1227 (2d Cir. April 9, 
11 / See the government's Supplemental Memorandum, filed June 5, 
1981, in Electronic Data Systems, Iran v. The Social Security 
Organization of Iran, supra. 
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1981), slip op. 2436 (retaining jurisdiction of these cases 
pending remand for further proceedings).l2 I 
Principles of sound judicial administration also weigh 
strongly in favor of certiorari before judgment here. There are 
more than 400 cases involving claims against Iran pending in 
district courts around the country. Review by this Court, which 
alone can furnish precedent that will control in all district 
courts, will allow for the orderly disposition of these cases and 
remove any remaining uncertainty about the validity of Executive 
orders and regulations implementing the Agreement with Iran. 
For these reasons, the instant case plainly is one of 
"imperative public importance" req_uiring "immediate settlement in 
this Court" by means of certiorari before judgment. S. Ct. Rule 
18. If the Court grants certiorari in this case, the Department 
of the Treasury will not seek to impose criminal and civil 
sanctions on persons who do not transfer assets to the Federal 
12 I Despite these most recent efforts to obtain a prompt 
decision from the courts in the Southern District of New York and 
the Second Circuit, we cannot be confident that those courts will 
reach a decision within the time req_uired for the timely transfer 
of bank-held assets to the Federal Reserve Bank for subseq_uent 
transfer pursuant to the Agreement with Iran. Moreover, although 
we believe that the decisions of the First and District of 
Columbia Circuits are compelling precedent, if the Second Circuit 
or Southern District should nevertheless conclude that the 
President was without authority in some respects to enter into 
and implement the Agreement with Iran, the government would 
intend to seek immediate review in this Court in order that bank-
held assets would be transferred by July 19. Because the 
Southern District and the Second Circuit have not yet ruled, 
there would be even less time for this Court to consider a 
petition for certiorari in those circumstances than there is 
here. We note as well that there has been no controlling ruling 
on the merits of these q_uestions in the Ninth Circuit, although 
decisions of three district courts in that circuit have sustained 
the President's authority and the Ninth Circuit has denied a stay 
pending appeal in one of the cases. We therefore believe that 
the most prudent course involves immediate review by this Court 
in the instant case, which presents the same issues. 
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Reserve Eank by the June 19 deadline set f orth in the June 4 
revisions of the Treasury regulations (Pet. App. 152). 
4. If the Court concludes that the petition for a writ of 
certiorari before judgment should be granted, the Court may wish 
to consider summary affirmance of the district court's order on 
the basis of the thorough opinions of the Courts of Appeals for 
the First and District of Columbia Circuits in Chas. T. Main 
International, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, et al., 
and American International Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
supra. For the Court's convenience, we are appending copies of 
those opinions to this Memorandum. We are also appending a copy 
of the government's brief in the latter case, which fully sets 
out the arguments in favor of the Presidential action challenged 
here.ll_) Although the questions presented are indisputably of 
major public importance because of the number of claimants and 
cases affected, and plainly require immediate resolution, we 
believe that these questions are not particularly difficult and 
that the attached materials furnish a fully adequate basis on 
which to decide them. See S. Ct. Rule 23.1. 
Petitioner obtained attachments of assets of the Iranian 
bank defendants after November 14, 1979, when President Carter 
issued Executive Order 12170 (44 Fed. Reg. 65729) freezing 
Iranian assets in this country. After issuance of that Executive 
Order, pre-judgment attachments of Iranian assets could only be 
obtained by means of a license obtained from the Treasury. 31 
C.F.R. 535.201, 535.203, 535.310 (1980). The Department of the 
Treasury issued a blanket license for judicial proceedings with 
13 / See also the government is memorandum in support of its 
motion to dismiss the complaint in the district court (Pet. App. 
90-105). 
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respect to Iranian property, including pre-judgment attachments 
(31 C.F.R. 535.418, 535.504(a) (1980)), but entry of a final 
judgment was expressly barred by the regulations (31 C.F.R. 
535.504(b)(l) (1980)). However, such orders and licenses were 
explicitly made revocable at any time (31 C.F.R. 535.805 
(1980). Thus, petitioner was on notice when it obtained its pre-
judgment attachments that the license for such attachments could 
be revoked at any time. See also Orvis v. Brownell, 345 U.S. 
183, 187 (1953). Thus, no unfairness to petitioner resulted when 
the President revoked these licenses and the district court 
ordered the attachments vacated. As explained in the opinions of 
the First and District of Columbia Circuits, the President's 
actions revoking the license for attachments and rendering those 
attachments of no legal effect were plainly authorized by the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). No lower 
court decision has taken a contrary position. 
The First and District of Columbia Circuit opinions also 
amply sustain the power of the President to settle claims against 
Iran by providing for arbitration of those claims, particularly 
in the context of the grave international crisis resulting from 
the seizure of American hostages. See also 22 U.S.C. 1732.l1_} 
Under Executive Order 12294 (Pet. App. 52), petitioner's claim 
against Iran is only suspended pending its presentation to the 
Claims Tribunal; its claim need not be dismissed outright. If 
that Tribunal determines that it does not have jurisdiction of 
14 / Petitioner's contention that the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act implicitly divested the President of his authority 
to settle claims is in error for the reasons given by the First 
Circuit in its Charles T. Main opinion, at 20-21. That Act dealt 
with the question of immunity to suit, not whether the 
plaintiff in a suit against a foreign sovereign has stated a 
claim on which relief could be granted. 
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petitioner's claim, the claim may be react i vated in district 
court (Executive Order 12294, Section 3). If the Tribunal 
determines that petitioner should recover on its claim, that 
determination operates as a discharge of Iran's obligation only 
upon full payment of the award (ibid., Section 4). Thus, 
petitioner's claim in district court would be preserved if the 
award were not paid. 
Hence, the President has provided a reasonable and fully 
ade~uate means for resolving claims against Iran and, consistent 
with the purposes of IEEPA, has assured the presence of funds to 
pay arbitration awards out of the Iranian assets that were frozen 
on November 14, 1979. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the petition for 
a writ of certiorari before judgment should be granted, and the 
judgment of the district court should be affirmed. 
WADE H. McCREE, JR. 
Solicitor General 
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B0-:"2078 01\MJ~S & MOORE v . DONALD '1'. Rio:Cl\N , ~;ECRE'f'l\RY 01-' Tm: 
TREASURY , ET AL . 
The motion of Sperry Corporil Lion, ct ;tl . [ o1: 
leave i...o file il br j ef <lS _amici curiae is <j t·anted. 
The mo-tion of Bank Mu.rkazi In.tn for leave to ittll2l-
vene is granted . The motion of the Islamic RcpuhU c 
of Iran and t h e Atomic Energy Organization of the 
Government of lr~tn for lec1ve to ln tcrvcnt.: <..ts 
respondeni...s is grantl!d . 'l'lte motion of tlw Soli.ci tor 
General to expedite consideration of the petition 
for a writ of certiorari before judgment is qrc1ntcd . 
'l'he petition fc)): <t writ of ccrt iora r i before j uc1~~--
mcnL is yrc1tlLC'd . Tlw t·C:.!qucsl c1f Lhc Solic.il.ur 
General to expcdit~ the schedule for briefing and 
oral argument is granted. 'J.'hc parties shall excll:liHJ·~ 
u.nd f i l opening bricE s by 3: 0 0 p . m. on June 19, L 9 81 
and u.ny reply briefs shall be exchanged and filed by 
3:00 p . m. on June 23, 1981. Oral argument is sat fur 
June 24, 1981 at 10 : 00 a . m. 




June 11, 1981 Conference 
Supplemental List 
No. 80-2078 
DAMES & MOORE 
v. 
REGAN, Sec. of Treasury, 
et al. 
1. Motion by the Bank Markazi 
Iran to Intervene 
2. Motion by Sperry Corp., et al. 
to file an amici brief 
3. Petr's response to SG's motion 
to Expedite 
SUMMARY: The Bank Markazi . Iran seeks leave to intervene as 
a resp. Sperry Corp and Sperry World Trade, Inc. seek leave to 
file an amici brief. Petr concurs in the SG's request for expedition, 
but proposes a different schedule. 
CONTENTIONS: (1) Bank Markazi Iran is the central bank of Iran ·------and holds and regulates the monetary reserves and currency of Iran. 
At the time of the blocking order, Bank Markazi held over $3 billion 
in its New York branch and various commercial banks throughout the 
United States. Bank Markazi argues that it is a real party in interest 
1/A preliminary memorandum was prepared and circulated on 
June 10, 1981. 
I 
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because most of the assets to be transferred on July 19 are its 
assets. Bank Markazi also · claims standing to intervene because 
it was a party to a companion case in the DC. The DC considered 
the companion case at the same time as it considered the case that 
is now before the Court. Therefore, Bank Markazi' s failure to 
formally move to intervene in this action before the DC should not 
be determinative. 
(2) Sperry seeks leave to file an amici brief because it has 
also filed suit against Iran and obtained a prejudgment writ of 
attachment against Iranian assets in this country. Petr consents 
to the filing of the amici brief. 
(3) Petr joins in the request for expedition. However, petr 
suggests that the briefing schedule prop'osed by the SG "is unreasonable 
in light of the significant constitutional issues presented." Petr 
suggests the following ~chedule: 
June 26 - opening briefs filed and exchanged 
June 30 - reply briefs filed and exchanged 
July 2 - oral argument 
DISCUSSION: (1) Intervention in this Court is an extraordinary 
remedy. Intervention will normally be granted "only for the most 
imperative of reasons and where one's interests may otherwise be 
lost." Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court Practice, 5th Ed. page 436. 
Although Bank Markazi is clearly interested in this litigation, 
its interests are not directly at stake. If the Islamic Republic 
of Iran is allowed to intervene (see preliminary memorandum), Iran 





arguments that Bank Markazi wishes to raise that differ from the 
arguments advanced by Iran 'may be presented in an amicus brief. 
(2) Sperry's motion to file an amici brief should be grar.ted. 
The Court is usually liberal in accepting timely amici briefs. 
(3) The only difference between the schedule proposed by the 
petr and the schedule proposed by the SG is that petr advances the 
due date for the initial briefs from June 19 to June 26. The time 
between opening briefs and reply briefs (4 days) is the same as is 
the time between reply briefs and argument (2 days). 
Although the issues are important, petr should be sufficiently 
familiar with the issues to file a meaningful brief by June 19. The 
major advantage of the SG's schedule is that it will allow for argu-








June 11, 1981 Conference 
Supplemental List 
No. 80-2078 
DAMES & MOORE 
v. 
REGAN, Sec. of the Treasury, 
et al. 
1. Petition for Certiorari 
2. Motion of the SG to Expedite 
3. Motion of Islamic Republic 
of Iran, et al. to Intervene 
SUMMARY: Unlike the Electronic Data Systems Corp., Inc. petn 
(80-2035) considered last week, this petn squarely raises the issue 
of whether the President may vacate attachments on Iranian funds and 
transfer said funds to the Central Bank of Algeria on July 19. The 
SG, while defending the President's authority, does not oppose the 
petn and requests that the petn be expedited in order than an opinion 
may issue before the end of the Term. The SG has proposed an expedited 
schedule which the Court may wish to adopt. 
In addition, Iran and the Atomic Energy Organization of the 
government of Iran seek leave to intervene as resps. 
( 
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BACKGROUND: On Nov. 4, 1979, the 
American Embassy in Tehran · was seized ' and its personnel were held 
as hostages. On Nov. 15, 1979, Pre~ident Carter, acting under the 
International Economic Emergency Powers Act ( IEEPA) , 50 U.S~ C. 
§§1701-1706, issued regulations that, inter alia, blocked the removal 
or transfer of Iranian assets in the United States except according 
to the terms of licenses accompanying the blocking order or later 
·issued pursuant to it. See 31 C. F. R. Part 535 (19 80) (this order is 
hereafter referred to as "the blocking order") • Of particular 
importance is 31 C.F.R. §535.203(e) (1980) which states: 
Unless licensed or authorized pursuant 
to this part any attachment, judgment, decree, 
lien, execution, garnishment, or other judi-
cial process is null and void with respect to 
any property in which on or since the effective 
date there existed an interest in Iran. 
In Dec. 1979, petr filed a suit in the DC (Central District 
of California) against Iranian government agencies to collect 
approximately $3,500,000 in unpaid invoices. On Dec. 20, 1979, 
Jan. 4, 1980, Feb. 4, 1980 and May 12, 1980, the DC issued prejudg-
ment writs of attachments against Iranian assets. On Feb. 18, 1981, 
the DC entered a final judgment for $3,788,930.79 plus interest in 
favor of petr. In March two superior courts in the State of 
Washington issued writs of execution and garnishment in enforcement 
of the DC's judgment. Apparently a sheriff's execution sale of 
certain Iranian property in Washington has been noticed. 
Meanwhile, on Jan. 21, 1981, President Carter issued a series 
1/ 
of executive order implementing the Algerian Declarations.- These 
1/These declarations signed by Warren Christopher on Jan. 19, 
1981,-set forth the agreements between the United States, Algeria 
and Iran which led to the release of the hostages. The declarations 
are set forth as Exhibit D at pages 21 through 35 of the appendix to 
the petn. 
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Executive Orders (Nos. 12,279, 12,280, 12,281) nullified attach-
ments on Iranian property in the Unite'd States. They also required 
persons holding such assets to transfer the assets to the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York and provided that persons who transferred 
the assets would not be held liable for such actions. 
On Feb. 24, 1981, President Reagan issued Executive Order 
12,294. This Order ratified the Executive Orders issued by 
President Carter and "suspended" all claims against Iranian assets. 
The Order and the regulations promulgated by the Treasury Department 
implementing the order require that all claims be presented to the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal provided for in the Algerian 
Declarations. In furtherance of the Algerian Declarations, the 
United States apparently intends to tran'sfer some $4 billion of 
Iranian assets to the Central Bank of Algeria on or before July 19, 
1981. 
Petr felt that the United States' acts were interfering with 
its prosecution of petr'·s claims and therefore filed a second action 
in the DC. Petr requested: (1) a preliminary and permanent injunc-
tion enjoining the government from interfering with petr's actions 
again?t Iran; and (2) a declaratory judgment that the Algerian 
Declarations and the Executive Orders and regulations purporting 
to implement the Declarations, to the extent that they authorized 
interference with petrs' actions, were beyond the constitutional 
and statutory powers of the President and therefore void. 
Petr moved for a preliminary injunction and the government 
sought dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief 





liminary injunction and granted the government's motion to 
dismiss. Petr filed a notice of appeal to the CA 9 on June 3 
and on June 8, the DC granted petr a stay prohibiting the 
government from transferring, pending appeal, any Iranian assets 
which are subject to a writ of attachment, garnishment, judgment 
or lien in favor of petr. 
On June 10, petr filed the petn for prejudgment writ of cert 
at bar. 
Both the CA 1 and the CADC have considered the President's 
authority to suspend claims against Iranian assets and to transfer 
those assets out of the country and both courts held that the 
President has such authority. Chas. T. Main International, Inc. 
v. Khuzestan Water and Power Authority, · F.2d (CA 1, May 22, 
1981) and American International Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran, F.2d (CADC, June 5, 1981). Both courts issued lengthy 
opinions explaining their judgments. However, the claimants in 
those actions have yet to seek review in this Court. 
In another case in the DC for the C~ntral District of California, 
Security Pacific National Bank v. Government and State of Iran, 
No. Cv. 79-4661-RJK (CD Cal., Apr. 30, 1981), Judge Kelleher 
apparently held that the IEEPA authorized the vacation of attach-
ments and the dismissal of pending claims. 
Perhaps the most important action is pending in the CA 2. New 
England Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power Generation and 
Transmission Co., Nos. 1049, et al., consists of some 96 consolidated 
cases in which the government seeks to have attachments vacated. 







Finally, as the Court knows, the DC for the DC of Texas 
has enjoined the government, from transferring Iranian assets that 
are subject to writs of attachments issued before the blocking 
I 
order of Nov. 15, 1979. The case is preseritly before the CA 5 
and the Supreme Court has denied a petn for prejudgment review. 
Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. Social Secu~ity Organization of 
Iran, No. 80-2035, cert denied June 8, 1981. In the case at bar 
the initial lawsuit was filed, and the writs of attachment issued, 
after the blocking order. 
PETR'S CONTENTIONS: Petr recognizes that a prejudgment writ 
will only issue "upon a showing that the case is of such imperative 
public importance as to justify the deviation from normal appellate 
practice and to require immediate settlement in this Court." Petr 
argues that the case presents novel and fundamental questions of 
law going to the core of the separation of powers set forth in the 
Constitution. Furthermore, time is truly of the essence because: 
(a) by June 19, all Iranian assets must be transferred to the Federal 
Reserve Bank; and (b) by July 19, the government will transfer these 
assets out of the country. 
Basically, petr argues that the President does not have the 
authority either pursuant to statute or pursuant to his inherent 
power over foreign affairs to compromise the legal rights and property 
interests of private citizens, particularly where as here the citizens 
have pursued judicial proceedings authorized by Congress. This 
requires a determination of (a) what the Executive Orders and 
regulations really do; (b) the authority conferred on the President 
by IEEPA, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and possibly the 
.. 
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Hostage Act of 1868, 22 u.s.c. §1732 (1976); (c) the President's 
inherent power to control foreign aff~irs; and (d) the nature of 
petr's interest affected by the Executive Orders and regulations. 
THE GOVERNMENT'S MOTION TO EXPEDITE: In order that the govern-
ment can meet its obligation to transfer the assets by July 19, the 
SG requests that the Court expedite its consideration of the petn. 
The SG acquiesces in the grant of the writ and suggests that, if 
the Court does not summarily affirm, the Court adopt an emergency 
briefing schedule. The SG suggests the following schedule: 
June 19 - 3:00 p.m. - Opening briefs by each party 
filed and served by hand on 
opposing parties 
June 2 3 - 3: 0 0 p.m .. - Reply briefs by each party 
filed and served by hand on 
opposing ' parties 
June 25 - Oral argument 
To facilitate such a schedule, the SG recommends (a) that the Court 
immediately announce its decision on scheduling; and (b) that the 
requirement for printing the briefs and the joint appendix be 
temporarily lifted and the appendix and briefs be accepted in type-
written form. 
The SG explains that in order to comply with the July 19 deadline, 
the government will need at least seven days after this Court's 
opinion (assuming it is favorable to the g~vernment) to settle the 
numerous pending cases and arrange for the transfer. 
IRAN'S MOTION TO INTERVENE: The Islamic Republic of Iran and 
the Atomic Energy Orgnization of Iran (AEOI) seek leave to intervene 
as resps because: (1) the assets in issue belong to Iran; (2) petr's 
.. 
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underlying judgment is against AEOI; and (3) Iran's interests differ 
from the government's. Iran alleges that the judgment against 
AEOI was entered unlawfully after the Algerian Declarations were 
agreed to and after President Carter issued Executive Orders 
implementing the Declarations. Iran has an immediate ownership 
interest in the assets and will be the beneficiary of the transfer 
of the assets. The government, on the other hand, merely wishes 
to make a good faith effort to comply with the Declarations. Iran 
suggests that its presence as a resp is essential to insure that 
the Court is presented with a complete picture of the Iranian assets 
controversy. 
Iran and AEOI have tendered their brief in·acquiescence to 
the petn for cert. The government does not oppose the motion. 
DISCUSSION: 1. Merits. This petn presents truly novel issues. 
The Executive Orders and the regulations in issue require that 
private citizens release their claims to certain Iranian assets in 
this country and forego judicial remedies at least temporarily in 
favor of their resolution by an internation tribunal. Even assuming 
that the President clearly had the authority to promulgate these 
changes, their scope mandates an opinion from this Court. Furthermore, 
however clear the outcome, the issues are fairly complex (the CADC's 
opinion covers 46 pages and the CAl's opinion covers 25 legal-size 
pages). This Court's interpretation of (a) the Executive Orders 
and the regulations; (b) two or three statutes authorizing the 
President to decide particular issues of foreign affairs; (c) the 
scope of the President's inherent power- over foreign affairs; and 
( 
~ 
(d) the nature of petr's interest in the Iranian assets will control not 
only the 400 Iranian assets cases but will also establish the' guidelines 
( 
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for numerous future cases. As the country becomes increasingly involved 
in international business and affairs, the federal courts can expect 
to be called upon to resolve conflicts between citizens, the govern-
ment and foreign ·countries. Petr compares the importance of this 
case to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 u. S. 579 (1972). 
While this may be an overstatement, the case does appear to deserve 
plenary consideration. 
2. Expedition. The July 19 deadline for the transfer of 
assets presents a very real emergency. The loss of the funds will 
irreparably harm petr and petr is powerless to avoid that harm. 
The government must either transfer the funds or face an international 
crisis. Theoretically the government and Iran could agree to extend 
the deadline but considering the relationship between the two 
countries, this is merely wishful thinking. Now that the controversy 
is squarely before the Court, the Court has a responsibility to 
resolve it before July 19. 
As the novelty, importance and complexity of the issues pre-
sented appear to rule out summary affirmance or reversal, the adoption 
of the SG's proposed schedule appears reasonable. The complexity of 
the issues suggests that a further reduction in briefing time would 
not be productive. However, as all parties are familiar with the 
issues and have the benefit of the opinions by the CA 1 and the CADC, 
they should be able to prepare meaningful briefs within the time 
allotted. 
The Court may wish to tentatively schedule argument for July 25. 
This will allow preparation for argument· and should the Court sub-
sequently determine that argument is not warranted, the argument 
date can always be vacated. .. 
/ 
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3. Intervention. Although intervention in this Court is a 
remedy seldom invoked and rarely -grant'ed (see Stern & Gressman, 
Supreme Court Practice, 5th Ed., pages 433-438), the Court may 
wish to grant Iran and AEOI leave to intervene. The intervenors 
are parties to two parallel cases below. However, petr chose to 
seek cert on the action against the government. Iran and AEOI's 
interests in the action differ fundamentally from the government's. 
The government may ·wish to adhere to the Algerian Declarations but 
it has not real interest in the assets. Iran has an immediate 
ownership interest in the funds, regardless of the legality of the 
Declarations. Furthermore, if Iran and AEOI are allowed to intervene, 
as far as American law is concerned, they will be bound by the 
Court's decision. 
Should the Court determine not to grant the motion to intervene, 
Iran and AEOI should be allowed to file an amici brief. 
CONCLUSION: The novelty, importance and complexity of the 
issues presented recommend that the Court grant the writ and give 
the case plenary consideration. The July 19 transfer date recommends 
that the Court adopt the abbreviated briefing schedule proposed by 
the SG. Iran's and AEOI's unique interests in the litigation and 
the advantages inherent in binding them to the Court's decision 
suggest that they be granted leave to intervene as resps. 
To facilitate consideration, this office in conjunction with 
the Clerk's office has presumed to prepare alternate proposed orders 
which are attached to the memorandum. 
6/10/81 Schickele 





PROPOSED ORDER IN: 
Dames & Moore v. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury, et al., 
No. 80-1078 
The Motion of Islamic Republic of Iran and the Atomic 
Energy Organization of Iran for leave to intervene as. a party 
respondent is denied. (or granted} The petition for a writ 
of certiorari is granted. The motion of the Solicitor General 
for an expedited schedule is granted. The parties shall 
exchange and file opening briefs by 3:00 p.m. on June 19, 1981 
and any reply briefs shall be exchanged and filed by 3:00 p.m. 
on June 23, 1981. Oral argument is set for June 25, 1981 at 
10:00 a.m. 
OR 
The motion of Islamic Republic of Iran and the Atomic 
Energy Organization of Iran for leave to' intervene as a party 
respondent is denied. (or granted} The petition for a writ 
of certiorari is granted. The motion of the Solicitor General 
for an expedited schedule is granted. The parties shall 
exchange and file opening briefs by 3:00 p.m. on June 19, 1981 
and any reply briefs shall be exchanged and filed by 3:00 p.m. 
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FOR THE UNITED STATES 
JAMES E. PATTERSON, 
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v. 
HANS J. SCHACHT, OTIS J. 
ABERNATHY, JAMES LEWIS, 
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2200 First National Bank Tower 
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Theodore G. Frankel 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
FOR THE UNITED STATES 
JAMES E. PATTERSON, 
Appellant-Petitioner, 
v. 
HANS J. SCHACHT, OTIS J. 
ABERNATHY, JAMES LEWIS, 
RALPH JOHNSON, NEIL 
GUNTER, WESLEY BOYD HINCHEY, 
KENNETH GORDON, THEODORE 
FRANKEL, and THE UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, 
Appellees-Respondents, 
NO. 80-6657 
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL 
Appellee-Respondent THEODORE G. FRANKEL {hereinafter 
"Frankel") respectfully moves this Court to Dismiss the Appeal 
of Appellant-Respondent JAMES E. PATTERSON (hereinafter 
"Patterson"), on the ground that the Appeal is not made in 
conformity with the Rules of this Court and on the further 
ground that the Appeal is frivolous and incomprehensible. 
Rule 12 requires an Appeal to be docketed not more 
than 90 days after the entry of the judgment appealed from. 
The judgment appealed from in this case was entered on December 
29, 1980 and the case was not docketed in this Court until 
April 9, 1981, a total of 101 days after the entry of 
judgment. The Appeal, therefore, should be dismissed as not 
timely filed. 
If this Appeal is treated as a Writ of Certiorari, it 
is untimely under Rule 20. Rule 20 requires that the Writ be 
applied for within 60 days of the judgment sought to be 
reviewed and this time limit may not be extended for more than 
30 days. 
Rule 15 has to do with the form of the Jurisdictional 
Statement filed with the Court. Section .l(a) requires that 
all questions be presented in a short and concise manner 
without unnecessary detail. Patterson's jurisdictional 
statement is long, rambling and at times unintelligible. 
Section .l(b) requires a list of parties within the 
Jurisdictional Statement if the parties are not listed in the 
caption. Patterson is inconsistent with the list of parties in 
his various captions~ it is not clear who the parties are. At 
least one "party" Jeffrey Smith was not a party below. 
Section .l(e) requires a concise statement of the grounds 
alleged for jurisdiction. Patterson's alleged grounds for 
jurisdiction are rambling, unclear a~d unintelligible. 
Since the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia is a party, Patterson failed to 
comply with Rule 28 by failing to serve the Solictor General, 
Department of Justice. 
There are numerous, less serious violations of · the 
Rules of this Court. 
Aside from violations of the Rules of the Court, 
Patterson's Appeal is frivolous, incoherent, unintelligible, 
and not subject to a rational response. 
For the foregoing reasons, Frankel respectfully 
requests this Court to dismiss Patterson's Appeal, and if the 
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Court should deem Patterson's filing to be a Petition for 
Certiorari, that this Court deny the Petition. 
This /tJtP day of June, 1981. 
OF COUNSEL: 
TROTTER, BONDURANT, MILLER 
& HISHON 
2200 First National Bank Tower 




Attorney fo pellee-Respondent 
Theodore G. Frankel 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, William E. Hoffmann, Jr., do hereby certify that I 
have this day served the within and foregoing pleadings by 
mailing a copy thereof to counsel of record in an envelope 
properly stamped and addressed as follows: 
James E. Patterson 
1004 Vernon Street 
LaGrange, Georgia 30240 
Robert J. Castellani, Esq. 
u. s. Attorney 
Room 428 
U. S. Courthouse 
Atlanta, Georgia 30303 
John M. Taylor, Esq. 
Lewis, Hunnicutt, Taylor & Daniel, P.C. 
304 Church Street 
P. 0. Box 1027 
LaGrange, Georgia 30240 
Steven E. Fanning, Esq. 
Attorney-at-Law 
32 South Court Square 
P. o. Box 220 
LaGrange, Georgia 30263 
Linda R. Birrell, Esq. 
Ga. Assistant Attorney General 
132 State Judicial Bldg. 
Atlanta, Georgia 30334 
Mr. Jerry Willis 
P. o. Box 508 
LaGrange, Georgia 30241 
Solicitor General 
Department of Justice 
Washington, D. C. 20530 
This ~ day of June, 1981. 
No. 80-2078 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
October Term, 1980 
DAMES & MOORE, a partnership, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DONALD T. REGAN, THE SECRETARY OF THE 
TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Respondents, 
and 
BANK MARKAZI IRAN, THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 
OF IRAN and THE ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANIZATION 
OF IRAN, 
Intervenors. 
MOTION OF 26 IRANIAN BANKS, DEFENDANTS 
IN DAMES & MOORE V. ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANIZATION 
OF IRAN, TO INTERVENE 
1/ 
The movants, 26 Iranian commercial banks- which are all 
named parties defendant in the underlying Dames & Moore action 
described in the petition for certiorari herein, move for leave 
1/ 
- Bank Melli Iran, Industrial Credit Bank, Industrial and Mining 
Development Bank of Iran, International Bank of Iran, Agricultural 
Development Bank of Iran, Bank of Tehran, Agricultural Cooperative 
Bank of Iran, Bank Bazargani Iran, Bank Bimeh Iran, Bank Iranshahr, 
Bank Dariush, Bank Kar, The Bank of Iran and the Middle East, Bank 
of Omran, Bank Pars, Bank Rafah Kargaran, Bank Sakhteman, Bank Sanaye 
Iran, Bank Sepah, Bank Shahryar, Banque Etebarate Iran, Development 
and Investment Bank of Iran, Distributors Cooperative Credit Bank, 
The Foreign Trade Bank of Iran, Iranians' Bank, and Mortage Bank 
of I ran. 
to intervene in the present case, scheduled for argument before 
this Court on June 24. 
Statement 
The 26 moving bank defendants were among the 30 Iranian 
defendants named by petitioner in Dames & Moore v. Atomic Energy 
Organization of Iran, No. CV-79-04198 LEW (Px), brought in the 
United States District Court for the Central District of California 
in 1979. Among the other named defendants in this underlying action 
was Bank Markazi Iran, whose motion to intervene in the present case 
has already been granted by this Court. Like Bank Markazi Iran, the 
moving bank defendants were among the parties whose assets were 
attached pursuant to writs issued by Judge Waters. 
In the underlying Dames & Moore action, the moving bank defen-
dants challenged subject matter and personal jurisdiction, as well 
as the propriety of the writs of attachment issued against their 
assets. And, following the Algerian Declarations, they argued to 
Judge Waters the validity and applicability of the Declarations and 
ensuing executive orders. The present action against Secretary Regan 
and the United States was commenced by Dames & Moore on April 28, 
1981. While the moving bank defendants, like Bank Markazi Iran, were 
not technically parties in the present action, because of its clear 
implications for their interests and position, fourteen of the moving 
bank defendants -- those who had been served with process in the 
underlying action -- were granted leave by Judge Waters to partici-
pate in the litigation~ and they did in fact participate below. 
-2-
Argument 
THE MOTION TO INTERVENE SHOULD BE GRANTED 
The 26 moving bank defendants were all named as parties 
defendant in the underlying Dames & Moore litigation and have 
participated at every stage in the proceedings. Judge Waters 
ruled that the moving bank defendants were subject to the juris-
diction of the District Court and made their assets subject to 
attachment. Later, in the related action brought by Dames & 
Moore against Secretary Regan and the United States, the court 
vacated the attachments against property of the moving bank de-
fendants and stayed proceedings in the underlying action. The 
moving bank defendants will be directly affected by this Court's 
determination of the present action. 
Moreover, although the present action is the only Iranian 
assets litigation now before this Court, the Court's decision 
will control proceedings in over 100 other suits in which the 
moving banks or similarly situated Iranian commercial banks were 
named as defendants and had their assets attached. These include 
several in which the issues now before the Court have been ruled 
upon. The moving bank defendants briefed and argued the appeals 
in the Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and Second 
Circuits, and were heard earlier this month in the Iranian assets 
proceeding before United States District Judge Kevin T. Duffy in 
New York. 
In the present action, the Court has already granted the 
motion of Bank Markazi Iran to intervene. The moving bank de-
fendants are similarly situated, being co-defendants of Bank 
- 3-
Markazi Iran in the underlying action and would be equally 
affected by t his Court's determination. Moreover, unlike 
Bank Markazi Iran and other i ntervenors, the moving bank 
defendants actually participated in Dames & Moore's suit 
against Secretary Regan and the United States, through the 
filing of their own brief. 
Conclusion 
We urge the Court to grant this motion to intervene. We 
are prepared to meet the briefing schedule set by the Court and 
to present oral argument on June 24. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Daniel P. Levitt 
Michael S. Oberman 
Greg A. Danilow 
Alan R. Friedman 
Kramer, Levin, Nessen, Kamin & Soll 
Attorneys for 26 Iranians Banks 
919 Third Avenue 
New York, New York 10022 
(212) 688-1100 
Robert A. Seefried 
Allan s. Hoffman 
Seymour, Seefried & Hoffman 
1901 L Street, N.W. 
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TWX: 910-321-3056 
June 16, 1981 
BY HAND 
Mr. Alexander L. Stevas 
Clerk of the United States Supreme Court 
1 First Street, N.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Re: Dames & Moore v. Donald T. 
No. 80-2078 
Dear Mr. Stevas: 
Regan, 
RECEIVED 
JUN 1 6 1981 
OFFiet'tlr7t~~tlfK 
SUPREME COU RT, U.S. 
TUTTLE & TAYLOR 
1901 L STREET, N . W., SUITE 805 
WASHINGTON, D . c. 20036 
(2021 661-0666 
et al., 
In connection with the above-referenced matter, we 
respectfully lodge copies of the following two opinions: 
(1) the Opinion filed June 11, 1981 by Judge Duffy of the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York in The Marschalk Company, Inc. v. Iran National Airlines 
Corp., et al. [79 C1v. 7035 (CBM)]; and (2) the Memorandum 
Opinion and Order and Judgment filed June 7, 1981 by Judge 
Porter of the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Texas in Electronic Data Systems Corporation, 
Iran v. The Social Secur1ty Organization 9f the Government of 
Iran, et al • . (No. ~A3-79-218-F). 
We are providing copies of this letter to counsel of 
record for the United States and for intervenors the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and Bank Markazi. 
CSH:cb 
Enclosures 
Very truly yours, 
TUTTLE & TAYLOR 
c. S.J.,.-k-H~ 
By 
C. Stephen Howard 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Dames & Moore 
"' 
lfp/ss 6/16/81 
80-2078 Dames & M.oore v. Regan and the United States 
This brief memo for the file is dictated to record 
my initial impressions of CADC's opinion in the American 
International Group and Pfizer cases. 
CADC's judgment order, entered May 22, and 
followed on June 5 with its opinion, (i) vacated all 
outstanding attachments and prejudgment restrains (the 
attachments having been obtained pursuant to revocable 
licenses); (ii) remanded the cases with instructions to stay 
further proceedings; and (iii) denied the government's 
request to vacate the award of partial summary judgments. 
Following seizure of the hostages, and on November 
15, 1979, the President - acting under the International 
Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA), issued regulations 
blocking the removal or transfer of Iranian assets except 
according to the term of licenses. Apparently a general 
license was issued authorizing judicial proceedings against 
Iran, with some exceptions. 
CADC's opinion (p. 9) contains an excerpt from an 
affidavit by Secretary Haig that warned, should the courts 
refuse to free the Iranian assets "the whole structure of 
the agreements may begin to crumble, and there could be set 
in motion a series of ~ctions and reactions that would have 
serious consequences have both for the claimants and for the 
,, 
2. 
foreign policy of the United States". I would like to see 
Haig's entire statement. I wonder what serious consequences 
could result, since we now both the hostages and the assets. 
We made the agreement under the most lawless sort of 
coercion and blackmail. In the private world, it would be a 
nullity • . .,. 
~~".' -. Part II of CADC's opinion involved a request that 
the cases be remanded to the District Court. It is 
presently irrelevant. 
Part III addresses, and rejects, the argument that 
the agreement with Iran - not having been approved by the 
Congress - violated the separation of powers doctrine. ~ If 
indeed IEEPA can fairly be read as authorizing the President 
to do what he has done, there would be no violation. The 
question I would like to have examined carefully by my 
clerks is whether IEEPA does so authorize the President. 
·':;t;"y,tll; '' .i!:,fi' Suppose, to take a hypothetical, that Libya had 
seized Billy Carter (his beer formula and all), and that in 
order to free his brother, the President declared an 
emergency, and agreed to the release of all Libyan assets in 
the United States - with American claims to be resolved by a 
three party tribunal composed of a KGB agent, a North 
Vietnamese commissar and Jane Fonda? If the Act gives a 
President power as broad as he exercied where 53 hostages 
were involved, and where an argument can be made that the 








authorized such action, where does this power end? Who has 
authority to determine whether an emergency did in fact 
exist? Who has authority to decide whether the ransom - in 
this came release of $4 billion of Iranian assets - was fair 
and reasonable in the circumstances? Putting it differently 
does the President have an absolute, unreviewable right to 
do what Carter did?* 
r' 
Part IV holds that the President had authority to 
revoke licenses issued that permitted prejudgment restraints 
(attachments) upon Iranian assets. The President vacated 
the attachments and -pursuant to §1702(a) (1) of IEEPA-
nullified the judgments in those cases. I suppose if IEEPA 
is valid, revocation of the licenses would be valid also. 
It is said that the licenses were revocable. I suppose we 
should check that. 
*My fiypotnetical may not be too good an example. From what 
one reads in the press, President Carter would have been 
glad to leave Billy in Libya - indefinitely. 
4. 
·~ Part v holds that the President also had authority 
"to suspend the claims of appellees (all American claimants 
against Iran). The opinion, at this point, is talking 
primarily about President Reagan's Executive Order 12294 of 
February 24, 1981. That order stated that "all claims which 
may be presented to the Claims Tribunal [are] suspended ••• " , , 
·~· ... eilr.· . . ·.r . . l::.'!i <. 
:'C" :· . CADC emphasized that the President did not order r 
litigation suspended or that the power of the courts 
consider claims be suspended. Rather, "he acted with 
respect to the claims only". Therefore, no action was taken 
to modify or affect the jurisdiction of the courts, only the 
"substantive rule of law" was modified by the order. p. 24 • . 
Putting it differently, CADC said: 
"We are persuaded that the difference between 
modifying federal court jursidction and 
directing the courts to apply a different 
rule of law on appeal is a meaningful one." 
p. 25 
The opinion repeatedly emphasized that the order •;' 
"modified the law" - I suppose by suspending the claims so 
that the assets could be freed. See pp. 26-27. ;*'~''' 
In sustaining the President's power to do 
CADC noted that there was "only suspension, not 
cancellation", and that the President "has provided an 
alternative fo~urn capable of providing meaningful relief". 




such inherent power". p. 27. ' It should be noted here that 
the court's decision was based on inherent power, and not on 
IEEPA. In reaching this conclusion, CADC expressed 
agreement with CAl. See fn. 15, p. 27,28. lf?f~:~~·~r~: 
Without reading the cases, I have no basis for ~ 
agreeing or disagreeing with CADC - except a high level of 
skepticism. This does seem to me to be a rather t 
extraordinary view of presidential power: that a President, 
after declaring some emergency - not necessarily an IEEPA 
emergency - may by executive fiat change substantive law. ~ 
Suppose there were a federal statute that expressly forbade 
a President from doing what has been done in this case. I 
would hardly think any President, by virtue of inherent 
power, could suspend the operation. A first reading 
CADC's opinion on this issue leaves me less than ' 
enthusiastic. I would like enlightenment 
Part VI considers the "taking issue", concludes 
" 
that it is not ripe, that there has been no taking up to 
this point, and that there may well be a right to sue in the 
Court of Claims - probably under the Tucker Act. 
I would like for a clerk to develop a memorandum 
on this issue. Pages 37-42 of CADC's opinion are relevant. 
The memorandum should state exactly what CAl and CADC have 
said with respect to compensation, and should recommend what 
we should say or hold on this issue. One can predict with a 
' i! 






fair degree of certainty that once the Ayatollah gets the 
assets out of the United States, there will be substantial 
shortfalls in the settlement of just debts. 
6. 
CADC may well be right in concluding that the 
taking issue is not before the court if we should hold that 
the President had the power to free the attached assets, 
return them to Iran, and commit American creditors to 
present their claims to a stacked tribunal - with no 
provision in the agreement or any present order (as I 
understand it) for recovery from the United States of unpaid 
just claims. 
* * * 
I add one further question: Is it not true that ~ 
Congress enacted all of the relevant statutes to protect and 
greserve the rights of u.s. citizens against foreign 
governments where assets were subject to the jurisdiction of 
our courts? If so, do these statutes also authorize a 
President to use the power granted to endanger - if not 
nullify such rights? What does the legislative history 
reveal? 






80-2078 Dames & Moore v. Regan and the United States 
This brief memo for the file is dictated to record 
my initial impressions of CADC's opinion in the American 
International Group and Pfizer cases. 
CADC's judgment order, entered May 22, and 
followed on June 5 with its opinion, (i) vacated all 
outstanding attachments and prejudgment restrains (the 
attachments having been obtained pursuant to revocable 
licenses): (ii) remanded the cases with instructions to stay 
further proceedings~ and (iii) denied the government's 
request to vacate the award of partial summary judgments. 
Following seizure of the hostages, and on November 
15, 1979, the President - acting under the International 
Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) , issued regulations 
blocking the removal or transfer of Iranian assets except 
according to the term of licenses. Apparently a general 
license was issued authorizing judicial proceedings against 
Iran, with some exceptions. 
CADC's opinion (p. 9) contains an excerpt from an 
affidavit by Secretary Haig that warned, should the courts 
refuse to free the Iranian assets "the whole structure of 
the agreements may begin to crumble, and there could be set 
in motion a series of actions and reactions that would have 
serious consequences have both for the claimants and for the 
2. 
foreign policy of the United States". I would like to see 
Haig's entire statement. I wonder what serious consequences 
could result, since we now both the hostages and the assets. 
We made the agreement under the most lawless sort of 
coercion and blackmail. In the private world, it would be a 
nullity. 
Part II of CADC's opinion involved a request that 
the cases be remanded to the District Court. It is 
presently irrelevant. 
Part III addresses, and rejects, the argument that 
the agreement with Iran - not having been approved by the 
Congress - violated the separation of powers doctrine. If 
indeed IEEPA can fairly be read as authorizing the President 
to do what he has done, there would be no violation. The 
question I would like to have examined carefully by my 
clerks is whether IEEPA does so authorize the President. 
Suppose, to take a hypothetical, that Libya had 
seized Billy Carter (his beer formula and all), and that in 
\ 
order to free his brother, the President declared an 
emergency, and agreed to the release of all Libyan assets in 
the United States - with American claims to be resolved by a 
three party tribunal composed of a KGB agent, a North 
Vietnamese commissar and Jane Fonda? If the Act gives a 
President power as broad as he exercied where 53 hostages 
were involved, and where an argument can be made that the 
agreement was not wholly irrational if Congress had 
' ' ' 
3. 
authorized such action, where does this power end? Who has 
authority to determine whether an emergency did in fact 
exist? Who has authority to decide whether the ransom - in 
this came release of $4 billion of Iranian assets - was fair 
and reasonable in the circumstances? Putting it differently 
does the President have an absolute, unreviewable right to 
do what Carter did?* 
Part IV holds that the President had authority to 
revoke licenses issued that permitted prejudgment restraints 
(attachments} upon Iranian assets. The President vacated 
the attachments and- pursuant to §1702(a} (1} of IEEPA-
nullified the judgments in those cases. I suppose if IEEPA 
is valid, revocation of the licenses would be valid also. 
It is said that the licenses were revocable. I suppose we 
should check that. 
*My hypothetical may not be too good an example. From what 
one reads in the press, President Carter would have been 
glad to leave Billy in Libya - indefinitely. 
4. 
Part V holds that the President also had authority 
"to suspend the claims of appellees (all American claimants 
against Iran). The opinion, at this point, is talking 
primarily about President Reagan's Executive Order 12294 of 
February 24, 1981. That order stated that "all claims which 
may be presented to the Claims Tribunal [are] suspended ..• " 
CADC emphasized that the President did not order 
litigation suspended or that the power of the courts to 
consider claims be suspended. Rather, "he acted with 
respect to the claims only". Therefore, no action was taken 
to modify or affect the jurisdiction of the courts, only the 
"substantive rule of law" was modified by the order. p. 24. 
Putting it differently, CADC said: 
"We are persuaded that the difference between 
modifying federal court jursidction and 
directing the courts to apply a different 
rule of law on appeal is a meaningful one." 
p. 25 
The opinion repeatedly emphasized that the order 
"modified the law" - I suppose by suspending the claims so 
that the assets could be freed. See pp. 26-27. 
In sustaining the President's power to do this, 
CADC noted that there was "only suspension, not 
cancellation", and that the President "has provided an 
alternative forum capable of providing meaningful relief". 
CADC accordingly "concluded that the President did possess 
5. 
such inherent power". p. 27. It should be noted here that 
the court's decision was based on inherent power, and not on 
IEEPA. In reaching this conclusion, CADC expressed 
agreement with CAl. See fn. 15, p. 27,28. 
Without reading the cases, I have no basis for 
agreeing or disagreeing with CADC - except a high level of 
skepticism. This does seem to me to be a rather 
extraordinary view of presidential power: that a President, 
after declaring some emergency - not necessarily an IEEPA 
emergency - may by executive fiat change substantive law. 
Suppose there were a federal statute that expressly forbade 
a President from doing what has been done in this case. I 
would hardly think any President, by virtue of inherent 
power, could suspend the operation. A first reading of 
CADC's opinion on this issue leaves me less than 
enthusiastic. I would like enlightenment from my clerk. 
Part VI considers the "taking issue", concludes 
that it is not ripe, that there has been no taking up to 
this point, and that there may well be a right to sue in the 
Court of Claims - probably under the Tucker Act. 
I would like for a clerk to develop a memorandum 
on this issue. Pages 37-42 of CADC's opinion are relevant. 
The memorandum should state exactly what CAl and CADC have 
said with respect to compensation, and should recommend what 
we should say or hold on this issue. One can predict with a 
fair degree of certainty that once the Ayatollah gets the 
assets out of the United States, there will be substantial 
shortfalls in the settlement of just debts. 
6. 
CADC may well be right in concluding that the 
taking issue is not before the court if we should hold that 
the President had the power to free the attached assets, 
return them to Iran, and commit American creditors to 
present their claims to a stacked tribunal - with no 
provision in the agreement or any present order (as I 
understand it} for recovery from the United States of unpaid 
just claims. 
* * * 
I add one further question: Is it not true that 
Congress enacted all of the relevant statutes to protect and 
preserve ~he rights of u.s. citizens against foreign 
governments where assets were subject to the jurisdiction of 
our courts? If so, do these statutes also authorize a 
President to use the power granted to endanger - if not 






80-2078 Iranian Case 
At the Conference scheduled for June 18 we have a 
request from the Second Circuit to receive certification of 
questions in the above case. This is styled No. 80-2126 
Iran National Air Lines v. Marschalk. The papers include a 
very long list of lawyers and the names of parties whom they 
represent. 
Both Peter Byrne, Sally and I have reviewed this 
list with some care. We find no company in which there is 
any stock ownership problem. But United Virginia Bank is 
listed among the clients of Coubert Bros. as party to a case 
against Industrial Credit Bank of Iran - I suppose this is 
one of the cases pending in CA2. 
In a talk this afternoon with Bob Buford, general 
counsel for UVB, I find that there is no problem. UVB, to 
the extent of $4,000,000 was in a consortium of bank that 
lent several hundred million dollars to Iran or some 
government agency there. UVB was not one of the lead banks, 
but merely took a relatively small participation in the 
loan. But UVB has been paid in full, and Bob thinks that 
only the lead banks retain a pecuniary interest in the case. 
We discussed the possibility of a claim being made in the 
event Iran wins, to reinstate the loan - i.e. to return the 
$4,000,000 that in fact is owned by UVB. Bob says no such 
·,. 
.. ' 
claim has been made, none is expected and he thinks it is 
wholly improbable that any such claim can or would be 
asserted. 
In short he saw no reason to notify me of any 
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No. 80-2078 
ALEXANDER L. STEVAS, 
CLERK 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OCTOBER TERM, 1980 
DAMES & MOORE, a Partnership, Petitioner, 
v. 
DONALD T. REGAN, ET AL., Respondents. 
On Petition for Writ Of Certiorari 
To The United States Court of Appeals 
For The Ninth Circuit 
MOTION TO PARTICIPATE AS AMICUS CURIAE 
AT ORAL ARGUMENT AND FOR AN ENLARGEMENT 
OF TIME FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Electronic Data Systems Corporation Iran ("EDS") 
respectfully moves this Court for leave to present oral argu-
ment as amicus curia~/ in this case pursuant to Rule 38, 
subdivisions 3, 4 and 7 of the Rules of this Court, and, for 
this purpose, for an enlargement by ten minutes of the time 
set for oral argument. 
This Court granted certiorari in the instant case 
which presents three expansive questions of extraordinary 
national importance involving some of the most serious 
*/ EDS will file a motion for leave to file a brief amicus 
curiae together with the accompanying brief in this case, 
pursuant to Rule 36 of this Court, by 3:00 p.m. on June 19, 
the time established by this Court for the simultaneous 
filing and exchange of briefs. 
EDS is a subsidiary of E.D.S. World Corporation, 
whose parent is Electronic Data Systems Corporation. 
--
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questions as to the allocation of powers among the co-equal 
branches of our tripartite form of government ever to be 
submitted to this Court.~/ 
EDS seeks this leave solely to present argument on 
a position, different from that of any of the parties, on 
the principles that should be applied to the broad questions 
now before the Court in this case. Those questions compre-
hend two specific issues which neither Dames & Moore nor 
any other litigant, other than EDSi has any direct interest 
in placing before this Court -- but which have critical 
constitutional ramifications: 
1. The power of the Executive to nullify or 
negate a pre-freeze attachment of funds held in custodia 
legis; and 
2. The power of the Executive to nullify or 
"suspend" an effective and enforceable judgment, secured 
after full trial on the merits and prior to the Algerian 
Declarations. 
These specific questions constitute critical 
aspects of the grave constitutional issues already before 
the Court and thus Petitioner submits that this Court's task 
*/ 1. Whether the President has statutory or 
!nherent constitutional authority to settle legally 
enforceable claims of American citizens against foreign 
states, agencies, and controlled entities pending in 
United States courts and nullify judgments of United 
States courts adjudicating such claims? 
2. Whether the President has statutory or 
inherent constitutional authority to nullify attachment 
liens and judgment liens imposed by process of United 
States courts on property of foreign states, agencies, 
and controlled entities to secure or satisfy legally 
enforceable claims and judgments of American citizens 
and to order the transfer of such property out of the 
reach of process of United States courts? 
3. Whether Presidential action substantially 
diminishing or destroying the value of legally enforce-
able claims of American citizens against foreign states, 
agencies, and controlled entities is an unconstitutional 
taking of property? 
- 3 -
would be facilitated by argument directed to these specific 
issues. 
The facts of EDS' case which both Iran and the 
Government have recognized as "unique" in their success-
ful opposition to EDS' June 3, 1981 certiorari petition 
(No. 80-2035), are that EDS "was one of the very few claim-
ants that instituted suit and obtained attachments prior 
to the November 14, 1979 blocking order, and was one of the 
few claimants that obtained a judgment against Iran, albeit 
after the blocking order."~/ The Government pointed out 
that the "vast bulk of the over 400 Iranian cases involve 
suits filed, and attachments obtained, after November 14, 
1979, and have not gone to judgment" (id.) --a concession 
that aptly and clearly demonstrates that only EDS has an 
adequate stake to address the complete ramifications of 
the position asserted by the Government. 
As a result of these "unique" facts, EDS has 
an interest in addressing the consequences of the sweeping 
issues now before the Court. More importantly, this "unique" 
position is not represented by the record of the case now 
before the Court. 
Both as a matter of fundamental fairness to EDS 
~nd to assure that the Court is fully apprised of the 
constitutional effects of adjudicating the potentially 
sweeping questions presented in Dames & Moore, EDS respect-
fully requests an opportunity to be heard.~/ 
*I Memorandum of Federal Respondents in Opposition, June, 
T981, at 7 n.8, in Electronic Data Systems Corp. Iran v. 
Social Security Organization of Iran, No. 80-2035, cert. 
denied (June 8, 1981); see Iran Brief in Opposition~ne 3, 
1981, pp. 7, 13-14. 
**/ It is respectfully submitted that adequate presentation 
of this position would necessitate 10 additional minutes 
to be allocated to EDS for oral argument. 
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(212) 483-1000 
(Counsel for Amici Curiae Citibank 
International, et al.) 
by hand delivery to: 
Wade H. McCree, Jr. 
Solicitor General, Room 5614 
Department of Justice 
Washington, D. C. 20530 
Miles N. Ruthberg, Esq. 
TUTTLE & TAYLOR 
1901 L Street, NW 
Washington, D. c. 20036 
Thomas G. Shack, Jr. 
ABOUREZK, SHACK & MENDENHALL, P.C. 
1129 Twentieth Street, NW 
Washington, D. C. 20036 
(202) 293-5900 
(Counsel for Intervenor-
Respondent Islamic Republic of Iran) 
Alan Raywid, Esq. 
COLE, RAYWID & BRAVERMAN 
1919 Pennsylvani~ Avenue, NW 
Washington, D. c. 20006 
(202) 659-9750 
(Counsel for Amici Curiae Sperry 
Corporation, et al.) 
Jl~QA w. Lv:" 
Thomas W. Luce, III 
Counsel of Record 
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ALEXAI\Iut:R L. STEVAS, 
------------------------------------------~--r-----~vLERK 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
********** 
October Term, 1980 
********** 
DAMES & MOORE, a partnership, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DONALD T. REGAN, THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and THE UNITED 
STATES . OF AMERICA, 
Respondents. 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTIONS 
OF INTERVENORS FOR TIME FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND DIVIDED ORAL ARGUMENT 
OF COUNSEL: 
Stanley C. Fickle 
University of Indiana 
Law School 
C. Stephen Howard 
Counsel of Record 
Merlin w. Call 
Raymond c. Fisher 
Miles N. Ruthberg 
William C. Schweinfurth 
Jeffrey M. Hamerling 
TUTTLE & TAYLOR Incorporated 
609 South Grand Avenue 
Los Angeles, California 90017 
( 213) 683-0600 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Dames & Moore 




SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
********** 
October Term, 1980 
********** 
DAMES & MOORE, a partnership, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DONALD T. REGAN, THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, 
Respondents. 
/ 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO MOTIONS 
OF INTERVENORS FOR TIME FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND DIVIDED ORAL ARGUMENT 
Petitioner Dames & Moore does not oppose (1) the 
Motion of Intervenor-Respondent The Islamic Republic of Iran 
for Leave to Argue or, Alternatively, for Divided Argument or 
(2) the Motion of Intervenor Bank Markazi Iran for 
Englargement of Time for Oral Argument and for Divided Oral 
Argument, provided that Petitioner is allowed equal 
additional time in order to respond to the oral argument of 
the Intervenors, both of whom will argue against Petitioner. 
-2-
The overall allocation of time suggested by Bank 
Markazi~/ is acceptable to Petitioner. 
Dated: June 17, 1981 
Respectfully submitted, 
E~~rH~~~ 
Counsel of Record, 
MERLIN W. CALL, 
RAYMOND C. FISHER, 
MILES N. ROTHBERG, 
WILLIAM C. SCHWEINFURTH, 
JEFFREY M. HAMERLING, 
TUTTLE & TAYLOR Incorporated 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Dames & Moore. 
Of Counsel: 
Stanley C. Fickle 
~I Petitioner Dames & Moore 50 minutes 
Intevenor Bank Markazi 10 minutes 
Intervenor Islamic Republic 
of Iran 10 minutes 
Respondent United States 30 minutes 
, .... 
'•' 0\ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Eldon V.C. Greenberg, a member of the Bar of this 
Court, declare as follows: 
On June 17, 1981, I served the foregoing Memorandum 
in Response to Motions of Intervenors for Time for Oral 
Argument and Divided Oral Argument on the parties in this 
action by ·causing true copies thereof to be personally 
delivered to the office of: 
Office of the Solicitor General 
Department of Justice 
Washington, D.C. 20530 
William Black, Esq. 
Department of Justice-Civil Division 
Room 3338 
lOth & Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20530 
Dzintra I. Janavs, Esq. 
Assistant United States Attorney 
1100 United States Courthouse 
312 North Spring Street 
Los Angeles, California 90012 
Thomas G. Shack, Esq. 
Abourezk, Shack & Mendenhall, P.C. 
1129 - 20th Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
and by overnight courier to: 
Elihu Inselbuch, Esq. 
Gilbert, Segall & Young 
430 Park Avenue 
New York, New York 10022 
Leonard B. Boudin, Esq. 
Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & 
Lieberman, P.C. 
30 East 42nd Street 
New York, New York 10017 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing 
is true and correct. 
Executed on June 17, 1981, at Washington, D.C. 
Eldon V.C. Greenberg 
Office-Supreme Court, U.S. 
F I LED 
NO. 80-2078 
JUN 17 1981 
----- ----------------~--+--Al=l"r:-~'vi:P'' .. ,..."'~-Yo"':ER L STEVAS. 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
********** 
October Term, 1980 
********** 
DAMES & MOORE, a partnership, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DONALD T. REGAN, THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, 
Respondents. 
MOTION TO DISPENSE W!TH THE 
REQUIREMENT OF A JOINT APPENDIX 
C. Stephen Howard 
Counsel of Record 
Merlin w. Call 
Raymond C. Fisher 
Miles N. Ruthberg 
William C. Schweinfurth 
Jeffrey M. Hamerling 
TUTTLE & TAYLOR Incorporated 
609 South Grand Avenue 
CLERK 
Los Angeles, California 90017 
( 213) 683-0600 
OF COUNSEL: 
Stanley C. Fickle 
University of Indiana 
Law School 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Dames & Moore 




SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
********** 
October Term, 1980 
********** 
DAMES & MOORE, a partnership, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DONALD T. REGAN, THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, 
Respondents. 
MOTION TO DISPENSE WITH THE 
REQUIREMENT OF A JOINT APPENDIX 
Pursuant to Rule 30.7, Petitioner Dames & Moore 
hereby moves to dispense with the requirement of a joint 
appendix and to permit this case to be heard on the original 
record and the Appendix filed with the Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari before Judgment. 
Petitioner and the Government have concluded that the 
Appendix to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari before 
Judgment, filed June 10, 1981, already includes all materials 
which either party believes should be included in a Joint 
Appendix. Rule 30.1 provides that such materials, once 
-2-
produced in the original Appendix, need not be reproduced 
in a Joint Appendix. Accordingly, Petitioner moves to 
dispense with the Joint Appendix. 
Petitioner has been authorized to state that the 
Government and Intervenor Bank Markazi Iran support this 
motion and that Intervenor Islamic Republic of Iran does not 
oppose it. 
For the above reasons, Petitioner respectfully 
requests the Court to grant this motion to dispense with the 
requirement of a Joint Appendix. 
Dated: June 17, 1981 
Of Counsel: 
Stanley C. Fickle 
Respectfully submitted, 
c . >br&-- lbd; NWit 
C. STEPHEN HOWARDf 
Counsel of Record, 
MERLIN W. CALL, 
RAYMOND C. FISHER, 
MILES N. ROTHBERG, 
WILLIAM C. SCHWEINFURTH, 
JEFFREY M. HAMERLING, 
TUTTLE & TAYLOR Incorporated, 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Dames & Moore. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Eldon V.C. Greenberg, a member of the Bar of this 
Court, declare as follows: 
On June 17, 1981, I served the foregoing Motion to 
Dispense with the Requirement of a Joint Appendix on the 
parties in this action by causing true copies thereof to be 
personally delivered to the office of: 
Office of the Solicitor General 
Department of Justice 
Washington, D.C. 20530 
William Black, Esq. 
Department of Justice-Civil Division 
Room 3338 
lOth & Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20530 
Dzintra I. Janavs, Esq. 
Assistant United States Attorney 
1100 United States Courthouse 
312 North Spring Street 
Los Angeles, California 90012 
Thomas G. Shack, Esq. 
Abourezk, Shack & Mendenhall, P.C. 
1129 - 20th Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
and by overnight courier to: 
Elihu Inselbuch, Esq. 
Gilbert, Segall & Young 
430 Park Avenue 
New York, New York 10022 
Leonard B. Boudin, Esq. 
Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & 
Lieberman, P.C. 
30 East 42nd Street 
New York, New York 10017 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing 
is true and correct. 
Executed on June 17, 1981, at Washington, D.C. 
f;;~ !--;------ J 
Eldon V.C"": Gre:/ 
-- ...... 
LAW Orr!CES 
JAML~ C. ABOUREZK 
TIIOMAS C. SHACK,JR. 
CRECCORY B. MENDENHALL 
RAYMOND J. KIMBALL 
GLENN M. f-ELDMAN 
THOMAS D. SILVERSTEIN 
CHRISTINE C. NETTESHE IM 
ABOUREZK, SHACK 8 MENDENHALL 
P. C. 
SU ITE 500 
11 29 TWENTIETH ST., N. W. 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036 
(202) 293-5900 
TELEX 90-400b 
TELECOPIER (202) 659·3493 
NEW YORK OFFICE 
ABOUREZK,SHACK B MENDENHALL 
SUITE 2265 
630 Fll TH AVI:NUE 
NEWYORK.NEWYORK lOIII 
(212) 489-1374 
GREGORY DE SOUSA 
JOliN B. BEATY 
C. DANIEL McCARTHY 
JAM!.~ A. S II NCLR 
June 18, 1981 ---------------------RECEIVED 
Mr. Alexander L. Stevas 
Clerk of the 
United States Supreme Court 
l First Street, N.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Mr. Stevas: 
Re: 
JUN 18 1981 
OntCt Of "fHE. CLc1\K 
SUPREME COURT, U.S. 
Dames & Hoore v. Donald T. 
Regan, et al., No. 80-2078 
In connection with the above-referenced case, we 
respectfully lodge 20 copies of the Memorandum Opinion and Order 
issued by Judge Gesell in Kamran Mashayekhi and Claudia l1ashayekhi 
v. Iran, and Iran National Radio and Televis1on, Clv. Act. No. 
79-2039 (D.D.C. June 10, 1981). 
We are providing copies of this letter and the Hemorandum 
Opinion and Order to counsel of record for the petitioner, the 
United S±ates, and intervenors, the Atomic Energy Organization 
of Iran and Bank Markazi. 
TDS/psl ~ 
Enclosures 
Very truly yours, 
ABOUREZK, SHACK & MENDENHALL, P.C . 
. --/ / , 0 j / 
/ /-f 1 !:4';/ .// · 1-l ~ , -< lr' t ~ 
Thomas D. Silverstein 
Counsel for the Islamic 
Republic of Iran 
.. . IN 'l'HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT CUUln· 
FOR TilE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
KAMRAN HASHAYEI<HI 















Civil Action No. 79-2039 , 
IRAN, and 






This is a civil action for damages brought pursuant to 
the Foreign Sovereign Inununities Act ("FSIA"). 
The issue now presented on defendants' motion to 
dismiss is whether an Iranian citizen can invoke that Act to 
recover money allegedly due him under his former employment 
contract with an instrumentality of the Iranian Government 
for work done in the United States. The motion to dismiss 
attacks the jurisdiction of tne Court and asserts, in the 
alternative, that defend~nts are i~une from suit. 
Plaintiff Kamran Mashayekhi!/ formerly worked as Bureau 
Chief of the Washington, D. C., office of Iran National 
Radio and Television, now known as Voice and Vision of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. National Radio and Television 
operated a~ part of the Iranian Bureau of Information under 
a budget established by the government. It performed 
informational and propaganda services from the United States. 
As an arm of the Iranian government it developed radio and 
television coverage of activities in the United States and 
transmitted the material for use in Iran on the nationally 
controlled radio and television network. Dissemination in 
Iran was effected in accordance with official policy. On 
!/ The claim of co-plaintiff Claudia Hashayekhi, an American 
citizen and wife of Kamran Mashayekhi, was severed on he~ 
unopposed .. 1otion by Order of the Court en April 22, 1981. 
The severance was without prejudice to prosecution of her 
claim through arbitration pur s uant to the Algerian Accords 
agreed to by the Unite d States and Iran. No provi s ion of 
the Accords relates directly to Kamran Mashayekhi's claim. 
occasion, the agency made available to American media 
materi a l s from I r an. \'Vith the fal1 of the Shah, plaintiff's 
employment ceased and he went into hiding in this country. 
His claim is for salary, benefits, and advances not 
reimbursed. To protect his position, he allegedly 
appropriated from Voice and Vision two violins and other 
valuable musical instrlli~ents, at least some of which he now 
admittedly holds as security. Voice and Vision has 
counterclaimed for these items. 
This case arises in the context of the Treaty of Amity, 
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights Between the United 
States of America and Iran, signed by the two nations in 
1955. This Treaty has never been abrogated and has remained 
in effect. 21 Under the FSIA, passed· by Congress in 1976, 
what \vere then "existing international agreements" remained 
~alid and superior to the FSIA wherever the te~ms concerning 
inununity contained in the previous agreement conflict with 
the FSIA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487 
at 17-18, reprinted in {1976] u.s. Code Cong. & Admin. News 
6604, 6616. 
Defendants contest federal jurisdiction, asserting that 
this Court has no jurisdiction because the plaintiff is a 
citizen of a foreign state suing defendants who both are 
foreign entities, and the common law contract claim finds no 
basis in any particularized grant of federal jurisdiction. 
Relying on the reasoning of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit in its recent decision in 
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, C.A. No. 80-7413 
(2d Cir., filed April 16, 1981), defendants contend that the 
limited jurisdiction of the federal courts, as set forth in 
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, does not extend 
to claims such as the one presented here. Although the 
y The treaty is printed at 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. 3853. 
The continuing validity of the treaty has been recognized by 
numerous courts revie wing suits between citizens of the two 
nations. 










FSIA appears to grant jurisdiction to the federal courts to 
hear claims like those of plaintiff, see 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) 
(1976), it is clear under the reasoning of Verlinden that 
the Act cannot grant jurisdiction beyond those circumstances 
for which there is some underlying consti tut.ional basis on 
which that grant can rest. Diversity, of co~rse, is not 
available as a constitutional basis for the jurisdiction, 
because all of the parties are foreign. The issue, then, as 
the Verlinden decision recognized, is whether this case in 
some way "arises under" the laws of the United States. The 
Court finds that it does. As the Second Circuit noted in 
Verlinden, slip op. at 9, there are occasions on which the 
national interest is sufficiently ·Strong to compel USe of a 
federal rule of decision rather than state law, and in such 
a situation there is federal jurisdiction. Cf. Clearfield 
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 u.s. 363 (1943). That is 
the si t'-.1ation here, where the heightened tensions beb1een 
the two nations involved and the existence of hundreds of 
. 
suits have created an exceedingly strong federal interest in 
consistent interpretation of the Treaty of Amity and its 
immunity provisions as they are read in the light of the 
FSIA. Although this case is for breach of contract, the 
meaning of the Treaty is at the core of any decision and the 
strong federal interest in the interpretation of the Treaty 
and the resolution of these numerous disputes is sufficient 
to ground federal court jurisdiction. 
Turning to the merits, defendants argue that the limited 
waiver of immunity in Article XI of the Treaty of Amity does 
not apply in this case and that plaintiff's claim is thus 
barred. In particular, defendants contend that the 
11 enterprises" . for which immunity is waived under the Treaty 
are only those \vhich are privately owned and controlled and 
engaged in corn.TUcrcial activity for eco11omic gain within the · · 
United States. In support of this interpretation, defendants 
. . .. 
-4-
have engaged in a careful analysis of the language of the 
Treaty itself, and also have submitted a wide variety of 
documentary evidence, including material dra\vn from 
negotiating documents, governmental statements made in 
connection with this and similar treaties, analyses by 
commentators, and, perhaps most important, recent statements 
by the United States that reflect the government's-present 
interpretation of immunity under the Treaty. 
Upon reviewing the material presented and the argumepts 
of counsel, the Court agrees with defendants that the 
governmental, not-for-profit nature of the activities of 
Iran and of Voice and Vision fall within the scope of 
aciivities for which . Iran and its instrumentalities have 
retained immunity. Neither Iran nor Voice and Vision has 
waived its immunity by virtue of its activities under the 
terms of the Treaty of Amity ~nd that immunity will be 
recognized, thus making it necessary to grant defendants' 
motion to dismiss. 
At oral argument, counsel for Voice and Vision made it 
clear that its protective counterclaim for the return of the 
musical instruments will not be pursued if plaintiff's claim 
is dismissed on the grounds of immunity. 
Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint 
is granted. The complaint is dismissed, without prejudice 
· to all parties pursuing relief in other forums if they so 
choose. The counterclaim is withdrawn. 
SO ORDERED. 
June) b , 19 81. 
~/ ./ /J-4-:- . ~ 
~~~J£'.g:_ L~~=-==-­
uNITEo STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
... IN TilE UNI'l'ED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
KAMRAN NASHAYEKHI 




















Civil Action No. 79-2039= 
.Ju:·l 1 o ISS 1 
JAMES F. DA\'EY,. C:c:rl' 
For the reasons set forth in the Court's Hemorandwn 
filed this day, defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint 
is granted. The complaint is dismissed, without prejudice 
to all parties pursuing relief in other forums if they so 
choose. The counterclaim is ~ithdrawn. 
SO ORDERED. 
June /C) , 1981. 
. . . . :' 




THURSDAY, JUNE 18, 1981 
ORDER IN PENDING CASE 
DAMES & MOORE V. REGAN, SECRETARY OF TREASURY, ET AL. 
The joint application for a waiver of 
the page limitation of the parties' briefs 
on the merits addressed to the Chief Justice 
and referre d to the Court is granted. 
The motion of petitioner to dispense with 















June 18, 1981 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 4 
No. 80-2078 
DAMES & MOORE 
v. 
REGAN, Sec. of Treasury 
Motion to Intervene 
SUMMARY: Twenty-six Iranian commercial banks, named party 
defendants in the _companion action brought by Dames & Moore (petr) 
in the DC, request leave to intervene as resps. 
BACKGROUND: The 26 banks were among the 30 Iranian defendants 
named by petr in Dames & Moore v. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, 
No. CV-79-04198 LEW (Px) , DC for Central Ca. In this action the 
banks challenged subject matter and personal jurisdiction as well 
as the propriety of the writs of attachment. Following the Algerian 




Petr commenced a separate action in Apr. 1981 against the 
Sec. of the Treasury and the government only. The DC considered 
the new case in conjunction with petr's other cases. Petr sought 
a prejudgment writ only on its action against the government. 
INTERVENORS' POSITION: The 26 banks argue that they, like the 
Bank Markazi Iran which was granted leave to intervene, have a sub-
stantial interest in the underlying assets. Not only were their 
assets attached by petr but this case will decide the validity of 
the attachments in over a hundred other cases. The banks should 
be allowed to intervene to protect their interests. 
The banks also argue that their participation in petr's actions 
before the DC gives them a particular familiarity with this action 
which .may be helpful to the Court. 
DISCUSSION: Stern & Gressman's Supreme Court Practice, 5th Ed., 
page 436 suggests that "only for the most imperative of reasons 
and where one's interest may otherwise be lost will the Court enter-
tain a motion to intervene in pending proceedings before the Court." 
In this case, the banks' interests in particular assets are 
not in issue. The issue is the President's autbority to vacate 
writs of attachment lodged against the assets. The President's 
authority will be ably defended by the government and by Iran 
and its central bank, the Bank Markazi Iran, which have been gran·ted 
leave to intervene. 
Thus, there does not appear to be a critical need to allow 
the 26 banks to intervene. However, should the Court be inclined 
to bring as many interested parties into the litigation as possible, 
the inclusion of the 26 banks will not broaden the issues presented 





In light of the abbreviated schedule adopted in this case, 
the Court may wish to anno\.mce its decision on the motion as soon 
as a decision is reached. 






June 18, 1981 Conference 
Supplemental List 
No. 80-2078 
DAMES & MOORE 
v. 
1. Motion to Dispense with the 
Requirement of a Joint 
Appendix 
2. Motion to Participate as 
Amicus at Oral Argument 
REGAN, Sec. of Treas., et al. 
SUMMARY: ( 1) 
3. Motion for Leave to File 
Amicus Brief 
Petr requests leave to dispense with a joint 
appendix; (2) Electronic Data Systems Corporation Iran requests 
leave to present oral argument as amicus curiae; and (3) Danie~, 
Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall request leave to file an amicus brief. 
All three requests were received on June 17. 
CONTENTIONS: (1) Petr requests leave to dispense with the 
requirement of a joint appendix because the Court has the original 
record and the appendix to the petn for writ contains all the material: 




The government joins in the request and the intervenors either 
support or do not oppose the motion~ 
(2) Electronic Data Systems Corporation Iran (EDS) requests 
leave to present oral argument as an amicus. EDS would like 10 
minutes in which to argue the legality of the President's action 
from the perspective of a claimant that has a pre-blocking order 
writ of attachment. 
(3) Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall (DMJM) seek leave 
to file an amicus brief. DMJM had several contracts with Iranian 
entities and has filed lawsuits against them. DMJM suggests that 
its amicus brief may be helpful to the Court because DMJM's contracts 
had different forum selection clauses and DMJM has an actual final 
judgment in its favor against an Iranian entity. DMJM believes 
that all parties would agree to the filing of an amicus brief but 
time did not permit the gathering of their approvals. 
DISCUSSION: (1) Rule 30.1 provides that if the items that 
compose the joint appendix "have already been reproduced in a jurisdic 
tional statement or the petition for certiorari complying with Rule 
33.1 [they) need not be reproduced again in the joint appendix." Here 
the appendix to the petn contains all the materials and the Court 
also has the original record. Requiring a separate joint appendix 
would not provide the Court with more information and may make it 
difficult for the parties to comply with the abbreviated briefing 
schedule adopted in this case. 
(2) EDS, an amicus, argues that its position is unique because, 
unlike most claimants, it obtained a writ of attachment before the 





to present its position in oral argument. The Court may wish to 
deny the request for several reasons·. First, there is the need 
to limit the number of counsel that will argue this case. Second, 
EDS's concern is not subject to the extreme time limitation that 
this case presents. EDS attempted to obtain a prejudgment petn for 
writ. This was denied in part because the Iranian assets subject 
to EDS's writ of attachment will not be transferred out of the 
country in July. (EDS v. Soc. Sec. Org. of Iran, No. 80-2035, denied 
June 8, 1981). 
(3) DMJM's amicus brief is timely, relatively short and may 
be helpful to the Court. No party will be prejudiced by the accept-
ance of the amicus brief. 






June 18, 1981 Conference 
Supplemental List 
No. 80-2078 
DAMES & MOORE 
v. 
Joiht Application for Waiver of 
Page Limitation Presented to the 
Chief Justice and Referred .to the 
Court. (Heretofore Denied by 
Justice Rehnquist) 
REGAN, Sec. of Treas., et al. 
CONTENTIONS: The parties request waiver of the page limitation 
for briefs (Rule 33). Because the briefs were in prefaration and were 
not submitted to the printer until the evening of June 17, the 
parties could not represent with certainty the exact length of the 
briefs. However, the parties feel that there is a substantial likeli-
hood that the briefs will exceed the limit (65 pages) and request that 
this be allowed "because of the importance and complexity of the 
issues in the case, and because of the extraordinary time constraints 







DISCUSSION: After Justice Rehnguist denied the application, 
petr merely tendered a cover letter requesting that the application 
be resubmitted to the Chief Justice. The two-page application 
simply states that the brief may be oversized and suggests that 
the importance of the case and the time deadlines makes the extended 
brief reasonable. 
Neither the importance of a case nor an abbreviated briefing 
schedule nor a combination of these factors should result in a per se 
allowance of an oversized brief. Particularly in a case such as this 
where the Court is also subject to time pressures, the Court should 
not be required to wade through an oversized brief unless it is clear 
that the issues could not be presented in less pages. As the 
application fails to articulate which issues require an expanded 
discussion, the Court might deny the motion. 
A denial of the motion might result in some slippage of the 
briefing dates or the acceptance of Xeroxed briefs pending the 
printing of the briefs. 
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WASHINGTON. 0 . C . 
ZURICH 
As you know, on June 16, 1981, Baker & McKenzie, on 
behalf of plaintiffs in 25 of the approximately 150 actions in 
the Southern District of New York, moved pursuant to Rule 38.7 of 
the Rules of this Court for leave to permit Lawrence w. Newman, a 
partner in our firm, to present oral argument before this Court 
on June 24, 1981 in respect of claimants' right to compensation 
for the taking of their claims and attachments against Iran. 
Pursuant to your request, enclosed as Attachment l is a 
statement listing all parent companies, subsidiaries (except 
wholly owned subsidiaries) and affiliates of each plaintiff in 
the 25 actions, as described in Rule 28.1 of the Rules of this 
Court. 
Mr. Francis J. Lorson 
Deputy Clerk 
June 19, 1981 
Page 2 
The Court should be aware that plaintiffs in 17 other 
actions in New York have joined in our motio n a nd amici brief. 
Accordingly, we also are enclosing, as Attachment 2, a Rule 
28.1 statement for those other plaintiffs. 
MB:hpl 
enclosures 
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80-2078 Dames & Moore v. Regan and U.S. 
MEMORANDUM TO FILE 
This memo is dictated as an aid to memory. It is 
limited to the "taking" issue. I have read the parties' 
opening briefs and several of the amici briefs. Reply 
briefs have not yet been received~ nor have the memos I 
requested from my clerks. 
Among the briefs I have read, petitioner's is the 
most helpful on the taking issue. See also amici briefs 
filed on behalf of Electronic Data Systems by Steptoe & 
Johnson, and on behalf of Flag, Inc., by Covington & 
Burling. This memo is a brief, incomplete and unstructured 
series of notes based primarily on petitioner's brief. 
I am not at rest on the principal issues presented 
by the present case: (i) whether under the relevant 
statutes, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(IEEPA) (the sucessor statute to the Trading with the Enemy 
Act), and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), the 
President had the authority to enter into the Algiers 
Agreement, and (ii) whether under his implied powers under 
the Constitution the President had the authority - as 
summarized by the SG's brief: 
"(1) To terminate all legal proceedings 
in the United States courts involving claims 
·.~ 
- ' 
of United States persons and institutions 
against Iran and its state enterprises: (2} 
to nullify all attachments and judgments 
obtained therein: (3} to prohibit all further 
litigation based on such claims, and (4} 
bring about the termination of such claims 
through binding arbitration." (SG's brief, p. 
7}, that I believe is a quotation from the 
Algiers Agreement itself. 
I view these questions as serious indeed, and 
doubt that either the statutes or the Constitution were 
every intended to confer this extraordinary power on a 
President - apparently without review by Congress or the 
2. 
courts, according to the SG. Yet, for whatever reasons, two 
Presidents now have approved the Agreement and its 
provisions. Moreover, Secretary Haig has filed an affidavit 
that - in strong language - advises us that the foreign 
policy of the United States would suffer "serious 
consequences" if we fail to up hold the agreement. I may 
join such a judgment in the interest of our country, and 
under the special circumstances that prevailed at an 
election time with two Presidents - perhaps for different 
reasons sharing responsibility and concurring. I would 
hope, however, if the Court so decides, that Congress acts 
to restrict presidential power at least to the extent of 
requiring congressional approval - as is true with respect 
to all treaties. 
* * * 
3. 
If the Court's judgment should be to affirm, my 
view at this time - rather strongly - is that I could join 
such a judgment only if we made clear (or at least left 
clearly open) the taking question, and held that the Court 
of Claims under the Tucker Act may entertain taking cases. 
If the Court's opinion is not entirely clear to this effect, 
I will write separately perhaps saying that my understanding 
of the holding (unless it is categorically to the contrary) 
is that the taking issue remains and may be litigated. 
Petitioner's brief p. 33-43, is persuasive. 
Footnote 32 (p. 34) recognizing that the taking 
issue may not be ripe, and reserves its Fifth Amendment 
claim if any of these events occur: 
"(1) Petitioner is denied the opportunity to 
present its claims to the arbitral tribunal; 
(2) petitioner establishes that its rights 
before the tribunal are demonstrably inferior 
to its rights to obtain redress in federal 
courts; or (3) petitioner's claim is 
adjudicated by the tribunal but its recovery 
is less than the amount it would have 
obtained by proceeding on its judgment (and 
attachment of Iranian assets) in federal 
court". 
In WJB's dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. 
(March 24, 1981), that I joined, he said: 
"When one persons is asked to assume more 
than a fair share of the public burden, the 
payment of just compensation operates to 
redistribute the economic cost from the 
individual to the public at large." 
I said the same thing in Agins. The Court also made this 
point in Armstrong v. U.S., 364 u.s. 40, 49. 
4. 
If there ever was a case where a relatively small 
group of Americans would bear the burdens of the Algiers 
Agreements, this is it. No one disputes that its purpose 
was to resolve what Carter declared to be a major foreign 
policy crisis and the citizens who benefitted specifically 
were the hostages, their families and friends.* 
In a word, in the event of any of the 
contingencies occurring that are mentioned in fn. 32 (see 
above}, the citizens who seem liley to suffer are American 
creditors of Iran. The petitioner in this case, like 
several hundred other identifiable creditors, had valid 
liens on assets that clearly were within the in rem 
jurisdiction of United States courts. Indeed, under the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, there may have been in 
personam jurisdiction also. As the SG acknowledges the 
agreement effects a change in the "substantive law" of the 
United States to the disadvantage of these creditors. The 
SG is compelled to make this argument, as he relies on it 
for his further argument that the agreement does not 
*See brief of Flag, Inc., that points out the adverse 
consequences of the agreement even for the hostages - who 
are deprived, apparently, of the right to bring damage 
suits. 
, .. "' ·~ 
• ' j 
il- • 
5. 
violate the separation of powers by removing the 
jurisdiction of federal courts. I therefore conclude 
without difficulty that the nullification of petitioner's 
attachments, judgment and judgment liens constitutes a 
taking of property. It is clear that a valid attachment 
lien, at least, is a property interest. See Louisville Bank 
v. Radford, 295 u.s. 555, 601-602: Armstrong v. United 
States , 3 6 4 u . S . 4 0 • * 
Petitioner argues that enforcement of the Iranian 
Agreement should be enjoined because no one can tell whether 
"just compensation" will be paid for the "taking" (p. 40-
42). The agreement, as I understand it, falls considerably 
short of requiring enough money in the escrow fund to cover 
all American claims (this should be made clear in any 
opinion that I write). The agreement does provide, however, 
that Iran will pay American creditors for any deficiency in 
the payment of valid claims by arbitration. I pause here to 
say that, as presently advised, I do not know whether the 
agreement permits American courts subsequently to determine 
*If I write, as I expect to, my opinion should address the 
effect of revocation of the license issued by the Secretary 
of Treasury to obtain attachments (brief p. 37-39). 
Reservation of the power to revoke is irrelevant to my view, 
but we should address it. 
whether a clain is valid and also whether there has been a 
"short fall" in its payment. I am inclined to think that 
the agreement leaves this exclusively to the Tribunal: it 
provides that decisions of the Tribunal shall be final and 
binding everywhere. 
Despite these reservations, I do not think an 
injunction is indicated if we sustain the validity of the 
agreement, and if - and only if - we make clear that a 
remedy exists against the United States in the event of a 
short fall. 
6. 
As presently advised, I would hold that a remedy 
does exist in the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act. See 
pp. 42-43 of petitioner's brief. Section 1502 is not 
applicable for various reasons, including the fact that the 
agreement is not a treaty. A treaty does not become valid 
until it has been approved by the Senate. 
* * * 
The Algerian Agreement would be null and void 
under the most elementary principles of law and fairness in 
any domestic controversy. It was not an agreement that 
resulted from voluntary bargaining. Iran, correctly 
characterized by President Reagan as a country controlled by 
"barbarians", had kidnapped American citizens and held them 
for well over a year. Not only were our citizens kidnapped 
but they were being held under conditions equivalent to 
·'. 
7 0 
imprisonment potentially serious to their physical and 
mental health. Nor were these ordinary citizens (though 
this would make no difference with me) ; they were diplomats 
and diplomatic staff. Finally, they were under constant 
threat of execution by the criminals who held them. 
In short, this was no "agreement" at all. The 
United States acted under coercion of the most barbarous 
kind. Such an agreement has nomore validity under 
international law than a private agreement being examined in 
our courts. I know little about international law, but the 
International Court of Justice at the Hague has decided that 
the Iranian crime was a continuing violation of 
international law. I therefore would conclude - were it not 
for President Reagan's approval of it and Secretary Haig's 
representation to us - that the agreement is null and void, 
and we should proclaim this to the world. We have the 
hostages. I am not sure that any Iranian funds are still 
held in the United States, as they were transferred - as I 
understand it - to the Bank of England. I would assume, 
however, that Great Britain would recognize international 
law also, and that British courts would follow our judgment 
invalidating this coerced document. In sum, in almost any 
other circumstances, I would hold that our country is not 
bound. Yet, apparently such a holding, in the special 





broder interests of the u.s. I may therefore affirm on this 
issue. 







7>~~ ~~~ f7~. ~td. ~ 





Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Peter Byrne 
DATE: June 21, 1981 
RE: No. 80-2078, Dames & Moore v. Regan, Sec'y 
Question Presented 
Does the President have power to "settle" the claims 
of American nationals against foreign sovereigns? 
I 
There are, of course, no statutes or Court cases that 
directly control the question of whether Presidents Carter and 
Reagan had the power to "suspend" petr's suit for damages 
against Iran and require petr to submit to the adjudication of 
an international arbitral tribunal. Courts and Congress speak 
about the Presidents power's to act in foreign affairs in only 
the broadest terms. Indeed there is so little precise legal 
anticipation or precedent for this action that characterization 
of what the President has done is crucial. 
The President acted primarily to secure the release 
of American hostages. In return for this, he took steps to 
allow Iran to recover Iranian assets held in American banks and 
to settle American claims against Iran in a forum acceptable to 
Iran. Seen this way, the President has bartered the rights of 
private American concerns to compel adjudication of valid 
claims in the courts of the United States to gain the public 
benefit of the return of the hostages. This is one aspect of 
the situation. 
It can algp fairly be said, althought the SG urges 
the interpretation too strenuously, that the President has 
-----~- ""-'-
acted . to provide some compensation for American private 
concerns who had valid, but practically unenforceable claims 
against an unfriendly and radical foreign sovereign. Under this 
interpretation, pre-judgment attachment of Iranian assets by 
American creditors were unlawful because of the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Actl, but the President's blocking order 
1 
1 
1 Paul Smith has explained this relevance of the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in his memorandum. The 
basic point is that the President could have left the 
American creditors in a worse situation if he had never 
taken any action with respect to the Iranian assets or the 
creditors' claims. Indeed he might, to release the 
hostages, have merely transfered the blocked Iranian 
assets out of the country. While this might have been 
politically unpopular or could constitute a "taking" which 
the United States would have to compensate, there can be 
little debate that the President had the power under the 
International Economic Emergency Powers Act ( IEEPA) to 
accomplish this result. T?. e question whether the President 
had the additional power 1to settle\\ the creditors' claims 
should be addressed with awareness-of this possibility. 
marshalled the Iranian assets, prevented them from being 
removed from the country, and gave him a substantial bargaining 
chip to secure some settlement of American claims from the 
Iranians. The President rationally could have concluded that 
the chance of gaining a judgment from the tribunal, backed by 
the $1 billion settlement fund, was better than the greater 
certainty of getting a full judgment from a federal court that 
might not be enforced. While this interpretation provides only 
a partial truth, it should be kept in mind. The Algerian 
Declarations concluded a number of outstanding issues between 
the two countries and brought a measure of order out of chaotic 
circumstances.2 
The question of the power of the President to settle 
the petr's claim should be distinguished from the power of the 
United States to settle petr's claim and - the question of 
whether the settlement will violate the Fifth Amendment if petr 
does not receive just compensation. The case of United States 
v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103 (1803) would seem to give the 
United States power by Treaty to barter a national's claim. In 
2 The Algerian Declarations also arranged the return 
of Iranian assets held in the overseas branches of 
American banks and in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
minus the satisfaction of various loans~reviously extended 
to Iran by American banking syndicate/: The SG represents 
that these arrangements have worked very well so far: $3.7 
billion has been paid to the banks, another $1.4 Billion 
has been placed in escrow. Brief for United States at 7, 
n. 8. The SG wishes the Court to see that American 
interests have received already substantial economic 
benefit from the Agreement. The Banks have supported the 
Agreement in litigation. 
that case, Americans who had been commissioned by the President 
as privateers had lawfully captured ~ French vessel and had won 
a condemnation in the District Court, affirmed in the Circuit 
Court, when the United States concluded a Treaty with France 
promising the restoration of ships captured but not yet 
condemmed. The Court held that the Treaty, as the supreme law 
of the land had altered prior law and that the judgment below, 
not being final, must be reversed. The Court wrote, [I]f the 
nation has given up the vested rights of its citizens, it is 
not for the court, but for the government, to consider whether 
it be a case proper for compensation. Id. at 110. In the modern 
context of the Takings Clause and the Tucker Act, I would read 
this statement as meaning that the government has the power to 
extinguish a lawful claim recognized in Court, even if it is 
liable for compensation. 
Thus, the question that must be addressed is not 
:? 
~ whether the United States has the power to settle the claims qy ? Tr; _::f ,- but whether the President has the powe-;-;;-;-d:-:o by 
:~ J • ..J.Executive Agreement. Th; qu:_,st!:_on is one of separation of C9 
~ powers: has the President the power to act in this regard 
.::: ... 
without the consent of the Senate? The touchstone for any 
. f 'd . . "' h b analys1s o Pres1 ent1al power 1s Youngstown S eet & Tu e Co. 
v • Sawyer , 3 4 3 U • S • 57 9 ( 19 5 2 ) . 
Youngstown held that President Truman lacked inherent 
power to seize the nation's steel mills to continue production 
during a strike during the Korean conflict, when Congress had 
rather explicitly rejected the idea of giving the President 
such power. Justice Black's opinion for the Court directs 
attention to the President's enumerated powers: his executive 
authority, his status as commander-in-chief, and his power to 
see that the laws are faithfully executed. In my view, however, 
the lasting lesson of Youngstown is that the President's power 
~
to take particular steps must be examined in light of the 
positions of the other branches. The Constitution allocates 
powers among the branches, particularly between the President 
and the Congress, only in general terms. Determining whether 
the President has a certain power depends in large measure on 
the attitude of the Congress toward his exercise of that power. 
This analysis is presented most directly by the 
opinion of Justice Jackson, who established three categories of 
Presidential power. First, where the President acts pursuant to 
an express or implied authorization of Congress, he possess all 
the power that the United States itelf possesses." Id. at 635-
36. Second, where he acts without any authorization or denial 
of such by Congress, we are in a "zone of twilight", where 
"congressional inertia, indifference or quiessence may 
sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not 
invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In 
this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the 
imperatives of events rather than on abstract theories of law." 
Id. at 636. Finally, when "the President takes measures 
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, 
his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only on 
his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers 
of Congress over the matter." Id. Understandably, the parties 
have argued over into which category ' the Iran Agreement should 
be placed; accordingly after addressing directly the 
President's power to settle individual claims, I will turn to 
statutes drawing his act into one or another category. 
Preliminarily, it should be noted that Jackson's categories 
might more precisely be understood as a continuum with the 
first and third categories forming the poles. 
The same sensitivity to the actual relation between 
President and Congress informed the opinion of Justice 
Frankfurter. He stressed that "the content of the three 
authorities of government is not to be derived from abstract 
analysis." Id. He denied the power to the President in the case 
at hand because Congress had specifically concluded that he 
lacked the power. But, he wrote: 
"In short, a systematic, unbroken, executive 
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the 
Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by 
Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the 
constitution, making as it were such exercise of 
power part of the structure of our government, may be 
treated as a gloss on "executive Power" vested in the 
President by §1 of Art. II." Id. at 610-611. 
This observation can be profitably employed as an elaboration 
of Justice Jackson's second category. 
II 
Assuming Congress has neither authorized nor denied } 
authority to the President to settle claims of Americans, does ~ 
he have inherent authority. The SG argues that he does, and the 
CAl and CADC, with some qualification agreed. The President has 
settled the claims of nationals with foreign nations since the ~------~--'-_____________ .'-__________________ _ 
earliest days of the Republic; he has extinguished the claims 
in return for lump-sum payments. J.B. Moore was able to say in 
1905: "It would be a work of superogation to attempt to cite 
all the cses in which the Executive of the United States has 
settled individual claims against foreign governments without 
reference to the Senate." Moore also noted that arbitration had 
repeatedly been employed. Moore, Treaties and Executive 
Agreements, 1905 Politcal Science Q. 385. Professor Henkin has ~ 
observed that the President has "sometimes disposed of the 
~ ~ la ims of citizens without their consent , or even without 
yf ~~~~consulation with them, usually without exclusive regard for 
~ their interests, as distinguished from those of the nation as a 
whole." Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 262 
(1972). Finally, the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations 
Law § 213 (1965) states as black letter law that "The President 
may waive or settle a claim against a foreign state for an 
injury to a United States national, without the consent of such 
national." 
While these establish that the President customarily 
has settled claims and that such settlements are effective in 
remains whether such ~n I {.1 
executive agrement is binding in a United States court. Th1s ] 
-----~---- -
Court seems to have held that they are. InVOni ted States v. 
international law, the question 
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), the Court, in construing the 
settlements collateral to Litvinov Agreement by which the 
United States recognized the Soviet Union, seemed to equate the 
agreement in force of law with a Treaty. 
"Plainly the external powers of ~he United States are 
to be exercised without regard to state laws or 
policies ••.. And while this rule in respect of 
treaties is established by the express languge of cl. 
2Ar t. VI, of the Constitution, the same rule would 
result in the case of all international compacts and 
agreements from the very fact that complete power 
over international affairs is in the national 
government and is not and cannot be subject to any 
curtailment or interference on the part of the 
several states." Id. at 331. 
To be sure, this language is not controlling here, because 
there is no question of state law superceding federal, but the 
Court 1 s acceptance of the executive agreement, concluded in 
furtherence of the President 1 s power to establish diplomatic 
relations, supports the notion that the President had power to 
enter into the Algerian declarations, and that that agreement 
is as binding as the treaty in Schooner Peggy. 
In United States v. Pink, 315 u.s. 203 (1942), the 
Court considered more particularly the President 1 s power to 
settle the claims of nationals by an executive agreement. In 
that case, the United States was assigned by the Soviet Union 
assets of private Russian companies that the USSR had 
nationalized; the United States would settle claims of American 
nationals agaist the Soviet Union with these funds. This 
settlement agreement as part of the agreement by which the 
countries entered into normal relations. The court noted that 
this settlement was a method of iemoving "objections" raised by 
Soviet nationalization of american assets in Russia. In giving 
effect to the agreement the Court stated: 
'' 
Power to remove such obstacles to full recognition as 
settlement of claims of our nationals ... certainly 
is a modest impolied power of the President who is 
the • sole organ of the federal government in the 
field of international relations. • United States v. 
Curtis-Wright Export Corp., [299 u.s. 304,] 320. 
Effectiveness in handling the delicate problems of 
foreign relations requires no less. Unless such a 
power exists, the power of recognition might be 
thwarted or seriously diluted. No such obstacles can 
be placed in the way of rehabilitation of relations 
between this country and another nation, unless the 
historic conception of the powers of the President in 
the conduct of foreign affairs [cite to J.B. Moore 
article discussed above] is to be drastically 
revised. It was the judgment of the political 
department that full recognition of the Soviet 
Government required the settlement of all outstanding 
problems including the claims of our nationals. 
Recognition and the Litvinov Assignment were 
interdependent. We would usurp the executive function 
if we held that the decision was not final and 





Frankfurter - -..,.... 
of foreign 
stated flatly, "That 
relations includes 
settlement of claims is indisputable." Id. at 240.3 
the 
the 
3 The views of Learned Hand in an analogous case are 
well worth noting: 
"The constitutional power of the President 
extends to the settlement of mutual claims 
between a foreign government and the United 
States, at least when it is an incident to the 
recognition of that government; and it would be 
unreasonable to circumscribe it to such 
controversies. The continued mutual amity 
between the nation and other powers again and 
/
, again depends upon a satisfactory compromise of 
mutual claims; the necessary power to make such 
compromises has existed from the earliest times 
and been exercised by the foeeign offices of all 
civilized nations." Ozanic v. United States, 188 
F.2d 228, 231 (CA2 1951). 
The parties attempt to distinguish Pink and it is 
helpful to examine their arguments with care. Petr argues that 
Pink nd Belmont are only Supremecy CLause cases, holding that 
an Executive Ageeement preempts contrary state law. Pet Brief 
at 19-20. But, if the Agreement preempts state law, it must be 
because it is federal law. Stating that the agreement is law 
necessarily implies that the President had power to acheive it. 
Petrs are incorrect in arguing that the Litvinov Agreement did 
not involve settlement of the claims of American creditors; the 
President there was marshalling assigned Russian assets to 
satisfy the claims of American creditors for the expropriations 
of the communist regime. While it is true that the acts before 
the Court were the marshalling rather than a settlement of 
claims at less than their face value, the reasoning of the 
Court approved the entire process of settlement. It could well 
be argued that the Li tvinov Agreement was a better deal than 
the Algerian Declarations, that the former agreement obtained 
much larger payments to creditors than the present. But this 
objection involves only the question of whether the settlement 
is a "taking", a question we believe is separate from the 
question of the President's power to settle. ~ 
CADC declined to rest its decision on Pink and ~ 
Belmont essentially because the cases too blithely acceptedCJ!II}(:. 
vague Presidential powers. American Int'l Group v. Iran, Slip 
Op at 17. Rather, it chose to rest its decision on the history 
of Executive settlement agreements acquiesced in by Congress. 
But, in reaching this decision, the court again looked to Pink 
and Belmont, noting that "they do lend support 
proposition that the President need ' not seek the and 
consent of the Senate for all such settlements." Id. 33. 
This reluctance to rely squarely on ~k and Belmo® is 
understandable. The case were decided in the shadow of a world 
crisis when the authority of the President and our alliance 
with the Soviet Union each seemed vi tal to national welfare. 
The cases, while I think correctly decided, seem unconcerned 
with balancing power among the branches and are deferential to 
the President to a degree inapposite to contemporary attitudes. 
The cases are lax in identifying the source of the President's 
power. To a large extent they seem to suggest that the 
President has some plenary authority over the field of foreign 
affairs conferred by the necessities of foreign diplomacy. A 
contemporary court rightfully is reluctant to embrace the old 
idea that the President is the "sole organ" of nation in 
foreign affairs, particularly as regards a power, making 
executive agreements, potentially in conflict with the 
constitution's explicit Treaty power, requiring the 
participation of the Senate. Pink might be read as placing the 
President's power to make settlements in J. Jackson's category 
3, where the Presdient has inherent power to act regardless of 
the Congress's opposition. CADC relied on the history of 
Congressional acquiessence to bring their holding into category 
2. 
the President's power to settle claims is strong. As noted 
above, the President has exercised his power since early times 
without general disapproval from Congress. As CADC noted, the 
Congress disapproed the particular settlement made by the 
President of $105 million in claims against Czechoslovakia for 
$20.5 million. In that case the President held manny millions 
in Czech gold as a bargaining chip. Thus, it may be inferred 
that Congress could have disapproved of the Algerian Agreements 
if it had chosen to do so. 
I believe that the holding of this case can be 
further narrowed. As noted, Pink addressed only the President's 
power to make settlements incident to his acknowledged power to 
recognize foreign governments.4 The making of settlements has 
been recognized by the Court only as an incidental power to the 
effectuation of an object within the scope of the President's 
lawful authority. I think that in this case the Court need go 
no further. As Paul Smith will have discussed, Congress in the 
so-called Hostage Act, 22 u.s.c. § 1732, placed upon the 
President the duty to "use such means, not amounting to acts of 
war, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or 
effectuate the release". I tend to think that the President may 
use his recognized incidental power to settle the claims of 
,.. ~ -~ --
american nationals to acheive an object which Congress clearly 
............ ~ ...... 
has authorized. This approach would provide a narrow foundation 
--------
4 This power appears to be included in the 
President's enumerated power to "receive Ambassadors and 
other public Ministers." Art. II, sec. 3. 
for affirming the President's power by bringing the case almost 
into J. Jackson's category 1. It would not hold that Congress 
conferred any new power to the President in the Hostage Act, 
but merely that they authorized him to use such power as he 
possessed to accomplish a proper end. Also, it does not set up 
the power to enter settlements on an independent basis where 
the President can without compunction enter settlements in any 
international context; the reach of the power need not be 
addressed. As of now, I would hold thusly. 
III 
Petr 's strongest argument that the President lacks~­
power is that Congress in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act~ 
tf'n'-
(FSIA), 28 u.s.c. §§ 1330, 1602, et seg., places petr's claim,:s/,1# 
unambigously in federal court for a judicial determination free 
from political intereference. According to this theory, the 
history of Presidential settlements prior to the passage of 
FSIA is unimportant. The President is now in conflict with 
Congress, which has directed that federal courts have 
jurisdiction over the matter, and with the courts, because he 
is interfering with their Article III power by depriving them 
of jurisdiction over these claims. In my view, this argument 
mischaracterizes the President's acts and overstates the scope 
of the FSIA. 
~-----"""'"?' 
The FSIA granted jurisdiction to federal courts to 'r--
entertain suits between American citizens and foreign 
sovereigns involving commercial disputes. It also sought to 
place these suits more in the ordinary course of business and 
remove them from politics by for the first time directing 
federal courts to make the decision whether the foreign 
sovereign defendant was entitled to a defense of sovereign 
immunity. Prior to this, the State Dep't had issued an advisory 
letter to the court concerning immunity, which was almost 
always followed. Foreign nations were wise to this and sought 
to bargain with the State Dep't to obtain immunity. The Act 
established a legal test for sovereign immunity and directed it 
to govern unless an existing agreement between the foreign 
nation and the U.S. was to the contrary. 
Petr argues primarily that the FSIA evinces a 
Congressional intent to remove the Executive from commercial 
disputes, by depriving him of the sovereign immunity decision 
and allowing private litigation in federal court rather than 
the nation to nation settlements that the President 
historically had engaged in. This argument reads the statute 
too broadly. First, the FSIA does not address in any terms the 
President's power to settle claims as part of an international 
agreement. No decision about sovereign immunity is involved in 
this case. It must be doubtful that Congress would oust the 
President from a customary power only by implication. Second, 
that petrs have a judicial remedy does not go to the Pesident's 
power to act for the general welfare. Petrs would have itfhat 
the President settles claims only to confer a benefit on 
private Amercians, but as the Pink stresses and Schooner Peggy 
illustrates, the President may settle privte claims to remove 
obstacles to the acheivement of a public accord rather than 
merely to recover funds for private parties. Finally, the 
intent behind FSIA seems to have been , to depoliticize "ordinary 
legal disputes" when one party was an entity of a foreign 
government, because "foreign state enterprises are every day 
particpants in commercial activities", H.R. 94-1487, at 1-2 
(1976), not to cabin the President's authority to deal with 
public crises. The examples of cases that could now be 
litigated without executive interference given in the 
legislative history include: contrct litigation over delivered 
goods or the sale of land, or a tort suit when an American is 
struck by an embassy car. Id. I find nothing directed to 
extraordinary situations such as presented by the taking of 
hostages by a renegade nation. 
Judge Duffy in one of these cases held that the 
Executive was attempting to oust federal courts from 
juri sdici ton confer red on them by Congress when he directed 
that these claims be brought before the Tribunal. This holding 
is irresponsible. The President does not assert any power to ? 
-------------~~-----~------------------
characterization of his actions as such ill serves the 
separation of powers. Presumably it would not be argued that 
the President had ousted the court from jurisdiction if he had 
settled these claims by receiving a lump sum The 
analysis should be no different because he has 
agreement to arbitrate backed by an escrow fund. 
The President's order does not the 
jurisdiction of the courts but the 
claims. If he has "taken" anything it is not judicial power, 
but a chose in action. In my view, it is folly for a federal 
court to willfully characterize what the President has done as 
an unconstitutional incursion on Art III power. A significant 
underlying question in this case is the role of the judiciary. 
It seems to me broadly that the question of whether to make an 
agreement of the type at issue here is a political question. If 
Congress doesn't like it it can say so; if the People don't 
like it they can vote. The proper role for the judiciary is not 
to second guess the judgment of the President that this 
agreement was a proper response to difficult events, when the 
Congress has been silent. However, the judiciary has a 
significant role to play in seeing that individual rights are 
not washed away in the attempt to secure a public benefit. This 
role is most properly exercised in regard the "taking" question 
rather than in the question of the power of the President. The 
judicary should not say that the political arm cannot act, but 
should state that the political arm must pay for the private 
rights they employ to acheive their aims. This allows 
discretion, but protects the individuals rights. 
In summary, I would hold that the President acted 
pursuant to the Hostage Act and exercised his tradtiional power .,, 
to settle claims.'' ..------
PS 06/22/81 
I 
To: Mr. Just i ce Powell 
From: Paul Smith 
Re: No. 80-2078, Dames & Moore v. Regan--Statutory Issues 
There are three different statutes that have some 
relevance to this case: the International Economic 
Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 u.s.c. § 1701 et seq., the 
"Hostage Act," 22 U.S.C. § 1732, and the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act, 28 u.s.c. § 1602 et seq. The first two are 
possible sources of congressional authorization of the Iran 
Agreement. The third may indirectly support the President's 
power to void the attachments by making those attachments 
void ab initio on immunity grounds. I will treat each act 
in turn. 
I. The IEEPA 
; 
L. • 
The First Circuit and the DC Circuit both 
concluded that this statute, passed in 1977, gives the 
President the power to vacate the attachments entered under 
licenses issued by the Secretary of the Treasury after the 
initial "blocking" of the Iranian assets. They refused to 
accept the Government's argument that this statute also 
authorized the "suspension" of the cases pending in American 
courts and transfer of those cases to the Tribunal. These 
holdings appear to be correct. 
A. The Statute 
The IEEPA was passed in 1977 to provide standards 
for Presidential regulation of economic matters in times of 
emergency that fall short of actual war. Prior to that 
time, the Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 u.s.c. App. § S(b), 
applied both to wartime and to other emergencies declared by 
the President. It gave the President somewhat broader 
powers over foreign assets, including the power to seize and 
vest those assets. The Trading With the Enemy Act is now 
limited in effect to wartime, and the IEEPA "does not 
include the power to vest, i.e, to take title to foreign 
property." H.R. Rep. No. 95-459, p. 15 (1977). 
(:/ /£.Ef'A-
Instead, the emphasis is on regulation of assets 
-1 
during a short period of actual emergency. The President is 
empowered to 
investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, 
void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, 
holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, 
transportation, importation or exportation of, or 
dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or 
privilege with respect to, or transactions 
involving, any property in which any foreign 
country or a national thereof has any interest 
j. 
In the exercise of these powers, the President is not 
totally free of congressional control. He mus~eclare an 
emerge:~, an~~nsult with Congress prior to doing 
so. 50 U.S.C. § 1703 (a). He must transmit a full report 
specifying the reasons for his action and the specific 
actions to be undertaken. Id., § 1703(b). In addition, the 
Congress may terminate the President's actions by a 
concurrent resolution under the National Emergencies Act, 
id., § 1622(b), as long as it specifies in the resolution ~~ a.c,l;;;,.,. 
that it wishes to terminate Presidential authority under the 
IEEPA, id., § 1706(b). 
The purpose of the IEEPA was to restrict the broad 
grant of authority to the President in the Trading with the 
Enemy Act, which had been used by Presidents in many non-
emergency situations to regulate trade. Congress saw a need 
for "regulation of international economic transactions," 
House Report at 10-11, in times of emergency, but no need 
for the kinds of seizures and distributions of enemy 
property that are possible in wartime under the Trading with 
the Enemy Act. It also sought to ensure that the 
emergencies invoked would be short-term and real. 1-hfw- ~ 
B. Voiding the Attachments 
':t • 
~~-"IE6///I_, ~. I..J.~~ ~: 
Using these powers, in November of 1979 the 
President blocked removal of the Iranian assets and ordered 
that no attachment be entered on them unless licensed by the 
Government. The President ultimately did license 
attachments on these assets, but he also issued a regulation 
stating that "the provisions of this part and any rulings, 
licenses, authorization, instructions, orders, or forms 
issued thereunder may be amended, modified, or revoked at 
any time." 31 C.F.R. § 535.805. Thus it appears that most 
of the attachments, including those in this case, were 
conditioned at least implicitly on possible revocation of 
this authorization. Another category of cases involves 
attachments entered prior to the initial invocation of the 
President's IEEPA powers. 
The Act is easier to apply to the first category of 
attachments. As in the First Circuit case, petr here 
obtained its attachment under license from the government, 
after "the assets were within the President's control, under 
the umbrella of his IEEPA powers." Id., at 10. Therefore, 
it is much easier to argue that petr "could [not] obtain 
such an interest in the blocked assets as would later hamper 
the President in disposing of them." Id. The argument is 
that the President clearly could bar all future attachments 
against the funds after the entry of the blocking order and, 
if so, could allow such attachments subject to possible 
voiding at a later date under the President's IEEPA powers. 
5. 
In his decision from the Southern District of New 
York, Judge Duffy takes the contrary view, arguing that the 
attachments, once entered, were property rights that the 
President could not void. In his view, the license to 
impose attachments could only be revoked prospectively. 
While this view is not illogical, it seems less than 
compelling in light of the case law under the old provisions 
of the Trading with the Enemy Act. The principal case is 
Orvis v. Brownell, 345 u.s. 183 (1953), involving a blocking 
order entered by the government against Japanese assets 
under the TWEA. The Court previously had held that this 
blocking order did not prevent state attachment orders, 
which were then necessary in order to obtain jurisdiction 
over the Japanese defendants. However, in Orvis, the Court 
held that such an attachment could not narrow the 
prerogatives of the federal government (the "Custodian") 
with respect to these assets under the TWEA. The attachment 
did not constitute a "transfer," because to so interpret it 
would be to "ignore the express conditions on which the 
consent [to the attachment] was extended." Id., at 187. 
As Judge Duffy's opinion demonstrates, there are 
ways to distinguish Orvis. It did not involve the formal 
voiding of an attachment--merely the vesting of the property 
itself by the Government. And the blocking order issued 
here was more explicit in its authorization of attachment 
orders--and therefore less clear on any conditions. But the 
"' . 
basic thrust of the case supports the government: an 
attachment may be allowed against blocked assets, but it 
does not destroy the power of the government to regulate the 
assets under the statute allowing the initial blocking 
order--at least where preservation of this governmental 
power may fairly be implied in the terms of the license 
granted. 
Even disregarding the conditional licensing 
argument, there is support in the language of the IEEPA for 
the view that the President may nullify any attachment of 
foreign property--even those entered prior to the emergency. 
The Act authorizes the President to "nullify .•• any holding 
of, br exercising any right, power, or privilege 
with respect to •.. " foreign property. This would seem to 
include the power to "nullify" attachments. This reading is 
reinforced by tT President's apparent power to "direct and 
compel ..• transfer ..• or exportation of" foreign property. 
Such a transfer would have the effect of "voiding" an 
attachment. In the present case, the Court need not rely on 
this more general Presidential power, but choice of such a 
rationale might have an effect on other pending cases 
involving pre-emergency attachments. 
C. Suspending the Pending Court Cases 
The Iran Agreement did more than void existing 
attachments. It ordered "suspension" of court cases in 
favor of adjudication at the tribunal. The question thus 
7 • 
becomes whether such an action can be , brought within the 
statutory authorization of the IEEPA. Judge McGowan in the 
CADC case and the majority in the CAl case, refused to find 
such an authorization in the admittedly broad and vague 
terms of the Act. However the Government makes this 
argument, and was able to convince Judge Breyer of the CAl, 
who wrote a concurring opinion. Judge Breyer's theory was 
that the President has the power to "regulate, ... nullify, 
••• or prohibit ... [the] exercising [of] any right, power, 
or privilege with respect to ..• any property in which any 
foreign country or a national thereof has any interest; by 
any person • • • subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States." 50 u.s.c. § 1702(a) (1) (B). For him, a lawsuit 
against Iran (leaving aside any question of attached assets 
in the U.S.) is the "exercising" of a "right" with respect 
to "property" in which a foreign national has an interest by 
a person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 
If so, the President is authorized to regulate or nullify 
such a lawsuit. 
It seems clear that the statutory terms can be 
made to fit the order issued in this case. This is true 
because the property involved need not itself be in the 
United States, as long as someone subject to United States 
jurisdiction is seeking to exercise a right to that 
property. But there are a number of reasons why it probably 
is not fair to read the statute this broadly. First, it is 
H. 
clear that Congress meant (at lea~t principally) to 
authorize Presidential regulation of assets. Here, the 
question is not regulatioj n of assets--merely the validity 
of a lawsuit by an American company suing a foreign entity. 
The word property apparently was intended to refer to a 
tangible thing--since the IEEPA grew out of the TWEA, which 
was concerned with the disposition of enemy assets left in 
the United States. While the IEEPA gives the President 
broad power to regulate all forms of international 
transact ions, it goes pretty far to say that, under the 
IEEPA, he is authorized to stop a person from suing a 
foreigner. The proper distinction is analogous to the 
distinction between jurisdiciton in rem and jurisdiction in 
personam. The President can control a res, and control 
Americans seeking to obtain a res, but cannot prevent 
Americans from suing foreign countries altogether. 
Second, it seems odd to allow the President to use 
this statutory authority to benefit the "enemy" and injure 
----------~---
Americans. The Act grew out of an earlier one, the TWEA, 
which sought to ensure that enemies could not withdraw 
assets, as well as to ensure that American creditors 
received a fair share. Here, however, a "ransom" is being 
"paid" by means of a sacrifice of the rights of Americans to 
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President to do this, 
authorization in the 
I think it is 
IEEPA. Perhaps 
unfair to find an J ~ 
is why the SG this 
Y. 
makes only a perfunctory argument for the view that the 
President's suspension of the claims was authorized by the 
Act. SG's Br. at 53. If I am correct in my interpretation -
of the IEEPA, the voiding of the attachments was authorized, 
but the suspension of the court cases themselves must be 
justified on other statutory or constitutional grounds. 
II. The "Hostage Act" { J ft,S) -The SG also makes a short argument for the view 
that the President's actions are authorized by the Hostage 
Act, a statute passed in 1868 in response to the actions of --
other countries in detaining naturalized American citizens. 
The statute states that when a foreign government detains an 
American and refuses a demand for release, "the President 
shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he 
may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the 
release." 22 u.s.c. § 1732. The argument is that this 
constitutes a delegation of power to the President to deal 
with hostage-taking by foreign governments, and that such a 
broad delegation is permissible in the foreign affairs area. 
It seems clear to me that the statute, on its 
face, applied to these facts. It requires only that "any 
citizen of the United States [be] unjustly deprived of his 
liberty by or under the authority of any foreign 
government." Id. One could argue that the statute should 
be limited to situations in which governments have refused 
.LU. 
to recognize the naturalization of for~ign-born persons as 
Americans {the problem in 1868 in Great Britain). But in 
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 {1965), the Court suggested that 
this statute might apply to illegal imprisonments more like 
the present one--those undertaken in the early days of the 
Castro regime. Id., at 15. The Court cited the President's 
"statutory obligation" to take "necessary and proper" 
actions as one reason for denying Americans access to Cuba 
in the first place. Id. 
The question therefore becomes whether this 
statute can be said to authorize the particular response 
chosen by the President in this case--suspending pending 
court cases brought by American citizens. There appear to 
be two possible interpretations of what Congress did in 
1868. One might argue that Congress did not authorize the 
President to take any actions that were not already within 
his constitutional powers, and merely sought to ensure that 
he would take some action. The statute, after all, merely 
states that the President "shall use such means ... as he 
may think necessary and proper" to seek the release of the 
imprisoned persons. And the sponsor of the language 
ultimately adopted, Senator Williams of Oregon, stated that 
his main concern was presidential inaction at the time. 
Congressional Globe, pt. 5, at 4330 {July 22, 1868). See 
also id., at 4333 {President must act within the 
Constitution and other federal laws). Alternatively, as 
·, 
Judge McGowan stated in his concurring opinion in the CADC 
case, the statute may be viewed as an authorization to the 
President to take any action within the power of the federal 
government as a whole, without further statutory 
authorization. This certainly was the view of the opponents 
of the bill, who saw it as a vague and broad license to the 
President. There is also support for this view in the 
statements of Senator Williams, who called on the Senate to 
rely on the judgment of the President concerning what action 
was appropriate, id., at 4333, and argued that it was 
impossible to meet these international problems without 
allowing the President discretion to tailor the remedy to 
the natur'e of the particular country involved, id., at 4359. 
My view is that the Hostage Act does provide some 
congressional authorization to the President in this case by 
----------~-------------------------------· 
authorizing him to undertake some actions that might not be 
within the power of the President absent any statute. In 
other words, it is my view that the existence of this 
statute does lessen the separation-of-powers problem in this -------- ..__ . 
case by bringing the President's actions within the first of 
Justice Jackson's in Youngstown--where the -
President acts with legislative authorization. Of course, 
the legislative authorization here is extremely vague, and 
very old as well, and thus is not necessarily as convincing 
as a more specific and more recent statute. But the Hostage 






acceptance of wide Presidential discre,tion in the face of 
hostage problems. And very general delegations of power to 
the President in foreign affairs have been validated in the 
past. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 
u.s. 304, 320 (1936). If so, the Hostage Act can be used to 
fill the gap in the IEEPA identified above--authorizing not 
only the voiding of the attachments but also the suspension 
of the court cases themselves. This interpretation would 
allow the Court to avoid deciding whether the President has 
a general power to take such an action in an emergency that 
Jla~L, 
~
does not involve hostages--without congressional ~ ~ 
;1u:_ 
authorization. Unless the Court is convinced that the~ 
limitations in the IEEPA impliedly prohibit more extensive~~ 
actions affecting the court claims under the Hostage Act,~ 
this is the rationale I would advocate--at least as an ~ ~ 
alternative holding in addition to a constitutional one. 
1-o'~· 
n...c- ~~4.41 III. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is relevant 
to this case in two distinct ways. First, petr argues, and 
Judge Duffy held, that it constitutes an affirmative 
indication from Congress that commercial claims against 
foreign governments are to be handled judicially, and not 
~------'-------------------------------
compromised by the President. Second, the SG argues in a 
footnote, Br. at 26, n. 19, that the Act helps his cause 
because the attachments voided by the President were already 
illegal. The argument is that Iran had not waived its 
. : 
.J::Jo 
immunity with respect to pre-judgment 
....... ~~~-- ...._.. ... - attachme.vts, as 
required by the Act. The first argument will be handled by ----------Peter in the context of his constitutional discussion. The 
second I will discuss here. 
I have already argued that the Presiderrr has the 
power under the IEEPA to void the attachments entered by 
courts under licenses issued after the initial blocking of 
Iran's assets. This FSIA argument would constitute an 
additional reason why the President could void these 
attachments. Its main significance would be in cases 
involving attachments entered prior to the invocation of 
IEEPA powers by the President. In those cases, the 
President may only be able to void the attachments if they 
were void ab initio under the FSIA. 
The question of whether Iranian entities are 
immune from pre-judgment attachment depends on the 
interpretation given to the relevant FSIA provisions and to 
the Treaty of Amity between the two countries. The Act, 
passed in 1976, provides that "the property of a foreign -
state •.. used for commercial activity in the United States, 
shall not be immune from attachment prior to the entry of 
judgment ..• if--(1) the foreign state has explicitly waived 
its immunity II 28 u.s.c. § 1610(d). This is the only 
portion of the Act requiring an "explicit" waiver of 
immunity by the foreign state. In the present case, it 
would be difficult to argue that Iran has explicitly waived 
immunity from pre-judgment attachment. The relevant portion 
of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Art. XI, ,, 4, states: 
~enterprise of either High Contracting Party, 
including corporations, associations, and 
government a encies and instrumentalities, which 
is publ1cly owned or con ro e s a , if it 
engages in commercial, industrial, snipping or 
other business activities within the terri tor ies 
of the other High contracting Party, claim or 
enjoy, either for itself or for _its property, 
therein from taxation, su1t, execution of 
judgm§..nt o..E._ other J..iaQj.li ty towhi.ch pr iva±ely 
owned~d controlled -enterprises are subject 
tnerein. --- -----
As several courts have noted, this language does not contain 
anything approaching an explicit reference to pre-judgment 
attachment. ~, E-Systems, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 49l F. Supp. 1294, 1301-1302 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Behring 
International, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. 
Supp. 383, 393 (D.N.J. 1979). 
There is, however, one possible way for plaintiffs 
to get around this problem. The Act preserves in effect 
existing international agreements, 28 U.S .C. § 1609, and 
~ 
those agreements probably need not -\interpreted according to 
the standards established in the Act itself. Thus, if the 
1~55 Tr~ of_Ami~y can fairly be interpreted as effecting 
an 'implied waiver of immunit~~ from pre-judgment attachment, ....... ,..._.., 
that waiver would still be in effect--despite § 1610's 
requirement of an explicit waiver. The argument would be 
that the Treaty implied a waiver in its reference to "other 
liability to which privately owned and controlled 
: 
.L::>. 
enterprises are subject." If a pre-jud,gment attachment can 
be viewed as a form of "liability," it may be that the 
Treaty meant for Iranian assets to be treated just like 
those of private firms. 
The lower courts are split on this issue. Compare 
Behring International, supra, at 395 (Treaty waives 
immunity) with E-Systems, supra (rejecting this view because 
waivers of immunity are not inferred lightly and a waiver 
with respect to pre-judgment attachments would have 
contravened the normal practice in 1955). I lean toward the 
view that pre-judgment attachments are not among the forms 
of "liability" that clearly fall within the statutory terms. 
The Government raises a separate argument for the 
view that many of the attachments entered were invalid. Br. 
at 26, n. 19. It argues that the Treaty only waives 
immunity of any kind with respect to Iranian commercial 
entities--relying on the Treaty's reference to enterprises 
that "engage[] in commercial, industrial, shipping or other 
business activities 
Contracting Party." 
within the territories of the other High 
se:r~ 
In its view, the Iranian Army would be 
-t 
immune as a non-commercial entity, even if it purchases 
goods in America. The Government also argues that this 
limited waiver still controls despite the possibly broader 
language of the FSIA waiving immunity relating to 
"commercial activity carried on in the United States by the 
~~
foreign state." This argument seems-A a little strained, 
.Lt:>. 
since the distinction between commercial entities and 
governmental entities engaged in commerce is hard to draw 
and not really required by the Treaty or the Act. 
Perhaps the best thing to do with these questions 
is to state that they are an added reason for the Court's 7 
recognition of Presidential power to void the attachments. 
If the requisite waiver of immunity was absent, these 
attachments had no legal validity. 
One remaining argument must be addressed in this 
context. In an earlier case, Judge Duffy held that the 
President's actions in blocking the assets and licensing 
attachments themselves constituted a waiver of Iran's 
immunity. New England Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power 
and Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp. 120, 131 (SONY 1980). 
The court read the IEEPA as authorizing the President, in 
his regulation of foreign assets in time of emergency, to 
strip a foreign sovereign of any immunity with respect to 
those assets. It also found an intent to take this action 
in the general 1979 order issued by the President blocking 
Iran's assets. I find this argument unconvincing. First, 
it is far from clear that in the 1977 IEEPA the Congress 
meant to allow the President this extraordinary power only 
one year after, in the 1976 FSIA, it transferred control 
over foreign immunity issues from the State Department to 
the courts. Moreover, there is no explicit language 
affecting Iran's immunity in the President's blocking order, 
·, 
and one would expect something specific before finding an 
intent on the part of the President to waive immunity. See 
McGreevey, The Iranian Crisis and u.s. Law, 2 N.W. J. of 
Int'l Law and Business 384, 407-10 (1980). 
The IEEPA 
Summary 






action in voiding the attachments. For one 
appears that the the license to enter the 
was conditional, and did 
power to control the assets 
v. Brownell. Moreover, the 
not restrict the 
under the IEEPA. 
Act appears to 
authorize nullification of any attachment against foreign 
assets in time of emergency. The IEEPA does not constitute 
Congressional authorization of the President's action in 
suspending the court cases. 
The Hostage Act of 1868 probably should be read as 
authorizing the President to take any legal actions within 
the power of the federal government as a whole, when he is 
seeking to obtain the release of citizens wrongfully 
detained by foreign governments. If so, this can help to 
justify the suspension of the court cases. 
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, along with 
the Treaty of Amity, probably renders the attachment legally 
void ab initio--although there is a split in authority on 
this issue. I would not infer a "waiver" of this immunity 
.. 
in the President's blocking order and subsequent licensing 
of attachments. 
LFP/lab 
''tftjj- /'k ~"~~HI~} 
06/22/81 Rider A,,pg. 2 Iranian Case ~~ 
~~­
'/tt~t-J 
The President extinguished property right~
private American citizens in order to obtain release of the 
s~"'"f 
hostages. He agreed in the Declarations of Algie~. lo 
terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts ~ 
involving claims of United States persons and institutions • 
against Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify all 
attachments and judgments obtained therein, and to prohibit 
all further litigation based on such claims, and to bring 
about the termination of such claims through binding 
arbitration." (Decl.) This action was taken pursuant to a 
"finding" made by the President under the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 u.s.c. (Supp. III) 
170l(a), that there was an "extraordinary threat ••• to the 
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United 
States." Thus, for purposes only unrelated to the claim of 
petitioner and other American citizens similarly situated, 
the President acted for a public purpose. 
I think it clear that this use of private claims 
of citizens for a public purpose may effect a taking of 
property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment • 
. • 
; 
LFP/lab 06/22/81 Rider A, pg. 3 Iranian Case 
The government disposes of petitioner's "taking" 
argument in little more than two pages of its 66-page brief. 
The argument is said to be "without merit". The President 
is said to have the power "to settle claims against Iran by 
providing for their submission to arbitration". And, "[i]f 
there are insufficient funds in the escrow account, the 
Tribunal's awards may be enforced "in the courts of any 
nation in accordance with its laws". Br. 64, 65. 
One would have thought that the government of the 
United States would be sympathetic, rather than hostile, to 
assuring the ultimate payment of all just claims if - as 
seems entirely possible - payment in full is not made under 
the procedures required by the Declarations of Algiers. 
Apart from what the Constitution may require, private 
citizens with valid claims normally would expect their 
government, in circumstances such as these, voluntarily to 
assure that valid claims are fully paid at the expense of 
the Treasury of the United States if this should become 
necessary.* I therefore find the Government's position 
singularly insensitive to what many would view as at least a 
moral obligation. 
SEE FOOTNOTE PAGE 2. 
2. 
*It approaches a high level of naivete to rely on 
the recovery "in the courts of any nation" if there are 
insufficient funds in the escrow accounty. Even if this 
means that petitioner may sue Iran or its instrumentalities 
in the courts of the United States for any shortfall, this 
would assume the presence here of assets to attach - an · 
unlikely prospect indeed. In view of the demonstrated 
hostility that exists in Iran toward the United States, and 
the 16th century fanaticism of its rulers, it is irrational 
to predicate any legal decision on the assumption that Iran 
would leave assets in the United States if there is any 
possibility of suits for deficiency judgments. 
NOTE TO GREG: 
I am under the impression that the Agreement 
expressly states that all claims against Iran are 
extinguished. The SG repeatedly claims the power to 
"settle" these claims which - if it means anything - is to 
settle them finally without full payment. I do not want you 
to interrupt your dral€, out when you have the opportunity, 
let me know what you think the SG is talking about in saying 







80-2078 Dames & Moore v. Regan 
TO MY CLERKS 
In view of the "flood" of filings here in this 
case, including petitions to intervene and for permission to 
file amici briefs, I have been concerned whether there was 
any "recusal" problem. 
We need not worry about amici briefs, as the 
settled practice ever since I have been here is that one 
does not disqualify because of amicus briefs. Otherwise, a 
Justice deliberately could be knocked out of any case. 
There is no problem with Dames & Moore, as there 




however, granted several petitions to intervene as parties. 
I have tried to keep up with these, and check the parties. 
But with the pressures to move ahead with this 
case, and the multiplicity of papers and briefs filed, I 
would like the three of you who have worked on this case to 
double check me. The only possible recusal that came to my 
attention was United Virginia Bank. Its general counsel 
advises me that the bank has been paid off in full and has 
no interest in the case. 
As no conflict has come to my attention, I will 
'" "' sit tomorrow and attend the Conference. If you should 
.,. " • t "~ 
.<1": ·,, 'l•• 
J::'i 
discover some party we have not previously identified, I 
would, of course, recuse myself from the decision. 





OF"F"ICE OF" THE CLERK 
SUPREME COURT OF" THE UNITED STATES 
WASHINGTON, D . C .. 20543 
June 22, 1981 
Memorandum to the Conference 
Re: Dames & Moore v. Regan, Secretary of 
the Treasury, et al., No. 80-2078 
In the above-entitled case to be argued on 
Wednesday, June 24, 1981, Mr. Leonard Boudin informed 
the Clerk's Office today that he will be unable to 
argue because he was admitted to a New York hospital 
late Thursday evening with a heart infection and a 
103° temperature. His physician refuses to release 
him. 
Mr. Eric M. Lieberman will argue in his stead. 
Respectfully submitted, 
td/~~ 




DRAFT: No. 80-2078: Dames & Moore v. Regan 
5 
Justice Powell, memorandum. 
This memorandum addresses the question whether 
petitioner has a legal remedy in the Court of Claims under 10 
the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §1491, in the event that the 
President's actions effect a taking of petitioner's 
property for public use. The availability of the Tucker 
Act remedy is ripe for adjudication, and in my view it 
must be answered now rather than later. I conclude that 15 
such a remedy is available to petitioner. 
I 
2. 
The President used legal claims of private 
American citizens and enterprises in order to obtain the 20 
release of the hostages. He agreed "to terminate all 
legal proceedings in the United States courts involving 
claims of United States persons and institutions against 
Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify all attachments 
and judgments obtained therein, to prohibit all further 25 
litigation based on such claims, and to bring about the 
termination of such claims through binding arbitration." 
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and 
Popular Republic of Alergia, ,I B. Petitioner's attachment 
~1 Iranian assets is among the attachments nullified by 30 
this agreement, and its breach-of-contract claim against 
Iran and Iranian instrumentalities is among the claims 
terminated in United States courts and submitted to 
arbitration. 
I think it clear that this public use of the 35 
private claims of petitioner and other American citizens 
and entreprises may effect a taking of private property 
within the meaning of the Just Compensation Clause. 
Petitioner's breach-of-contract claim represents a 
3. 
property interest, 1 which will be diminished if, for 40 
example, petitioner is denied the opportunity to present 
claims to the Claims Tribunal; if petitioner 
establishes that its rights to redress before the Claims 
Tribunal are deme~-e-a:-'&l:y- inferior to its rights in United 
States courts; or if the Claims Tribunal awards petitioner 
an amount that falls demonstrably short of a fair 
satisfaction of its claim.2 
~ 
Petitioner contends that the 
"\ 
order of attachment it obtained upon Iranian assets is 
another property interest which, by nullification, the 
President already has taken. But the pr-ecise manner and 
J
.. -
of diminution are inconsequential, for "however 
accompli shed,~· and whether or not intended by the 
President, a diminution of petitioner's property interest 
will entitle petitioner to just compensation. It cannot 
~--------
- . -
~he President's actioif were 
1\ 
largely be disputed 
unrelated to legal claims such as petitioner's. Rather, 
the President acted in the national interest;' of obtaining 
the hostage's freedom and resolving an international 




relatively few citizens and enterprises with legal claims. 60 
4. 
The Just Compensation Clause applies in these 
circumstances, for it "was designed to bar Government from 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in 
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as 
a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 u.s. 40, 48-49 65 
(1960). See Gray v. United States, 21 Ct.Cl. 340, 3420343 
(18886); 3 ; cf. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 
260-261 (1980); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 
438 u.s. 104, 123-124 (1978). 
~-
The contends that petitioner's Government 
"taking" argument is "without merit." Brief 64. It is 
~ 
~.,y &;!~ said 
II" .~ "unaffected," 
that petitioner's is breach-of-contract claim 
for the President "simply" has "provide [d] 
~ ~~ Id., at 65. 
#-~~· 
~ insufficient 
for the same claim to be heard in a different forum." 
And if the funds in the escrow account are 
to satisfy the awards of the Claims Tribunal, 
~ it is said that petitioner may enforce the Tribunal's }~ 
'I- ~A') 
~r~ 
award "'in the courts of any nation in accordance with its 






I would have thought that the Government of the 
United States would be solicitous to assure the payment of 
just claims if, as seems to me entirely possible, payment 
in full is not made under the procedures established in 
the Declaration of Algeria. Apart from what the 85 
Constitution requires, citizens and enterprises with valid 
claims normally would expect the Government, in 
circumstances such as these, voluntarily to assure that 
they are fully paid at the expense of the Treasury of the 
United States if necessary. I find the Government's 90 
possi tion singularly insensitive to what many would view 
as at least its moral obligation. Furthermore, I cannot 
rely as the Government urges on the "right" given by the 
Declaration to recover "in the courts of any nation" if 
insufficient funds are deposited in the escrow account. 95 
Even if this means that petitioner may sue Iran and its 
instrumentalities in United States courts for a shortfall, 
the prospect that Iranian assets will be found in this 
country is highly unlikely. In view of Iran's 
demonstrated hostility toward the United States, it is 100 
hardly rational to predicate our decision on the 
6. 
assumption that Iran would leave assets in this country if 
there is any possibility of suits for deficiency 
judgments. 
possibility ....gxist.s, that the 105 
President's actions will effect a taking of petitioner's 
private property for a public use. That possibility makes 
ripe for adjudication the question whether petitioner will 
have a remedy at law in the Court of Claims under the 
Tucker Act, 28 u.s.c. §1491.4 I would have serious 110 
reservations about the constitutionality of a Presidential 
power that could effect a taking of property for which the 
property holder had no remedy against the United States. 
That the !:aot-~n.t..:.e£ - ._1:18 taking in this case is yet 
speculative is ineeRsQqueat:-i-a1, for "there must be at the 115 
time of taking 'a reasonable, certain and adequate 
provision for obtaining compensation.'" Regional Rail 
Reorganization Act Cases, 419 u.s. 102, 124-125 (1974), 
quoting Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 
U.S. 641, 659 (1890); see also Cities Service Co. v. 120 
McGrath, 342 u.s. 330, 335-336 (1952); Duke Power Co. v. 
Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 u.s. 59, 94, n. 39 
' ... 
7. 
(1978) . 5 I therefore turn to the availability of a remedy 
under the Tucker Act. 
125 
II 
Petitioner will have a remedy in the Court of 
Claims in the event of a taking of its property. Section 
1491 provides in pertinent part that "[t]he Court of 
Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any 130 
claim against the United States founded .•• upon the 
Constitution " A claim that the President's actions 
took its property for public use without just compensation 
"plainly would fall within the literal words" of §1491, 
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, supra, at 126, for 135 
" [ i] f there is a taking, the claim is 'founded upon the 
Constitution,'" United States v. Causby, 328 u.s. 256, 267 
(1946); accord Jacobs v. United States, 290 u.s. 13, 16 
(1933). 
There only remains, therefore, the question 140 
whether 28 u.s.c. §1502 divests the Court of Claims of 
jurisdiction over taking claims arising from the 
President's actions. Section 1502 provides, 
"Except as otherwise provided by Act of 
Congress, the Court of Claims shall not have 
jurisdiction of any claim against the United 
States growing out of or dependent upon any 
treaty entered into with foreign nations." 
8. 
As consistently construed by this Court and the Court of 
Claims, §1502 is not a bar to jurisdiction over taking 
claims such as petitioner might raise. This section 
divests the Court of Claims of jurisdiction only where a 
treaty itself confers the right that the claimant relies 
upon as against the United States. United States v. Weld, 
127 U.S. 51 (1888); United States v. Old Settlers, 148 
u.s. 427 (1893); Eastern Extension Telephone Co. v. 
United States, 231 u.s. 326 (1913) .6 In this case, the 




Just Compensation Clause, not by the Agreements entered 160 
into by the President with Iran nor by any of the 
Executive Orders or Department of Treasury regulations.? 
III 
In sum, petitioners have a remedy at law in the 165 
Court of Claims against the United States in the event 
that the President 1 s actions effect a taking of 
petitioner 1 s property, either by the submission of its 
9. 
breach-of-contract claim to arbitration or by the 
nullification of its attachments. The availability of 170 
this remedy is significant to my conclusion as to the 
President's powers, for the Just Compensation Clause "was 
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone 
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong v. 175 
United States, supra, at 49.8 
lPetitioner's complaint $3,788,930, plus 




~~·~·  2The Declaration provides that the Claims Tribunal is 
to be funded initially with $1 billion of Iranian assets 
to satisfy awards to American claimants, and that Iran 
wo8uld maintain a minimum balance of $500 million in a 
5 
security account until all awards of the Tribunal have 10 
been paid. Declaration, ,I 7. It is estimated, however, 
that American claims eligible for arbitration in the 
Tribunal total $3-4 billion. It is at yet unclear, of 
course, whether Iran will fulfill its promise to maintain 
the security account until all awards are paid. 15 
3Gr ay v. United States was an advisory opinion to 
Congress concerning a waiver by treaty of claims against 
France. In return for France's agreement to release the 20 
United States from a treaty obligation to protect French 
2. 
territorial possessions on this continent, the United 
States relinquished certain claims of American nationals 
against France. When asked whether this relinquishment 
implicated the Just Compensation Clause, the Court of 25 
Claims stated: 
"That any Government has the right to do this, 
as it has the right to refuse in war the 
protection of a wronged citizen, or to take 
other action, which, at the expense of the 
individual, is most beneficial to the whole 
people, is too clear for discussion. 
Nevertheless, the citizen whose property is thus 
sacrificied for the safety and welfa,re of his 
country has his claim against that country; he 
has a right to compensation .•.. It seems to us 
that this 'bargain' .•. which was brought about by 
the sacrifice of the interests of individual 
citizens, falls within the intent and meaning of 
the Constitution, which prohibits the taking of 
private property for public use without just 
compensation." 21 Ct. Cl. at 342-343. 




I think that Gray correctly concluded that the 45 
relinquishment of legal claims in the settlement of an 
international dispute was a taking of property interests 
for a public use compensable under the Just Compensation 
Clause. I do not read Blagge v. Balch, 162 U.S. 439, 457 
(1896) , to express any opinion on the legal reasoning in 50 
Gray. In any event, any opinion expressed on Gray would 
be dictum, as the only issue in Blagge was the 
interpretation of a congressional Act that governed the 
3. 
manner of paying claims found by the Court of Claims to be 
due as compensation for the relinquishment of legal claims 55 
at issue in Gray. See Aris Gloves, Inc. v. United 
States, 420 u.s. 1386, 1395-1397 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (Nichols, 
J., concurring); McGreevey, The Iranian Crisis and U.S. 
Law, 2 Nw. J. Int'l Law & Bus. 384, 439-440 (1980). 
60 
4The Tucker Act vests jurisdiction in federal district 
court, concurrent with the Court of Claims, for claims 
against the United States involving less than $10,000. 28 
u.s.c. §1346(a)(2). Although nothing in the record 65 
indicates whether a taking of petitioner's property would 
exceed $10,000, if a taking occurs at all, the nature of 
petitioner's commercial contracts with Iran make it 
unlikely that less than $10,000 would be involved. 
Accordingly, my concern is with the availability of a 70 
remedy in the Court of Claims, not in the district court. 
4. 
5cities Service Co. v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330 {1952), 
well illustrates this rule of law. The Attorney General, 75 
acting as successor to the Alien Property Custodian, 
sought payment of certain negotiable debentures from the 
obligor on the debentures and the indenture trustee. The 
obligations represented by the debentures had been seized 
by the Alien Property Custodian under the Trading with the 80 
Enemy Act, 50 u.s.c. App. §1 et seq., but the debentures 
themselves were not in the Custodian's possession. 
Petitioners argued that the seizure provisions of the Act 
would effect a taking of their property in the event that 
a foreign court subsequently held them liable to a holder 85 
in due course of the debentures, and that the taking would 
be without just compensation unless they had a remedy 
against the United States. Petitioners conceded that they 
could plead payment in this country as a defense to suit 
in another country. The Court considered the availability 90 
of a Tucker Act remedy despite skepticism as to 
petitioners' concern over the prospect of double payment. 
It stated: 
"While their defense to such litigation seems 
adequate and final payment by them improbable, 
we agree that petitioners might suffer judgment 
the payment of which would effect a double 
recovery against them. In that event, 
petitioner will have the right to recoup from 
the United States, for a 'taking' of their 
property within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment, 'just compensation' to the extent of 
their double liability. Such cause of action 
will accrue when, as, and if a foreign court 
forces petitioners to pay a holder in due course 
of the debentures. We agree .•. that only with 
this assurance against double liability can it 
fairly be said that the present seizure is not 
itself an unconstitutional taking of 
petitioners' property." Id., at 335-336. 
5. 
6In United States v. Weld, 127 u.s. 51, 57 (1888), the 
Court held: 
"In order to make the claim one arising out of a 
treaty within the meaning of [the predecessor 
provision to §1502], the right itself, which the 
petition makes to be the foundation of the 
claim, must have its origin--drive its life and 
existence--from some treaty stipulation" 
(emphasis in original). 







asserted in Weld with the claim asserted in Great Western 125 
Insurance Co v. United States 112 U.S. 193 ( 1884) . As 
described by the Court, "[t]he petition [in Great Western] 
based the right of recovery on the provisions of the 
treaty itself." In United States v. Old Settlers, 148 
U.S. 427, 469 (1893), the Court stated that "a case 130 
6. 
arising from or growing out of a treaty is one involving 
rights given or protected by a treaty." The Court of 
Claims has consistently followed this construction of 
§1502. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, supra, at 
902-906; Societe Anonyme Des Ateliers Brillie Freres v. 135 
United States, 160 Ct.Cl. 192, 196-99 (1963); S.N.T. 
Fratelli Gondrand v. Unites States, 166 Ct.Cl. 473, 477 
(1964). 
140 
7The word "treaty" in §1502 has been construed to 
include executive agreements. Hughes Aricraft Co. v. 
United States, 534 F.2d 889, 903, n. 17 (Ct. Cl. 1976). 
Because §1502 is inapplicable to this case, I do not 
question that construction. 145 
case does not involve a situation in which 
governmental action that already ~as effected a taking is 
determined to be unauthorized. A taking that is not 150 
authorized expressly or by necessary implication "is not 
7. 
the act of the Government,.. and recovery against the 
Government is not available in the Court of Claims. Hooe 
v. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 336 (1910); Regional Rail 
Reorganization Act Cases 419 u.s. 102, 127 n. 16 (1974). 155 
I do not address the question whether petitioner would 
have a remedy in some other court under another cause of 
action if unauthorized Presidential action had taken its 
property for a public use. 
<, 
) 
' • . ,. I 
lfp/ss 6/23/81 
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STATUTORY ISSUES - MEMO TO FILE 
Paul Smith's memo of June 22 on these issues is 
persuasive - more so than the SG's rather arrogant brief. 
Indeed, the Iranian parties really don't need a lawyer with 
the SG so enthusiastic on their side. 
This memorandum merely summarizes, for my use, 
Paul's views -perhaps with some observations. 
~~ The three statutes are: the International 
Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA), the Hostage Act, and 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The first two 
are possible sources of congressional authorization of the 
type of agreeemtn before us. FSIA affords some basis for 
arguing that the prejudgment attachments were void initially 
because Iran had not "explicitly" waived immunity. 
,, i .ti\ 
I. IEEPA 
Passed in 1977 to replace the Trading with the 
Enemy Act, IEEPA authorizes presidential regulation of 
economic matters in an emergency short of actual war. To my 
surprise, Paul notes that there is some congressional · ,; 
oversight. The President may declare an emergency to make 





Congress may terminate a President's action by a concurrence 
resolution. 
1. What constitutes consulting? What does the 
record in this case show with respect to consulting? 
2. Elaborate on the power to terminate. When? 
•, •J 
Voiding Attachments. Petitioner in this case did 
not attach until a license was issued that, by its terms, 
was revocable. Paul thinks IEEPA authorized revocation, and 
therefore whatever property interest petitioner gained by 
the attachment was subject to be divested. Paul cites Orvis 
v. Brownell as persuasive but not controlling authority. ",,' 
Even w'ith respect to the cases where attachments 
were obtained prior to the President's restrictive "'· ·' 1· ' ~. J. 
regulations, Paul thinks a fairly persuasive argument can be 
made that IEEPA authorized the President to "nullify" the 
attachments. •I find it difficult to believe that Congress 
intended any such broad grant of power. 
Power to Suseend Pending Cases. The Iran 
agreement, in addition to voiding the attachments, ·~· 
"suspended" all court cases in favor of adjudication by the 
tribunal. 
Both CAl and CADC held that IEEPA did not 






Paul observes that a "President can control a res, 
and control Americans seeking to obtain a res, but cannot 
prevent Americans from suing foreign countries". Paul also 
notes that it would be "odd to allow the President to use 
IEEPA to benefit the 'enemy' and injure Americans". Thus, 
Paul concludes that IEEPA does not authorize suspension of 
the law suits. Peter will conclude, I think, that the 
President has inherent power to do this - as CADC and CAl 
have held. 
' 'f 
II. The Hosta9e Act (1968). 
00"1 .• 1 .. f 
J, 
'1\' 
This ancient statute provides that "the President 
shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war as he may 
think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the 
release" of Americans held by other nations. 
" ',~,'' Although this statute is extremely vague, the 
government relies on it - and Paul thinks with some reason -
· • as a eliminating any argument as to the separation of 
powers. The Act appears to make a broad grant of authority 
to do as he pleases - within the Constitution - to release 
American citizens. I would have a hard time "buying" the 
full sweep of this argument. b.l 
'r'. Specifically, Paul thinks that the Hostage Act 
does constitute arguable authority for the right of a 











''\.· ''· 4. 
III. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). 
Both sides rely heavily on this Act. Petitioner 
argues that it constitutes an affirmative indication from 
Congress that commercial claims against foreign governments 
',, are to be hand led judicially, and not compromised by the 
President. , The SG also argues (fn. 19, p. 26) that FSIA 
supports the view that the attachments were already illegal. 
The Act (1976) provides that: 
"The property of a foreign state • used 
for commercial activity in the United States, 
shall not be immune from attachment prior to 
the entry of judgment ••• if (1) the 
foreign state has explicitly waived its 
immunity •• "26 u.s.c. 1610(d). 
Although the purpose of the Act is to protect 
American creditors, § 1610(d) is the only provision that 
reuires an "explicit" waiver of immunity. The question then 
is whether Iran has so waived immunity from prejudgmen~ 
attachment by its 1955 treaty ~f a~ity that states: 
"No [Iranianl enterprise of ••• shall ••• 
claim or enjoy either for itself or for its 
property, immunity therein from taxation, 
suit, execution of judgment or other 
liability to which privately owned and 
controlled enterprises are subject therein." 
Although this language makes no explict reference 
to prejudgment attachment, FSIA preserves existing 
" international agreements such as the 1955 treaty of amity. 
18 u.s.c.A §1609. It can be argued, therefore, that the 
broad language above includes at least an "implied waiver of 
',· 
s. 
immunity from prejudgment attachment". The language of the 
treaty waiving immunity with respect to suits, execution of 
judgments "or other liability to which privately owned" 
enterprises are subject, could well include prejudgment 
attachments. Such attachments are commonly available in 
private litigation. .': ., " 
'' ,,., Paul notes that "lower courts are split on this 
issue", and he inclines to favor the government's view that 
there has been no "explicit" waiver. GIT 
I would think there should be a presumption in 
favor of waiver, as otherwise commercial transactions with 
foreign entities will be discouraged severely. The right to 
sue, without the attachment right, often will be an empty 
one. 
I do note, however, that apparently Iran has 
waived immunity with respect to "suit" and "execution of 
judgment or other liabilities". The SG - apparently quite 
enthusiastic about Iranians' efforts to avoid paying just 
debts, even argues that contracts to provide goods and 
services to the Iranian army are noncommercial, and 
therefore not subject to any waiver of immunity. I would 
not accept this argument. 
* * * 
'" In brief summary, Paul's careful examination of 
the statutes and cases casues him to think: 
lfp/ss 6/23/81 
80-2078 Dames & Moore v. Regan 
STATUTORY ISSUES - MEMO TO FILE 
Paul Smith's memo of June 22 on these issues is 
persuasive - more so than the SG's rather arrogant brief. 
Indeed, the Iranian parties really don't need a lawyer with 
t 
the SG so enthusiast icf'~on their side. 
' This memorandum merely summarizes, for my use, 
Paul's views -perhaps with some observations. 
The three statutes are: the International 
Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA), the Hostage Act, and 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The first two 
are possible sources of congressional authorization of the 
type of agreeefu~p before us. FSIA affords some basis for 
.. J • 
arguing that the prejudgment attachments were void initially 
because Iran had not "explicitly" waived immunity. 
I. IEEPA 
Passed in 1977 to replace the Trading with the 
Enemy Act, IEEPA authorizes presidential regulation of 
economic matters in an emergency short of actual war. To my 
surprise, Paul notes that there is some congressional 
oversight. The President may declare an emergency to make 
the Act effective, but must first consult Congress. Also, 
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Congress may terminate a President's action by a concurrence 
resolution. 
Ask Paul: 
1. What constitutes consulting? What does the 
record in this case show with respect to consulting? 
2. Elaborate on the power to terminate. When? 
Voiding Attachments. Petitioner in this case did 
not attach until a license was issued that, by its terms, 
was revocable. Paul thinks IEEPA authorized revocation, and 
therefore whatever property interest petitioner gained by 
the attachment was subject to be divested. Paul cites Orvis 
v. Brownell as persuasive but not controlling authority. 
Even with respect to the cases where attachments 
were obtained prior to the President's restrictive 
regulations, Paul thinks a fairly persuasive argument can be 
made that IEEPA authorized the President to "nullify" ~ 
attachments. I find it difficult to believe that Congress 
intended any such broad grant of power. 
~ f~ '. Power to Suspend Pendin2 Cases. The Iran 
~ 'II" , aj.r-~ement, in addition to voiding the attachments, 
~,....,\ ,.P~'s u spended" all court cases in favor of ad j ud ica t ion by the 
rvr. ~v\ " '" \~,('II ~ yjbuna~~ :,,.~./f.ei~·' 
f.f ~ \ pgJ"V .~< . J 5 & '1,/l'}{.ltr"'"" Both CAl and CADC held that IEEPA did not 
t4~\ authorize this action. 
• .. 
3. 
Paul observes that a "President can control a res, 
and control Americans seeking to ,obtain a res, but cannot 
prevent Americans from suing foreign countries". Paul also 
notes that it would be "odd to allow the President to use 
IEEPA to benefit the 'enemy' and injure Americans". Thus, 
Paul concludes that IEEPA does not authorize suspension of 
the law suits. Peter will conclude, I think, that the 
President has inherent power to do this - as CADC and CAl 
have held. 
II. The Hostage Act (1968). 
This ancient statute provides that "the President 
shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war
1
as he may 
think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the 
release" of Americans held by other nations. 
Although this statute is extremely vague, the 
government relies on it - and Paul thinks with some reason -
as a eliminating any argument as to the separation of 
powers. The Act appears to make a broad grant of authority 
/'W /~ -.l.il-vt 
to do as .he pleases - within the Constitution - to release 
1\ 
American citizens. I would have a hard time "buying" the 
full sweep of this argument. 
Specifically, Paul thinks that the Hostage Act 
does constitute arguable authority for the right of a 
President to "suspend" these suits. 
4. 
III. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). 
Both sides rely heavily on this Act. Petitioner 
argues that it constitutes an affirmative indication from 
Congress that commercial claims against foreign governments 
are to be handled judicially, and not compromised by the 
President. The SG ~ argues (fn. 19, p. 26) that FSIA 
supports the view that the attachments were already illegal. 
The Act (1976) provides that: 
"The property of a foreign state . . • used 
for commercial activity in the United States, 
shall not be immune from attachment prior to 
the entry of judgment .•. if (1) the 
foreign state has explicitly waived its 
immunity ..• " 26 U.S .c. 1610 (d). 
Although the purpose of the Act is to protect 
American creditors, § 1610(d) is the only provision that 
retires an "explicit" waiver of immunity. The question then 
1\ 
is whether Iran has so waived immunity from prejudgment 
attachment by its 1955 treaty of amity that states: - -· - -"No [Iran ian] enterprise pe'. . . shall • 
claim or enjoy either for itself or for its 
property, immunity therein from taxation, 
suit, execution of judgment or other 
liability to which privately owned and 
controlled enterprises are subject therein." 
Although this language, makes no explict reference 
to prejudgment attachment, FSIA preserves existing 
international agreements such as the 19551[;eaty of ~ity. 
18 U.S.C.A §1609. It can be argued, therefore, that the 
broad language above includes at least an "implied waiver of 
5. 
immunity from prejudgment attachment". The language of the 
treaty waiving immunity with respect to suits, execution of 
judgments "or other liability to which privately owned" 
enterprises are subject, could well include prejudgment 
attachments. Such attachments are commonly available in 
private litigation. 
Paul notes that "lower courts are split on this 
issue", and he inclines to favor the government's view that 
there has been no "explicit" waiver. 
I would think there should be a presumption in 
favor of waiver, as otherwise commercial transactions with 
foreign entities will be discouraged severely. The right to 
sue, without the attachment right, often will be an empty 
one. 
I do note, however, that apparently Iran has 
waived immunity with respect to "suit" and "execution of 
judgment or other liabilities". The SG - apparently quite 
enthusiastic about Iranians' efforts to avoid paying just 
debts, even argues that contracts to provide goods and 
services to the Iranian army are noncommercial, and 
therefore not subject to any waiver .of immunity. I would 
not accept this argument. 
* * * 
In brief summary, Paul's careful examination of 
the statutes and cases casues him to think: 
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I. Petitioner challenges two distinct actions by the Pres-
ident in this case: (I) the ordering of the transfer of Iranian 
assets subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and 
(2) the provision for the settlement of claims against Iran by 
means of their presentatiOn to the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal. Although both of these measures were 
taken in connection with the Agreement with Iran, they 
implicate quite different powers of the President. -- . 
As we explain in our opening brief (Govt. Br. 28-29), the 
President had the power under the International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. (Supp. 
III) 1701 et seq., to direct the return of frozen Iranian 
property to Iran solely in order to obtain the release of the 
2 
hostages and resolve the crisis with Iran, without making 
a.!lY-£.!:__~i~i_o~~-f~_r_~~~_le~ent of the claims of United States 
nationals. Thus, the validity of the Presidential order to 
transref assets which are subject to judicial orders obtained 
by petitioner does not depend on whether petitioner's claim 
against the Iranian defendants is subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Claims Tribunal and is thereby settled by the Agree-
ment. See, e.g., American Be/lint'/, Inc. v. Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran, No. 80-321 (D. D.C. June II, 1981), cert. before 
judgment denied, No. 80-2111 (June 22, 1981). Nor does it 
depend on whether the President even had authority to 
settle claims of any American nationals. Conversely, the 
1. President's power under the Constitution, the Hostage Act 
(22 U .S.C. 1732), and the 1955 Treaty with Iran, 1 to provide 
for the settlement and discharge of the claims of American 
nationals against Iran through submission to arbi.!lation 
does not depend on wheti1eilleaT5o1Iasthe authority und er 
IEEPA to direct the transfer of blocked Iranian property, 
up to $1 billion of which will be deposited in a security 
account to fund awards by the Tribunal in favor of Ameri-
can claimants. 
'? 2. Petitioner concedes (Pet. Br. 18) that the President has 
authority to se~claims of United States nationals 
against a foreign government. See Govt. Br. 40-50. The 
entire burden of its argument on the claims settlement issue 
(see Pet. Br. 9-18, 20-21) is that the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA) , 28 U .S .C. 1602 et seq., implicitly 
carves out an exception to this broad authority in the case of 
claims for which that Act permits a suit against the foreign 
government. For the reasons given in our opening brief 
(Govt. Br. 56-63), however, the FSIA is wholly irrelevant to 
the claims settlement issue. 
1Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights Between 
the United States and Iran, Aug. 15 , 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899 , T.I.A.S. No. 
3853 . 
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The pertinent provisions of that Act (28 U .S.C. 1604-
1607) deal solely with issues of immunity (H.R. Rep. No. 
94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-
1310, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1976); see also Chas. T. Main 
Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, No. 
80-1027 (l st Cir. May 22, 1981 ), at 20) and confer jurisdic-
tion on the district courts of in personam actions against a 
foreign sovereign whenever the sovereign is not entitled to 
immunity (28 U .S.C. 1330(a)).2 The settlement by the Exec-
utive of a claim on which a claimant has filed suit against a 
foreign government no more interferes with the jurisdiction 
of the court or confers an immunity to that jurisdiction-
the subjects addressed by the FSIA-than would a settle-
ment entered into by the claimant himself. For example, if 
petitioner entered into an out-of-court agreement with the 
Iranian defendants settling its claims, that settlement would 
furnish a basis for the Iranian defendants to assert the 
affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction (Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 8(c)), not a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 
U .S.C. 1330(a) because of an immunity to suit. By the same 
token, if the President settles the claim pursuant to his 
constitutional or other authority, the Iranian defendants 
presumably could assert a similar defense (cf. Heckman v. 
United States, 224 U.S. 413, 444-446 (1912)) or one based 
upon the failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); American Int'/ Group, 
Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 80-1779, 80-1891 
(D.C. Cir. June 5, 1981 ), slip op. 23); they could not, how-
ever, obtain a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction because of a 
supposed immunity to the jurisdiction of the courts. 
2The legislative history of the FSIA cited by petitioner (Pet. Br. 
I 0-15) refers exclusively to the issue of a foreign government's immunity 
to suit and the State Department's previous role in making"suggestions 
of immunity" to the courts (id. at 12 & n.l 0). Petitioner still has cited no 
reference suggesting a congressional intent in the FS lA to abrogate the 
established practice of Executive claims settlement. 
4 
Moreover, as relevant here, the FSIA did not represent a 
break with the past with respect to foreign sovereign 
immunity; it merely codified the previously extant restric-
tive theory of sovereign immunity under which a foreign 
government is generally subject to suit for its commercial 
and other private acts. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, supra, at 
7. That theory of sovereign immunity had been adopted by 
the State Department itself in 1952. See Alfred Dunhill of 
London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698-699, 711-715 
(1976). Yet since 1952, as the District of Columbia Circuit 
observed, the Executive has entered into at least ten lump 
sum settlement agreements with other nations .. American 
lnt 'I Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, supra, slip op. 
30. Significantly, three of those agreements settled com-
mercial contract claims, on which the foreign government 
may not have been immune to suit in this country. See 
United States-Hungary Claims Settlement, Mar. 6, 1973, 
Art. 2(2), 24 U .S.T. 552, T.I.A.S. No. 7569; United States-
Bulgaria Claims Settlement, July 2, 1963, Art. l(l)(c), 14 
U.S.T. 969, T.I.A.S. No. 5378; United States-Rumania 
Claims Settlement, Mar. 30, 1960, Art. l(l)(c), II U.S.T. 
317, T.I.A.S. No. 4451. If these settlements of commercial 
contract claims were not inconsistent with the restrictive 
theory of sovereign immunity adopted by the State Depart-
ment in 1952, there is no reason to believe that Executive 
settlement of commercial claims became inconsistent with 
that same theory when it was codified in the FSIA. Sim-
ilarly, the Restatement, which incorporates the restrictive 
theory of sovereign immunity with respect to commercial 
activities (Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law 
§ 69 ( 1965)), explicitly notes that the Department of State 
will espouse and settle contract claims in appropriate cir-
cumstances even without the claimant's consent (id. at § 
212 Reporters' Note, § 213. The drafters of the Restate-
ment therefore apparently saw no inconsistency between 
the proposition that foreign governments are subject to suit 
I ' 
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on claims arising out of their commercial activities and the 
proposition that the President may settle the same claims. 
Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that Congress 
perceived such an inconsistency when it enacted the FSIA.J 
Finally, the FSIA subjects a foreign sovereign to suit on 
more than commercial contract claims. For example, 28 
U.S.C. 1605(a)(3) provides that a foreign sovereign is not 
immune from suit in the United States on certain expropria-
tion claims.4 Expropriation claims have frequently been the 
subject of claims settlement agreements. Yet under peti-
tioner's argument that claims may not be settled by the 
Executive where they are (or perhaps may be) the subject of 
a suit filed under the' FSIA, the Executive would be required 
to exclude certain expropriation claims from claims settle-
ment agreements as well. See also 28 U .S.C. 1605(a)(l) 
(permitting suits where the foreign government has waived 
immunity) . As we noted in our opening brief (Govt. Br. 59 
n.55), such an approach would pose an insurmountable 
barrier to claims settlement by the Executive, which would 
not be in a position to make the complex legal and factual 
JThe congressional reports on the FSIA also reflect an intent to 
ensure that the practice in the United States with respect to immunity is 
in line with that in other nations. H.R . Rep. No. 94-1487 , supra, at 7; 
S. Rep. No. 94-1310, supra, at 7. The statutory purpose of bringing the 
United States into line with the international community would not be 
served by a construction of the FSIA that would disable the United 
States government from settling the claims of its nationals through 
negotiations with another nation, especially in circumstances as com-
pelling as the Iranian crisis . 
428 u.s.c. 1605(a)(3) provides that a foreign state shall not be 
immune in any case in which rights in property taken in violation of 
international law are in issue and that property (or property exchanged 
for it) is present in the United States in connection with commercial 
activity or that property is owned or operated by an instrumentality of 
the foreign state that is engaged in commercial activity in the United 
States. 
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judgments necessary to determine whether each of a multi-
tude of claims was one for which a suit would lie under the 
FSIA and which was therefore not subject to settlement 
between nations. 
3. Petitioner contends (Pet. Br. 23-33) that IEEPA does 
not authorize the President to provide for the transfer of 
blocked Iranian assets to Iran and to the security account 
intended to fund awards by the Claims Tribunal. In peti-
tioner's view, the power to allow foreign assets to leave the 
country is an "awesome" one (Pet. Br. 24) that defeats the 
rights of American creditors. 
The language of IEEP A is indeed "sweeping and unquali-
fied" (Chas. T. Main Int'/, Inc. v. Kh'uzestan Water & 
Power Authority, supra, at 9) with respect to the powers the 
President may exercise over blocked assets of a foreign 
country. But the legal principle that explains how those 
powers may affect petitioner and other claimants who 
obtained orders of attachment against Iranian property 
after the President's November 14, 1979, blocking order is 
quite simple. By issuing the blocking order, the President 
obtained, in effect, a congressionally authorized "lien" or 
right in those assets in order to enable him to deal with the 
"unusual and extraordinary threat * * * to the national 
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States" 
(50 U.S.C. (Supp. Ill) 1701(a)) that was created by the 
hostage crisis. Petitioner and other individual claimants 
who obtained orders of attachment against that property 
after November 14, 1979, were thereby rendered, in effect, 
junior creditors whose interest in Iranian property was 
necessarily subordinate to and contingent upon the exercise 
of the President's prior and paramount authority to control 
the property in the national interest and for the benefit of 
claimants generally, rather than for the benefit of the rela-
tively few individual claimants who happened to have filed 
suit and obtained attachments. Petitioner therefore cannot 
7 
complain of the President's exercise of the very powers 
Congress conferred on him. 
Petitioner was on notice of the contingent and subordi-
nate nature of its interest when it filed suit, by virtue of 
regulations providing that "any attachment* * *is null and 
void" with respect to Iranian property"[ u ]nless licensed or 
authorized" under the regulations (31 C.F.R. 535.203(e) 
( 1980)) .and making clear that the general license for pre-
judgment attachments and other proceedings (31 C.F.R. 
535.418,535.504 (1980)) "may be* * *revoked at any time" 
(31 C. F. R. 535.805 (1980)). When that genera1license for 
pre-judgment attachments was revoked, the legal basis for 
the attachments was eliminated and the attachments were 
rendered "null and void. "5 Moreover, as we explain in our 
opening brief(Govt. Br. 28-38), past decisions ofthis Court 
make clear that a pre-judgment attachment of frozen assets 
in a suit against the foreign debtor does not restrict the 
President in his control over the property in any event. 
In petitioner's view, however, IEEPA does not allow the 
President "permanently to dispose" of foreign property out 
5Petitioner argues (Pet. Br. 37-40) that these regulations meant only 
that no new attachments could be obtained after the license was 
revoked, but that attachments that were obtained while the license was 
in effect would remain valid . Such an interpretation is inconsistent with 
the very concept of a license, which ordinarily allows the use of property 
only at 'the sufferance of the licensor, without creating any vested 
interest in the property that survives the revocation of the privilege. Cf. 
DeHaro v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 599,627 (1867). Because a 
license by definition may be revoked at any time, petitioner's construc-
tion renders the explicit revocability provision redundant. See Reiter v. 
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 ( 1979). Furthermore, petitioner's 
interpretation · is entirely inconsistent with the purpose of the assets 
control regulations, which is to leave control of the assets by the 
President unfettered by the creation of interests in property, by court 
order or otherwise. See Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S . 472 (1949). 
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of the country (Pet. Br. 28). 6 This argument is answered by 
the very language of JEEP A itself. The statute authorizes 
the President to "regulate" or "direct and compel" the 
"transfer, withdrawal, transportation,* * * or exportation 
of* * *any property in which [a] foreign country* * *has 
any interest * * * by any person, or with respect to any 
property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" 
(50 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 1702(a)(l)(B)). This language plainly 
authorizes the President to license a foreign country to 
"withdraw" or "export" the property it has in the United 
States or, as here, to bring about the same result by "direct-
ing" and "compelling" "any person" in possession of Iran-
ian property to "transfer," "transport," and "export" it so 
that it will be placed in the security account or in the custody 
and control of Iran, the country to which it belongs. See 
McLaughlin & Teclaff, The Iranian Hostage Agreements: 
A Legal Analysis, 4 Fordham Int'l L.J. 223, 235 ( 1981 ). 
Petitioner has pointed to nothing in JEEP A or its legisla-
tive history to suggest that Congress did not intend these 
words to mean exactly what they say. To the contrary, the 
House Report emphasizes that the power granted in JEEP A 
is ".sufficiently broad and flexible to enable the President to 
respond as appropriate and necessary to unforeseen contin-
gencies" (H.R. Rep. No. 95-459, 95th Cong., I st Sess. 10 
( 1977)). Here, the President determined that the transfers of 
Iranian property contemplated by the Agreement with Iran 
6Petitioner argues (Pet. Br. 27-28) that this supposed "permanent" 
disposition of the assets conflicts with JEEP A's purpose of allowing 
only temporary freezing of foreign assets. But petitioner loses sight of 
the fact that the President's withholding of the assets from Iran, the 
owner of the property, was temporary in nature, lasting only so long as 
necessary to accomplish the objectives of the blocking order. 
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were an "appropriate and necessary" response to the 
"unforeseen contingencies" of the crisis following the seiz-
ure of the American hostages, because they implemented 
the Agreement providing for the release of the hostages and 
resolution of claims of United States nationals and pre-
pared the way "to begin the process of normalization of 
relations between the United States and Iran" (Executive 
Order Nos. 12279, 12280, 12281 (46 Fed. Reg. 7919,7921, 
7923 ( 1981 )); Pet. App. 43, 46, 49). 
Petitioner takes a narrower view of the statute's pur-
poses, however, contending that the President cannot dis-
pose of the assets in a way that affects its attachments and, 
therefore, its ability to recover on its claim in district court. 
It is true that the blocking powers authorized by IEEP A 
were intended in part to protect American claimants. See 
Govt. Br. 29-30. But Congress expected that this would be 
accomplished by the President, through a lump sum or 
other form of settlement of claims generally. See, e.g., H.R. 
Rep. No. 95-459, supra, at 17. IEEPA was not intended to 
be a mere supplement to whatever powers of attachment 
individual claimants might have obtained in United States 
courts, as petitioner would have it. 
If attachments obtained by claimants in the United States 
were held to prevent the President from transferring or 
freeing up blocked assets, they would prevent the President 
from resolving the crisis that first led to the blocking order, 
as IEEP A obviously contemplates. In the particular cir-
cumstances of this case, such judicial restraints would pre-
vent the transfer of the $1 billion in bank-held assets that are 
to be placed in the security account to pay awards by the 
Claims Tribunal. And if the remainder of Iranian assets that 
are subject to attachment could not be returned to Iran in 
accordance with the terms of the Agreement, there is every 
likelihood that Iran would not make any additional pay-
ments into the security account to fund awards by the 
10 
Tribunal. In that event, the mechanism established by the 
President for the settlement of claims of United States 
nationals generally would be rendered ineffective. Such a 
result, reached for the benefit of those relatively few clai-
mants who obtained pre-judgment attachments, 7 would 
plainly conflict with the clear congressional purpose in 
enacting IEEPA that nothing in the Act was intended " to 
impede the settlement of claims of U.S. citizens against 
foreign countries" (S. Rep . No . 95-466, 95th Cong., I st 
Sess . 6 ( 1977); emphasis added). s 
7Thc passages in the I EEPA hearing and markup transcripts cited by 
petitioner (Pet . Br. 26 n.27) do not support its assertion that Congress 
intended to permit the President to freeze assets and negotiate a settle-
ment only where the claimants could not sue the foreign government in 
United States courts . 
xwc have answered petitioner's argument (Pet. Br. 25-27) that. by 
virtue of Sections 9 and 34 of the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA). 
50 U .S.C. app . 9 and 34, the President would have been prohibited 
under the TWEA from transferring frozen assets overseas rather than 
satisfying the claims of particular American claimants . See Govt. Br. 
36-38. Those sections provided a right for claimants to recover only out 
of assets that were vested in the federal government- i.e., foreign assets 
to which the United States had taken title. There is no compa rable right 
under the TWEA to recover out of assets that were only frozen or 
blocked, a s is the case with Iranian assets. See Markham v. Cabell, 326 
U.S. 404, 409-410 (1945). Congress declined to permit the President to 
vest foreign assets under IEEPA. This omission obviously was not 
meant to assist American claimants, because they are thereby deprived 
of the benefits of Sections 9 and 34; the omission was instead intended 
for the protection of the foreign property owner whose property might 
be taken over by the federal government. Thus, the deletion of the 
vesting power cuts strongly against recognizing a right in petitioner, 
through its post-blocking attachments, to prevent the disposition of 
foreign assets in the manner agreed to by their owner. Sec Mclaughlin 
& Tcclaff, supra, 4 Fordham lnt'l L.J . at 236 . 
II 
4.a. Petitioner contends (Pet. Br. 33-43) that the Presi-
dent's Executive Orders requiring the transfer of property 
notwithstanding the orders of attachment and other judicial 
orders petitioner obtained constitute a taking of property 
without just compensation and should, for that reason, be 
enjoined. But these attachments were acquired pursuant to 
a license that was expressly made revocable at any time, and 
all such judicial orders were in any event subordinate to the 
President's previously invoked power to direct the transfer 
of assets pursuant to IEEPA. See Govt. Br. 36 n.29, 64; 
Markham v. Cabell, supra; see also note 5, supra. Thus, 
petitione!___had no proEerty interest resulting from these 
judicial orders that could be asserted against the federal ----------government, and the President's directing the transfer of the 
property therefore does not constitute a taking of property 
requiring the payment of just compensation.9 
b. Petitioner concedes (Pet. Br. 34 n.32) that any taking 
argument with respect to the President's exercise of his 
distinct power to settle claims of United States nationals 
"may not yet be ripe for review" because it has not yet 
presented its claim to the Tribunal and therefore does not 
know how that claim will be received by the TribunaJ. 10 See 
9 Petitioner also contends (Pet. Br. 34, 36) that it is entitled to just 
compensation because the President has "nullified" the judgment peti-
tioner obtained against the Government of Iran and AEOI. However , 
Executive Order No. 12294 (46 Fed. Reg. 14111 (Feb. 26, 1981)) does 
not purport to "nullify" petitioner's judgment; that order merely sus-
pends the domestic effect of claims that may be submitted to the Claims 
Tribunal. Cf. American lnt'l Group. Inc . v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
supra, slip op 32-34. Sec also Govt. Br. 55-56 & n.52. 
10 Petitioner states (Pet. Br. 4) that it is "highly uncertain" whether its 
claim against the Iranian defendants is within the jurisdiction of the 
Claims Tribunal, because that jurisdiction docs not extend to "claims 
arising under a binding contract between the parties specifically provid-
ing that any disputes thereunder shall be within the sole jurisdiction of 
the competent I ran ian courts" (Dec!. II, Art. I I; Pet. App. 31 ). Petition-
er's contract provides that if a dispute between the parties cannot be 
12 
also Chas. T. Main lnt '1, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power 
Authority, supra, at 23-24; American lnt'l Group, Inc. v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, supra, slip op. 34-38. We agree 
with petitioner that this aspect of the taking issue need not 
be considered here. Petitioner's suit &gainst the Iranian 
defendants in California has not be;.; dismiss~d, ther~by 
terminating Its cause o action in · ed States courts. The 
cia 1m underlying that suit 1as only been suspen ed, and this 
~ension will in turn require on iy a sta y of judicial pro-
ceedings pending presentation of the claim to arbitration. 
Thus, there can be no argument at this stage that petition-
er's property has been taken. There will be time enough to 
consider a taking argument if the district court eventually 
resolved through discussion s, the dispute shall be submitted to concilia-
tion by three conciliators, one to be appointed by each party and the 
third to be appointed by an agency of the Government of Iran . If either 
party does not accept the deci sion of the conciliators, the contract 
provides that "the matter sha II be decided finally by resort tot he courts 
of Iran" (Pet. Br. 4 n.2). 
The United States has taken the position that a clause giving Iranian 
courts jurisdiction over disputes arising under the contract may not be 
"binding" within the meaning of the clause excluding claims arising 
under certain contracts from the Tribunal's jurisdiction, because cir-
cumstances have so changed in Iran that enforcement of the provision 
would be inconsistent with the parties' intent when they entered into the 
contract. See Iranian Asset Seu/ement: Hearing Before the Senate 
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., I st Sess. 
68 (I 981 ). Under the Agreement, the Tribunal is to decide cases on the 
"basis of respect for law, • • • taking into account relevant usages of 
the trade , contract provisions and changed circumstances" (Decl. II , 
Art. V; Pet. App. 33). The reference to "changed circumstances" in 
Article V was included for the specific purpose of bringing the changed 
circumstances doctrine into play with respect to forum clauses. Hear-
ing, supra, at 68 . In addition , the government has taken the position 
that, even if forum clauses are "binding" for purposes of the Agreement , 
clauses such as the one in petitioner's contract that provide for arbitra -
tion or conciliation prior to resort to the courts of Iran do not relate to 
disputes "within the sole jurisdiction oft he competent Iranian courts" 
for purposes of the exclusionary clause in Declaration II, Article II 
(emphasis added). 
1.1 
orders petitioner's suit against the Iranian defendants dis-
missed following a ruling by the Claims Tribunal on the 
merits of petitioner's claim- assuming, of course, that peti-
tioner would be dissatisfied with the award and would 
oppose the order of dismissal. II 
There would, moreover, be a host of factors to be taken .........____ ___.., 
into account in considering the taking issue, many of which 
are necessarily speculative at the present time. First, of 
course, is the question whether there could ever be a taking 
of property for purposes of the Just Compensation Clause 
resulting from the United States' settlement of a claim 
against a foreign government, in view of the established 
doctrine that claims taken up by the United States belong to 
the United States. See Govt. Br. 49; see also United Statesv. 
The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 103, 110 (1801); 
Great Western Insurance Co. v. United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 
206, 217-218; aff'd on other grounds, 112 U.S. 193 (1884); 
Arts Gloves, Inc. v. United States, 420 F. 2d 1386 (Ct. Cl. 
1970). 12 
11 Thus, this is not a case that will lead inexorably to a final convey-
ance of property without an opportunity for prior judicial review to 
consider the availability of a Tucker Act remedy. Compare Regional 
Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, f26-127, 138-141 (1974). 
In any event, an injunction should not be entered to prevent the imple-
mentation of an Executive Agreement of the President in circumstances 
such as this on the basis of mere speculation that the remedies provided 
will not be adequate in a few individual cases. 
12Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 340 ( 1886), does not indicate that 
there would be a compensable claim. Unlike the present situation, there 
the court found a taking because the American claims were valid, would 
have been honored by the French, and were released in full by the 
United States. See Aris Gloves, Inc. v. United States. supra, 420 F. 2d 
at 1396-1397 (Nichols, J., concurring) . In the present case, the Execu-
tive has not renounced petitioners claim in a similar fashion. Moreover, 
Gray was "strictly an advisory opinion [for Congress] which was not 
binding upon either of the parties and cannot be binding upon subse-
quent courts" (420 F. 2d at 1393). As this Court said of Gray, "[w]e 
think that payments thus prescribed to be made were purposely brought 
within the category of payments by way of gratuity, payments as of 
grace and not of right." Blagge v. Balch, 162 U.S. 439,457 (1896). 
14 
Second, as uming~t a aki!}g could be found in some 
such circumstances, the appropriate test in a situation 
involving an en bloc settlement of claims, we submit, should 
be whether, under the circumstances, the settlement pro-
vided for a reasonable recovery (or procedure for recovery) 
for the claimants as a group (cf. United States v. Sioux 
Nation of Indians, No. 79-639 (June 30, 1980), slip op. 
35-50), not whether any particular claimant would have 
received more in United States courts than he did in a lump 
sum settlement or through an arbitration mechanism. 
Indeed, any other rule would perhaps end the long-standing 
practice of en bloc claims settlement by the Executive. 
Third, if it were necessary to focus on the effects of a 
settlement on each individual claim comprised therein, a 
court considering a taking claim would be required to con-
duct a complex trial to determine whether the value 
received in settlement was in fact less than would have been 
received in domestic litigation. This would in turn depend 
on a variety of factors, many of which are unrelated to the 
merits of the particular contract, expropriation, or other 
claim that had been settlcd.IJ 
13Thus, in order to prove a taking of property in the context of the 
Iranian Agreement, a claimant would have to demonstrate some or all 
of the following: (I) that its underlying claim is meritorious; (2) that the 
claim would have been decided by an American court notwithstanding 
such defenses as sovereign immunity, act of state, lack of sufficient 
contacts for in personam jurisdiction, or perhaps an Iranian forum 
clause; (3) that the claimant could have executed on a domestic judg-
ment against Iranian property that would have remained in this country 
even absent the President's blocking order; (4) that the Tribunal's award 
was less than that a domestic court would have rendered; (5) that the 
claimant could not recover on an award from the Tribunal either from 
the $1 billion Security Account or the funds used to replenish and 
maintain that account at a minimum of $500 million; (6) that the 
claimant could not satisfy any Tribunal award in the courts of other 
nations, even those who arc a party to the Convention on Recognition 
and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,21 U.S.T. 2517, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6997; and (7) that it award would not be satisfied out of 
funds received by the United States as damages if Iran should default 
under the Agreement. 
15 
Finally, there is the question of what would constitute 
just compensation for the settlement of an international 
claim for less than its estimated value in domestic courts. 
Cf. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973). 
These issues obviously are better left for resolution in the 
case of a particular claimant who can demonstrate a con-
crete effect on his financial position. Hodel v. Virginia 
Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Nos. 79-1538, 
79-1596 (June 15, 1981), slip op. 26-31. 
For the foregoing reasons and the additional reasons 
stated in our opening brief, it is respectfully submitted that 
the judgment of the district court should be affirmed . 
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C iM-lE:>EF S OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
Re : 
.;§uprtmt ~~nrt of tqt ~r:i.Ub .,$,tafts 
~lt$qmghtn. :!0. "f. 2ll~'t~ 
June 24, 1981 
80 -2078 - Dames & Moore v. Regan 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
.) 
To "get the show on the road" Bill Rehnquist has ·-
agreed to get an opinion in our hands by noon Sunday , 
next - if not before . 
Regards , 
,-:''l-lf'~•.an \:.f-v:U:O: Ul Uf ~U,... TlUl'IJ 
~as-fringtcn. ~. QJ. 20,?'!-.;l 
CHAMIOERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
June 26, 1981 
Re: No. 80-2078 - Dames and Moore v. Regan, Secretary 
of the Treasury 
Dear Bill: 
I may possibly have a few inconsequential 
suggestions, but you may regard this as a "join." 
I will place ten Brownie Points in your personnel 
file and grant you two weekends leave. 
Regards, 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 




.§u.pntttt <!fourl of iltt 1lfuit~b .§taft,« 
~frittgiott, ~. <!f. 20.?)1.~ 
80-2078 - Dames & Moore v. 
June 26 , 17 
Regan V 
After a quick reading . of your draft, which I think is 
very good and which I shall study more carefully, I have the 
following comments: 
First, my own view, and I thought the view espoused in 
Conference, is that because of the President ' s authority to 
prevent and condition attachments and because of the orders 
he issued to this effect, it was not feasible for any 
creditor to acquire a property interest by attachment. 
Hence , there is no barrier to the transfer of the attached 
funds by the President and so no taking of a property 
interest giving rise to a claim for compensation . I had 
thought that this would decide the taking question with 
respect to liquidating the attachments . 
Second , what we are withholding is a decision on the 
taking question with respect to suspending or cancelling 
claims rather than the attachments . That discussion , along 
with the matter of the Court of Claims ' jurisdiction , 
perhaps should come after the section of the opinion dealing 
with claims settlement . 
~ Third , and this is a minor matter with respect to the 
attachment issue , it seems to me that we should say a word 
in response to the argument that although the President 
could have forbidden attachments , he allowed them and hence 
permitted the acquisition of a property interest . Of 
course, this merely requires a construction of the licensing 
regulation as anticipating retroactive revocation. 




Copies to the Conference 
''' 
- ---· 
.:§u-prtnu <!frtttd rtf tltt ~tdr .:§tmc.G' 
'Jil'a£tlrtng4rn, ~. <!f. 2D.;iJl.~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 26, 1981 
Re: 80-2078 - Dames & Moore v. Regan 
Dear Bill: 
Congratulations and thanks for putting together a 
first class opinion in such a short time span. I am 
prepared to join all of it except the two paragraphs on 
I 
pages 25-26 concerning jurisdiction in the Court of 
Claims.. I have serious doubts on the jurisdictional 
question and would simply not address it. I will not, 
however, write anything except something like the 
enclosed brief statement. 
My other suggestions, none of which is critical, 
are these: 
1. Page 28, line 10. Perhaps you should 
delete the word "unanimous" in view of Judge 
Breyer's separate opinion. 
2. Page 36, line 9. If, instead of stating 
"crucial to our decision" you could merely state 
something like "strongly supporting our decision" 
I would be a little happier because I would reach 
the same result without the congressional 
approval. 
3. Page 47, line 10. If you could leave out 
the words "are reasonable. The President has" I 
would be happier because I would like to avoid 
expressing an opinion that may be read as 
approving the merits of the settlement and I think 
your opinion will make the same point if you 
thereby simply combine the first two sentences of 
that paragraph. 
-2-
As I indicated, whether you accept or reject the 
last three suggestions, I will join your opinion except 
for the two paragraphs I identified at the outset. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
Enclosure 
0$2078I 
80-2078 - Dames & Moore v. Regan 
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring. 
In my judgment the possibility that requiring this 
petitioner to prosecute its claim in another forum will 
constitute an unconstitutional "taking" is so remote that I would 
not address the jurisdictional question considered in the last 
two paragraphs of Part III of the Court's opinion. However, I 
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Dames & Moore v. Regan, Secretary of the 
I 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The questions presented by this case touch~ 
upon the manner in which our Republic is to be governed. 
Throughout the nearly tt~ ~r~;l ~:::J:lLeJ:.e{]e ~ t 
under the Constitution, 't:-hi-s-s ttb j e e-t has gener ats4- considerable · · 
debate. We have had the benefit of commentators such as John 
Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison writing in The 
Federalist Papers at the nation's very inception, the benefit of 
astute fo~eign observers of our system su6h as Ale~is 
d'Tocqueville and James Bryce writing during the first century of 
the nation's existence, and the benefit of many other treatises 
- 2 -
as well as more than 400 volumes of reports of decisions of this 
Court. As these writings reveal it is ~bti~~-both futile and 
dangerous to ~any epigrammatical explanation of how 
this country has been governed. Indeed, as Justice Jackson 
noted, "[a] judge ..• may be surprised at the poverty of really 
useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems 
I 
of executive power as they actually present themselves." 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) 
(concurring opinion). 
Our decision today will not dramatically alter this 
situation, for the Framers "did not make the judiciary the 
overseer of our government." Id., at 594 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). We are confined to a resolution of the dispute 
presented to us. That dispute involves various executive orders 
and regulations by which the President nullified attachments and 
liens on Iranian assets in the United States, directed that these 
assets be transferred to Iran, and suspended claims against Iran 
that may be presented to an international Claims Tribunal. This 
- 3 -
action was taken in an effort to comply with an Executive 
Agreement between the United States and Iran. We granted 
certiorari before judgment in this case, and set an expedited 
briefing and argument schedule, because lower courts had reached 
conflicting conclusions on the validity of the President's 
actions and, as the Solicitor General informed ~~s the 
f 
Government acted by July 19th, Iran could consider the United 
States to be in breach of the Executive Agreement. 
But before turning to the facts and law which we believe 
determine the result in this case, we stress that the expeditious 
treatment of the issues involved by all of the courts which have 
considered the President's actions makes us acutely aware of the 
necessity to rest decision on the narrowest possible ground 
capable of deciding the case. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 u.s. 288, 
347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). This does not mean that 
reasoned analysis may give way to judicial fiat. It does mean 
that the statement of Justice Jackson that we decide difficult 
cases presented to us by virtue of our commissions, not our 
., 
- 4 -
competence, is especially true here. We attempt to lay down no 
general "guide-lines" covering other situations not involved 
here, and attempt to confine the opinion only to the very 
questions necessary to decision of the case. 
Perhaps it is because it is so difficult to reconcile the 
foregoing definition of Article III judicial power with the broad 
range of vitally important day-to-day questions regularly decided 
by Congress or the Executive, without either challenge or 
interference by the Judiciary, that the decisions of the Court in 
~ 
this area have been rare, episodic, and a££ord- little 
precedential value for subsequent cases. The tensions present in 
any exercise of executive power under the tri-partite system of 
£98 e r~~ government established by the Constitution have been 
reflected in opinions by members of ths Court more than once. 
The Court stated in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 
299 u.s. 304, 319-320 (1926): 
"[W]e are here dealing not alone with an authority 
vested in the President by an exertion of legislative 
power, but with such an authority plus the very 
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President 
as the sole organ of the federal government in the 
field of international relations--a power which does 
' · 
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not require as a basis for its exercise an act of 
Congress, but which, of course, like every other 
governmental power, must be exercised in subordination 
to the applicable provisions of the Constitution." 
And yet 15 years later, Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion 
in Youngstown, supra, which both parties agree brings together as 
much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this 
area, focused not on the "plenary and exclusive power of the 
President" but rather responded to a claim of virtually unlimited 
powers for the Executive by noting: 
"The example of such unlimited executive power that 
must have most impressed the forefathers was the 
prerogative exercised by George III, and the 
description of its evils in the Declaration of 
Independence leads me to doubt that they were creating 
their new Executive in his image." 343 U.S., at 641. 
As we ~rn to the factual and legal issues in this case, 
we freel~~~ ~bviously eciding only one more 
episode in t rre never-ending tension between the President 
exercising the executive authority in a world that presents each 
day some new challenge with which he must deal and the 
Constitution under which we all live and which no one disputes 




On November 4, 1979, the American Embassy in Tehran was 
seized and our diplomatic personnel were captured and held 
hostage. In response to that crisis, President Carter, acting 
pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 
u.s.c. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. II 1978) (hereinafter "IEEPA"), 
declared a national emergency on November 14, 1979,1 and 1 blocked 
the removal or transfer of "all property and interests in 
property of the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and 
controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran which are or 
become subject to the jurisdiction of the United States ...• " 
Executive Order No. 12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65279.2 President Carter 
lTitle 50 u.s.c. § 170l(a) (Supp. II 1978) states that the 
President's authority under the Act "may be exercised to deal 
with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source 
in whole or in substantial part outside the United States, to the 
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United 
States, if the President declares a national emergency with 
respect to such threat." Petitioner does not challenge President 
Carter's declaration of a national emergency. . 
2Title 50 u.s.c. § 1702 (a) (1) (B) (Supp. II 1978) empowers 
the President to: 
"investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, 
void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, 
withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, 
importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or 




authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate 
regulations carrying out the blocking order. On November 15, 
1979, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control 
issued a regulation providing that "[u]nless licensed or 
authorizea ... any attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, 
garnishment, or other judicial process is null ana void with 
respect to any property in which on or since [November 14, 1979] 
there existed an interest of Iran." 31 C.F.R. § 535.203(e) 
(1980). The regulations also made clear that any licenses or 
authorizations granted could be "amended, modified, or revoked at 
any time." 31 C.F.R. § 535.805 (1980) .3 
On November 26, 1979, the President granted a general 
license authorizing certain judicial proceedings against Iran but 
which d_ia not allow the "entry of any juagment..__9..r of any decree 
-------~· ............... .-..._ '"---'"~--- ... ________.~ --------------
to, or transactions involving, .any property in which 
any foreign country or a national thereof has any 
interest .••• " 
331 C.F.R. § 535.805 (1980) provides in full: "The 
provision of this part ana any rulings, licenses, instructions, 
orders, or forms issued thereunder may be amended, modified, or 




or order of similar or analogous effect .... " 31 C.F.R. § 
'------·----"\....-~::......------- -
535.504 {a) {1980). On December 19, 1979, a clarifying regulation 
was issued stating that "the general authorization for judicial 
proceedings contained in§ 535.504{a) includes pre-judgment 
attachment." 31 C.F.R. § 535.418 {1980). 
On December 19, 1979, petitioner Dames & Moore filed suit in 
the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California against the Government of Iran, the Atomic Energy 
Organization of Iran, and a number of Iranian banks. In its 
complaint, petitioner alleged that its wholly owned subsidiary, 
Dames & Moore International, S. R. L., was a party to a written 
contract with the Atomic Energy Organization, and that the 
subsidiary's entire interest in the contract had been assigned to 
petitioner. Under the contract, the subsidiary was to conduct 
site studies for a proposed nuclear power plant in Iran. As 
provided in the terms of the contract, the Atomic Energy 
Organization terminated the agreement for its own convenience on 
June 30, 1979. Petitioner contended, however, that it was owed 
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$3,436,694.30 plus interest for services performed under the 
contract prior to the date of termination.4 The District Court 
issued orders of attachment directed against property of the 
defendants, and the property of certain Iranian banks was then 
attached to secure any judgment that might be entered against 
them. 
On January 19, 1981, the Americans held hostage were 
released by Iran pursuant to an Agreement embodied in two 
Declarations of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria. 
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular 
Republic of Algeria {App. to Pet. for Cert., at 21-29), and 
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular 
Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the 
4The contract stated that any dispute incapable of 
resolution by agreement of the parties would be submitted to 
conciliation and that, if either party was unwilling to accept 
/} the results of conciliation, "the matter shall be decided finally 
' by resort to the courts of Iran." Pet. for Cert., at 7, n.2. In 
its complaint, which was based on breach of contract and related 
theories, petitioner alleged that it had sought a meeting with 
the Atomic Energy Organization for purposes of settling matters 
relating to the contract but that the Organization "has 
continually postponed [the] meeting and obviously does not intend 
that it take place." Complaint in Dames & Moore v. Atomic Energy 
Organization of Iran, No. 79-04918 LEW (Px) (C.D. Cal.), at ~ 27. 
- 10 -
Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran (App. to Pet. for Cert., at 30-35). 
The Agreement stated that "it is the purpose of [the United 
States and Iran] •.• to terminate all litigation as between the 
Government of each party and the nationals of the other, and to 
bring about the settlement and termination of all such claims 
through binding arbitration." App. to Pet. for Cert., at 21-22. 
In furtherance of this goal, the Agreement called for the 
establishment of an Iran-United States Claims Tribunal which 
would arbitrate any claims not settled within six months. Awards 
of the Claims Tribunal are to be "final and binding" and 
~
"enforceable ... in the courts of any nation in accordance with its 
laws." Id., at 32. Under the Agreement, the United States is 
obligated 
"to te..Qll..in~ie all legal proceedings in United States 
courts invo ving claims of United States persons and 
institutions against Iran and its state enterprises, to 
nullify all attachments and judgments obtained therein, 
to prohibit all further litigation based on such 
claims, and to bring about the termination of such 
claims through binding arbitration." Id., at 21-22. 
In addition, the United States must "act to bring about the 
... 
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transfer" by July 19, 1981, of all Iranian assets held in this 
country by American banks. Id., at 24-25. One billion dollars 
of these assets will be deposited in a security account in the 
Algerian Central Bank and used to satisfy awards rendered against 
Iran by the Claims Tribunal. Id. 
.....-r-'\--..... 
On January 19, 1981, Preside~r~Jr issued a series of 
executive orders implementing the terms of the Agreement t 
Executive Order Nos. 12276-12285, 46 Fed. Reg. 7913-7932. These 
orders revoked all licenses permitting the exercise of "any 
right, power, or privilege" with regard to Iranian funds, 
securities, or deposits; "nullified'' all non-Iranian interests in 
such assets acquired subsequent to the blocking order of November 
14, 1979; and required those banks holding Iranian assets to 
transfer them "to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to be 
held or transferred as directed by the Secretary of the 
Treasury." Executive Order No. 12279, 46 Fed. Reg~ 7919. 
On February 24, 1981, Presiden~ssued a second 
Executive Order in which he "ratified"- the January 19th 
~ 
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Executive Orders. Executive Order No. 12294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111. 
Moreover, he "suspended'' all "claims which may be presented to 
the ••• Tribunal" and provided that such claims "shall have no 
legal effect in any action now pending in any court of the United 
States." Ibid. The suspension of any particular ~laim 
terminates if the Claims Tribunal determines that it has no 
jurisdiction over that claim; claims are discharged for all 
purposes when the Claims Tribunal either awards some recovery or 
determines that no recovery is due. Ibid. 
Meanwhile, on January 27, 1981, petitioner moved for summary 
judgment in the District Court against the Government of Iran and 
the Atomic Energy Organization, but not as against the Iranian 
banks. The District Court granted petitioner's motion and 
awarded petitioner the amount claimed under the contract plus 
interest. Thereafter, petitioner attempted to execute the 
judgment by obtaining writs of garni·shment and execution in state 
court in the State of Washington, and a sheriff's sale of Iranian 
property in Washington was noticed to satisfy the judgment. 
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However, by order of May 28, 1981, as amended by order of June 8, 
the District Court stayed execution of its judgment pending 
appeal by the Government of Iran and the Atomic Energy 
Organization. The District Court also ordered that all pre-
judgment attachments obtained against the Iranian defendants be 
vacated and that further proceedings against the bank defendants 
be stayed in light of the executive orders discussed above. App. 
to Pet. for Cert. at 106-107. 
On April 28, 1981, petitioner filed this action in the 
District Court for declaratory and injunctive relief against the 
United States and the Secretary of the Treasury, seeking to 
prevent enforcement of the executive orders and Treasury 
Department regulations implementing the Agreement with Iran. In 
its complaint, petitioner alleged that the actions of the 
President and the Secretary of the Treasury implementing the 
Agreement ·with Iran were beyond their statutory and 
constitutional powers and, in any event, were unconstitutional to 
the extent they adversely affect petitioner's final judgment 
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against the Government of Iran and the Atomic Energy 
Organization, its execution of that judgment in the State of 
Washington, its pre-judgment attachments, and its ability to 
continue to litigate against the Iranian banks. Id., at 1-12. 
On May 28, 1981, the District Court denied petitioner's motion 
for a preliminary injunction and dismissed petitioner's complaint 
I 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
Id., at 106-107. Prior to the District Court's ruling; the 
... 
United States Courts of Appeals for the First and the District of 
Columbia Circuits upheld the President's . authority to issue the 
exectuve orders and regulations challenged by petitioner. See 
Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, 
No. 80-1027 (CA 1 May 22, 1981); American Int'l Group, Inc. v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 80-1779 (CA DC May 22, 
1981) (Opinion filed June 5, 1981). 
On June 3, 1981, petitioner filed a notice of appeal from 
the District Court's order, and the appeal was docketed in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On June 4, 
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the Treasury Department amended its regulations to mandate "the 
transfer of bank deposits and certain other financial assets of 
Iran in the United States to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
by noon, June 19." App. to Pet. for Cert., at 151-152. The 
District Court, however, entered an injunction pending appeal 
prohibiting the United States from requiring the transfer of 
I 
Iranian property that is subject to "any writ of attachment, 
garnishment, judgment, levy, or other judicial lien" issued by 
any court in favor of petitioner. Id., at 168. Arguing that 
this is a case of ''imperative public importance," petitioner then 
sought a writ of certiorari before judgment. Pet. for Cert. at 
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 210l(e); this Court's Rule 18 (1980). 
Because the issues presented here are of great significance and 
demand prompt resolution, we granted the petition for the writ, 
adopted an expedited briefing schedule, and set the case for oral 
argument on June 24, 1981. u.s. (1981). 
II 
The parties and the lower courts confronted with the instant 
... 
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questions have all agreed that much relevant analysis is 
contained in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 
(1952). Justice Black's opinion for the Court in that case, 
involving the validity of President Truman's effort to seize the 
country's steel mills in the wake of a nation-wide strike, 
recognized that "[t)he President's power, if any, to issue the 
order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the 
Constitution itself." Id., at 585. Justice Jackson's concurring 
opinion elaborated in a general way the consequences of different 
types of interaction between the two democratic branches in 
assessing presidential authority to act in any given case. When 
the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization from Congress, he exercises not only his powers but 
also those delegated by Congress. In such a case the executive 
action "would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and 
the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of 
persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it." 
Id., at 637. When the President acts in the absence of 
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congressional authorization he may enter "a zone of twilight in 
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which 
its distribution is uncertain." Id., at 637. In such a case the 
analysis becomes more complicated, and the validity of the 
President's action, at least so far as separation of powers 
principles are concerned, hinges on a consideration of all the 
circumstances which might shed light on the views of the 1 
legislative branch toward such action, including "congressional 
inertia, indifference or quiescence." Ibid. Finally, when the 
President acts in contravention of the will of Congress, "his 
power is at its lowest ebb," and the Court can sustain his 
actions "only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the 
subject." Id., at 637-638. 
Although we have in the past and do today find Justice 
Jackson's classification of executive actions into three general 
categories analytically useful, we s'hould ·be mindful of Justice 
Holmes' admonition, quoted by Justice Frankfurter in Youngstown, 
343 u.s., at 597 (concurring opinion), that "The great ordinances 
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of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black 
and white." Springer v. Phillipine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 
(1928) (dissenting opinion). Justice Jackson himself recognized 
that his three categories represented "a somewhat over-simplified 
grouping," 343 U.S., at 635, and it is doubtless the case that 
executive action in any particular instance falls, not neatly in 
' 
one of three pigeon-holes, but rather at some point along a 
spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to 
explicit congressional prohibition. This is particularly true as 
respects cases such as the one before us, involving responses to 
international crises the nature of which Congress can hardly have 
been expected to anticipate in any detail. 
III 
In nullifying post-November 14, 1979, attachments and 
directing those persons holding blocked Iranian funds and 
securities to transfer them to the Federal Reserve ·Bank of New 
York for ultimate transfer to Iran, President Carter cited five 
L------------------
sources of express or inherent power. The Government, however, 
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has principally relied o~2 of th~~:~ authorization 
for these actions. Section 1702 (a) (1) provides in part: 
"At the times and to the extent specified in section 
1701 of this title, the President may, under such 
regulations as he may prescribe, by means of 
instructions, licenses, or otherwise --
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit 
( i) any transact ions in foreign exchange, 
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, 
by, through, or to any banking institution, to the 
extent that such transfers or payments involve any 
interest of any foreign country or a national therebf, 
(iii) the importing or exporting of currency 
or securities, and 
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, 
nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, 
holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, 
transportation, importation or exportation of, or 
dealing in, or exercising any right, power or privilege 
with respect to, or transactions involving, any 
property in which any foreign country or a national 
thereof has any interest; 
by any person, or with respect to any property, subject 
to the jurisdiction of the United States." 
The Government contends that the acts of "nullifying" the 
attachments and ordering the "transfer" of the frozen assets are 
specifically authorized by the plain. language of the above 
statute. The two Courts of Appeals that have considered the 
-~ 
issue agreed with this contention. In Chas. T. Main Int'l., Inc. 
v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, supra, the Court of Appeals 
... 
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for the First Circuit explained: 
"The President relied on his IEEPA powers in November 
1979, when he 'blocked' all Iranian assets in this 
country, and again in January 1981, when he 'nullified' 
interests acquired in blocked property, and ordered 
that property's transfer. The President's actions, in 
this regard, are in keeping with the language of IEEPA; 
initially he 'prevent[ed] and prohibit[ed]' 'transfers' 
of Iranian assets; later he 'direct[ed] and 
compel[led]' the 'transfer' and 'withdrawal' of the 
assets, 'nullify[ing]' certain 'rights' and 
'privileges' acquired in them. 
"Main argues that IEEPA does not supply the 
President with power to override judicial remedies, 
such as attachments and injunctions, or to extinguish 
'interests' in foreign assets held by United States 
citizens. But we can find no such limitation in 1 
IEEPA's terms. The language of IEEPA is sweeping and 
unqualified. It provides broadly that the President 
may void or nullify the 'exercising [by any person of] 
any right, power or privilege with respect to ..• any 
property in which any foreign country has any interest 
.... ' 50 u.s.c. § 1702(a) (1) (B) (emphasis added)." 
Id., at 9. 
In American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, supra, 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
employed a similar rationale in sustaining President Carter's 
action: 
"The Presidential revocation of the license he 
issued permitting prejudgment restraints upon Iranian 
assets is an action that falls within the plain 
language of the IEEPA. In vacating the attachments, he 
acted to 'nullify [and] void ••. any ••• exercising any 
right, power, or privilege with respect to ••• any 
property in which any foreign country ••• has any 
interest ••• by any person .•• subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States.'" Id., at 19 
(footnote omitted). --
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Petitioner contends that we should ignore the plain language 
of this statute because an examination of its legislative history 
as well as the history of § 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy 
Act (TWEA), 50 u.s.c. App. § 5(b), from which the pertinent 
language of § 1702 is directly drawn, reveals that the statute 
was not intended to give the President such extensive power over 
the assets of a foreign state during times of national emergency. 
According to petitioner, once the President instituted the 
November 14, 1979, blocking order, § 1702 authorized him "only to 
continue the freez e or to discontinue controls." Brief of 
Petitioner at 32. 
We do not agree and refuse to read out of § 1702 all meaning 
r-----------------------------------------~ 
to the words "transfe r", "compel", or "nullify." Nothing in the 
-~~---------........__ 
legislative history of either § 1702 or § 5(b) of the TWEA 
requires such a result. To the contrary, we think both the 
legislative history and cases interpreting the TWEA fully sustain 
the broad authority of the Executive when acting under this 
congressional grant of power. See, ~' Orvis v. Brownell, 345 
- 22 -
U.S. 183 (1953) .5 Although Congress intended to limit the 
President's emergency power in peacetime, we do not think the 
changes brought about by the enactment of the IEEPA in any way 
affected the authority of the President to take the specific 
actions taken here. We likewise note that by the time petitioner 
instituted this action, the President had already entered the 
5petitioner argues that under the TWEA the President was 
given two powers: (1) the power temporarily to freeze or block 
the transfer of foreign-owned assets; and (2) the power summarily 
to seize and permanently vest title to foreign-owned assets. It 
is contended that only the "vesting" provisions of the TWEA gave 
the President the power to permanently dispose of assets and when 
Congress enacted the IEEPA in 1977 it purposefully did not grant 
the President this power. According to petitioner, the 
nullification of the attachments and the transfer of the assets 
will permanently dispose of the assets and would not even be 
permissible under the TWEA. We disagree. Although it is true 
that the IEEPA does not give the President the power to "vest" or 
to take title to the assets, it does not follow that the S · -
... 
President is not authorized under both the IEEPA and the TWEA to ~ 
otherwise permanently dispose of the assets in the manner done ~ + 
here. Petitioner errs in assuming that the only power granted b) ' 
the language used in both § 1702 and § 5(b) of the TWEA is the 
power to temporarily freeze assets. As noted above, the plain 
language of the statute defies such a holding. Section 1702 -~· J 
authorizes the President to "direct and compel" the "transfer, ·~ 
withdrawal, transportation, ••. or exportation of ••• any /?j~~- .. _ 
property in which any foreign country •.. has any interest •... " r-v~~ 
We likewise reject the contention that Orvis v. Brownell, 
345 U.S. 183 (1953), and Zittman v. McGrath, 341 u.s. 446 (1951), 
grant petitioner the right to retain . its attachment.s on the 
Iranian assets. To the contrary, we think Orvis supports the 
proposition that an American claimant may not use an attachment 
that is subject to a revocable license and that has been obtained 
after the entry of a freeze order to limit in any way the actions 
the President may take under § 1702 respecting the frozen assets. 
While an attachment so obtained may determine the relationships 
between the creditor and the foreign debtor, it is in every sense 
subordinate to the President's power under the IEEPA. 
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freeze order. Petitioner proceeded against the blocked assets 
only after the Treasury Department had issued revocable licenses 
authorizing such proceedings and attachments. The Treasury 
regulations provided that "unless licensed" any attachment is 
null and void, 31 C.F.R. § 535.203 (e), and all licenses "may be 
amended, modified or revoked at any time." 31 C.F.R. § 535.805. 
I 
As such, the attachments obtained by petitioner were specifically 
made subordinate to further actions which the President might ... 
take under the IEEPA. Petitioner was on notice of the contingent 
natur~~Jis interest in the frozen assets. ~ ·~ ~ 
~~~J) 'd N~~ f, l~~~~) ~ ~fl-.,4 
This Court has previou~y recognized that the congress·onal  
~ purpose in authorizing blocking orders is "to put control of 
foreign assets in the hands of the President .••• " Propper v. 
Clark, 337 u.s. 472, 493 (1949). Such orders permit the 
President to maintain the foreign assets at his disposal for use 
in negotiating the resolution of a declared national emergency. 
The frozen assets serve as a "bargaining chip" to be used by the 
President when dealing with a hostile country. Accordingly, it 
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is difficult to accept petitioner's argument because the 
practical effect of it is to allow individual claimants 
throughout the country to minimize or wholly eliminate this 
"bargaining chip" through attachments, garnishments or similar 
encumbrances on property. Neither the purpose the statute was 
enacted to serve nor its plain language supports such a result. 
I 
Because the President's action in nullifying the 
attachments and ordering the transfer of the assets was taken 
pursuant to specific congressional authorization, it is 
"supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest 
latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion 
would rest heavily upon any who might attack it." Youngstown, 
343 u.s., at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). Under the 
circumstances of this case, we cannot say that petitioner has 
sustained that heavy burden. A contrary ruling would mean that 
the Federal Government as a whole lacked the power exercised by 




We do not think it is appropriate at the present time to 
contention that even if the President had 
the authority to nullify the attachments, transfer the assets, 
and "suspend" all claims pending in United States courts 
(discussed infra), such actions would constitute an 
unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution in the absence of just f 
compensation. However, this contention, and the possibility that 
the President's actions may effect a taking of petitioner's 
property, makes ripe for adjudication the question whether 
petitioner will have a remedy at law in the Court of Claims under 
the Tucker Act, 28 u.s.c. §§ 1941, et ~., in such an event. 
That the fact and extent of the taking in this case is yet 
speculative is inconsequential because "there must be at the time 
of taking 'a reasonable, certain and adequate provision for 
obtaining ·compensation. '" Regional ·Ra i 1 Reorgani za:t ion Act 
Cases, 419 u.s. 102, 124-125 (1974), quoting Cherokee Nation v. 
Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 u.s. 641, 659 (1890); Cities Service 
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Co. v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330, 335-336 (1952); Duke Power Co. v. 
Carolina Enviornmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 94, n.39 (1978). 
It has been contended that the "treaty exception" to the 
Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1502, might preclude the Court of Claims 
from exercising jurisdiction over any takings claim the 
petitioner might bring. At oral argument, however, the 
I 
Government conceded that § 1502 would not act as a bar to 
petitioner's action in the Court of Claims. Transcript of Oral 
Arg. at We agree. See United States v. Weld, 127 U.S. 51 
(1888); United States v. Old Settlers, 148 U.S. 427 (1893); 
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 889 (Ct. Cl. 
1976). Accordingly, to the extent petitioner believes it has 
suffered an unconstitutional taking by any of the President's 
actions discussed here today, we see no jurisdictional obstacle 
to an appropriate action in the United States Court of Claims 
under the Tucker Act. 6 
6we are not implying that petitioner has in fact suffered 
a taking of his property by the President's actions nullifying 
the attachments. That question, however, should be addressed 
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IV 
Although we have concluded that the IEEPA constitutes 
specific congressional authorization to the President to nullify 
the attachments and order the transfer of Iranian assets, there 
remains the question of the President's authority to suspend 
claims pending in American courts. Such claims have, of course, 
an existence apart from the attachments which accompanied them. 
In terminating these claims through Executive Order No. 12294, 
the President purported to act under authority of both the IEEPA 
and 22 u.s.c. § 1732, the so-called "Hostage Act".7 App. to Pet. 
for Cert. 52. 
We conclude that although the IEEPA authorized the 
initially by the Court of Claims if the occassion should arise. 
We also note that we agree with petitioner and the Government 
that the question of whether the "suspension" of the claims 
constitutes a "taking" is not ripe for review. Brief of 
Petitioner at 34, n. 32; Brief of the United States at 65. 
Accord Chas. T. Main Int'l., Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power 
Authority~ No. 80-1027 (CA 1, May 22, 1981) at 23-24; American 
Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 80-1779, 80-
1891 (CA DC June 5, 1981) at 34-38. 
7 Judge Mikva, in his separate opinion in American Int'l 
Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, slip op., at 1, argued 
that the moniker "Hostage Act" was newly-coined for purposes of 
this litigation. Suffice it to say that we focus on the language 
of 22 u.s.c. §1732, not any short-hand description of it. See 
Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, II, ii, 43 ("What's in a name?"). 
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nullification of the attachments, it cannot be read to authorize 
the suspension of the claims. The claims of American citizens 
against Iran are not in themselves transactions involving Iranian 
property or efforts to exercise any rights with respect to such 
property. An in personam lawsuit, although it might eventually 
be reduced to judgment and that judgment might be executed upon, 
is an effort to establish liability and fix damages and does not 
focus on any particular property within the jurisdiction. The 
terms of IEEPA therefore do not authorize the President to 
suspend claims in American courts. This is the unanimous view of 
all the courts which have considered the question. Chas. T. Main 
Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, slip op., at 
13-14A; American Int'l Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran, slip 
op., at 27 n. 15; The Marschalk Co., Inc. v. Iran National 
Airlines, 79 Civ. 7035 (CBM), slip op., at 17-20 (SONY, June 11, 
1981); Electronic Data Systems v. Social Security Organization of 
Iran, No. CA3-79-218-F, slip op., at 20 (ND Tex., June 7, 1981). 
The Hostage Act, passed in 1868, provides: 
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"Whenever it is made known to th~ President that 
any citizen of the United States has been unjustly 
deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of 
any foreign government, it shall be the duty of the 
President forthwith to demand of that government the 
reasons of such imprisonment; and if it appears to be 
wrongful and in violation of the rights of American 
citizenship, the President shall forthwith demand the 
release of such citizen, and if the release so demanded 
is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall 
use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may 
think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the 
release; and all the facts and proceedings relative 
thereto shall as soon as practicable be communicated by 
the President to Congress." 22 U.S.C. § 1732. 
We are reluctant to conclude that this provision constitutes 
specific authorization to the President to suspend claims in 
American courts. Although the broad language of the Hostage Act 
suggests it may cover this case, there are several difficulties 
with such a view. The legislative history indicates that the Act 
was passed in response to a situation unlike the recent Iranian 
crisis. Congress in 1868 was concerned with the activity of 
certain countries refusing to recognize the citizenship of 
naturalized Americans travelling abroad and repatriating such 
citizens against their will. See, ~, Cong. Globe 4331, 40th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1868) (Sen. Fessenden); id., at 4354 (Sen. 
Conness); see also 22 u.s.c. § 1731. These countries were not 
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interested in returning the citizens in exchange for any sort of 
ransom. This also explains the reference in the Act to 
imprisonment "in violation of the rights of American 
citizenship." Although the Iranian hostage-taking violated 
international law and common decency, the hostages were not 
seized out of any refusal to recognize their American 
citizenship--they were seized precisely because of their American 
citizenship. The legislative history is also somewhat ambiguous 
on the question whether Congress contemplated presidential action 
such as that involved here or rather simply reprisals directed 
against the offending foreign country and its citizens. See, 
~, Cong. Globe 4205, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1868); American 
Int'l Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran, slip op. 1-3 (opinion of 
Mikva, J.). 
Concluding that neither IEEPA nor the Hostage Act 
constitutes specific authorization of the President's action 
suspending claims, however, is not to say that these statutory 
provisions are entirely irrelevant to the question of the 
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validity of the President's action. We think both statutes 
highly relevant in the looser sense of indicating congressional 
acceptance of a broad scope for executive action in circumstances 
such as those presented in this case. As noted above in Part 
III, supra, at 18-20, the IEEPA delegates broad authority to the 
President to act in times of national emergency with respect to 
property of a foreign country. The Hostage Act similarly 
indicates congressional willingness that the President have broad 
discretion when responding t the ~f foreign 
sovereigns. As Senator Williams, draftsman of the language 
eventually enacted as the Hostage Act, put it: 
"If you propose any remedy at all, you must invest 
the executive with some discretion, so that he may 
apply the remedy to a case as it may arise. As to 
England or France he might adopt one policy to relieve 
a citizen imprisoned by either one of those countries; 
as to the Barbary powers, he might adopt another 
policy; as to the islands of the ocean another. With 
different countries that have different systems of 
government he might adopt different means." Cong. 
Globe 4359, 40thCong., 2dSess. (1868). 
Proponents of the bill recognized that it placed "a loose 
discretion" in the President's hands, id., at 4238 (Sen. 
Stewart), but argued that "[s]omething must be intrusted to the 
- 32 -
Executive" and that "[t]he President ought to have the power to 
do what the exigencies of the case require to rescue [a] citizen 
from imprisonment". Id., at 4233, 4357 (Sen. Williams). An 
original version of the Act, which authorized the President to 
suspend trade with a foreign country and even arrest citizens of 
that country in the United States in retaliation, was rejected 
because "there may be a great variety of cases arising where 
other and different means would be equally effective and where 
the end desired could be accomplished without resorting to such 
dangerous and violent measures." Id., at 4233 (Sen. Williams). 
Although we have declined to conclude that the IEEPA or the 
Hostage Act directly authorizes the President's suspension of 
claims for the reasons noted, we cannot ignore the general tenor 
of Congress' legislation in this area in trying to determine 
whether the President is acting alone or at least with the 
acceptance of Congress. As we have noted, Congress cannot 
anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action the 
President may find it necessary to take or every possible 
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situation in which he might act. Such faiiure of Congress 
specifically to delegate authority does not, "especially .•• in the 
areas of foreign policy and national security," imply 
"congressional disapproval" of action taken by the Executive. 
u.s. (1981) . When Congress has enacted 
legislation delegating broad authority to the President to act in 
certain circumstances, and the President takes action in a 
similar and analogous circumstance, though perhaps not precisely 
covered by the statute, it is reasonable to suppose similar 
congressional willingness that the President have broad 
authority. The enactment of legislation closely related to the 
question of the President's authority in a particular case which 
evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad 
discretion may be considered to "invite" "measures on independent 
presidential responsibility," Youngstown, 343 u.s., at 637 
(Jackson, J., concurring). At least this is so where there is no 
contrary indication of legislative intent and when, as here, 
there is a history of congressional acquiescence in conduct of 
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the sort engaged in by the President. It is to that history 
which we now turn. 
Not infrequently in affairs between nations, outstanding 
claims by nationals of one country against the government of 
another country are ''sources of friction" between the two 
sovereigns. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 225 (1942). 
To resolve these difficulties, nations have often entered into 
agreements settling the claims of their respective nationals. As 
one treatise writer puts it, international agreements settling 
claims by nationals of one state against the government of 
another "are established international practice reflecting 
traditional international theory". L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs 
and the Constitution 262 (1972). Consistent with that principle, 
the United States has repeatedly exercised its sovereign 
authority to settle the claims of its nationals against foreign 
countries.8 Though those settlments have sometimes been made by 
8 At least since the case of the "Wilmington Packet" in 
1799, Presidents have exercised the power to settle claims of 
United States nationals by executive agreement. See Lillich, The 
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treaty, there has also been a long standing practice of settling 
such claims by executive agreement without the advice and consent 
of the Senate. Under such agreements, the President has agreed 
to renounce or extinguish claims of United States nationals 
against foreign governments, in return for lump sum payments or 
the establishment of arbitration procedures. To be sure, many of 
I 
these settlements were encouraged by the United States claimants 
themselves, since a claimant's only hope of obtaining any payment 
at all might lie in having his government negotiate a diplomatic 
settlement on his behalf. But it is also undisputed that the 
"President has sometimes disposed of the claims of citizens 
without their consent, or even without consultation with them, 
usually without exclusive regard for their interests, as 
distinguished from those of the nation of the whole. " Henkin, 
Gravel Amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1974, 69 Am. J. Int'l 
L. 837, 844 (1975). In fact, during the period of 1817-1917, "no 
fewer than eighty executive agreements were entered into by the 
United States looking to the liquidation of claims of its 
citizens." McClure, International Executive Agreements 53 
(1941). See also 14 M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law 247 
(1970). 
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supra, at 263. Accord, The Restatement (Second) of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States §213 (1965) (President "may 
waive or settle a claim against a foreign state ••. even without 
the consent of the [injured] national"). It is clear that the 
practice of settling claims continues today. Since 1952, the 
President has entered into at least ten binding settlements with 
foreign nations, including an $80 million dollar settlement with 
the People's Republic of China. 9 
Crucial to our decision today is the conclusion that 
Congress has implictly approved the practice of claim settlement 
by executive agreement. This is best demonstrated by Congress' 
enactment of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22 
U.S.C. § 1621, et seq., as amended (1980). The Act had two 
purposes: (1) to allocate to United States nationals funds 
received in the course of an executive claims settlement with 
9 Those agreements are 30 U.S.T. 1957 (1979) (People's 
Republic of China); 27 U.S.T 3993 (1976) (Peru); 27 U.S.T. 4214 
{1976) (Egypt); 25 U.S.T. 227 (1974) (Peru); 24 U.S.T. 522 (1973) 
(Hungary); 20 U.S.T. 2654 (1969); (Japan); 16 U.S.T. 1 (1965) 
(Yugoslavia); 14 U.S.T. 969 (1963) Bulgaria); 11 U.S.T. 1953 
(1960) (Poland); 11 U.S.T. 317 (1960) {Rumania). 
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Yugoslavia, and (2) to provide a procedure whereby funds 
resulting from future settlements could be distributed. To 
achieve these ends Congress created the International Claims 
Commission, now the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, and 
gave it jurisdiction to make final and binding decisions with 
respect to claims by United States nationals against settlement 
I 
funds. By creating a procedure to implement future settlement 
agreements, Congress placed its stamp of approval on such 
agreements. Indeed, the legislative history of the Act observed 
that the United States was seeking settlements with countries 
other than Yugoslavia and stated that the bill "contemplates that 
settlements of a similar nature are to be made in the future". 
H. Rep. No. 81-770, 8lst Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 8 (1949). 
Over the years Congress has frequently amended the 
International Claims Settlement Act to provide for particular 
problems arising out of settlement agreements, thus demonstrating 
Congress' continuing acceptance of the President's claim 
settlement authority. With respect to the Executive Agreement 
... 
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with the Peoples Republic of China, for example, Congress 
established an allocation formula for distribution of the funds 
received pursuant to the Agreement. 22 u.s.c. § 1627. As with 
legislation involving other executive agreements, Congress did 
not question the fact of the settlement or the power of the 
President to have concluded it. In 1976, Congress authorized the 
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to adjudicate the m~rits of 
claims by United States nationals against East Germany, prior to 
any settlement with East Germany, so that the Executive would "be 
in a better position to negotiate an adequate settlement .•• of 
these claims." S. Rep. No. 94-1188, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 
(1976); 22 U.S.C. § 1644b. Similarly, Congress recently amended 
the International Claims Settlement Act to facilitate the 
settlement of claims against Vietnam. 22 U.S.C. § 1645; § 
1645a(5). The House Report stated that the purpose of the 
legislation was to establish an offi~ial i~ventory ·of losses of 
private U.S. property in Vietnam so that recovery could be 
achieved "through direct Government-to Government negotiation of 
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private property claims." H.R. Rep. No. 96-915, 96th Cong. 2d 
Sess. 2-3 (1980). Finally, the legislative history of the IEEPA 
further reveals that Congress has accepted the authority of the 
Executive to enter into settlement agreements. Though IEEPA was 
enacted to provide for some limitation on the President's 
emergency powers, Congress stressed that "nothing in this Act is 
I 
intended to interfere with the authority of the President to 
[block assets], or to impede the settlement of claims of United 
States citizens against foreign countries." S. Rep. No. 95-466, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1977): 50 U.S.C. § 1706 (a) (1) .10 
10 Indeed, Congress has consistently failed to object to 
this long-standing practice of claim settlement by executive 
agreement, even when it has had an opportunity to do so. In 
1972, Congress entertained legislation relating to congressional 
oversight of such agreements. But Congress took only limited 
action, requiring that the text of significant executive 
agreements be transmitted to Congress. 1 u.s.c. § 112b. In Haig 
v. Agee, __ u.s. __ (1981), we noted that "Despite the 
longstanding and officially promulgated view that the Executive 
has the power to withold passports for reasons of national 
security, Congress in 1978, 'though it once again enacted 
legislation relating to passports, left completely untouched the 
broad rule-making authority granted 'in the earlier ·Act.'" Id., 
at 20, quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 12 (1965). Likewise in 
this case, Congress, though legislating in the area, has left 
"untouched" the authority of the President to enter into 
settlement agreements. 
The legislative history of 1 U.S.C. § 112b further reveals 
that Congress has accepted the President's authority to settle 
claims. During the hearings on the bill, Senator Case, the 
sponsor of the Act, stated with respect to executive claim 
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In addition to congressional acquiescence in the President's 
power to settle claims, prior cases of this Court have also 
recognized that the President does have some measure of power to 
enter into executive agreements without obtaining the advice and 
consent of the Senate. In United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 
(1942), for example, the Court upheld the validity of the 
Litvinov Assignment, which was part of an Executive Agreement 
whereby the Soviet Union assigned to the United States amounts 
owed to it by American nationals so that outstanding claims of 
other American nationals could be paid. The Court explained that 
the resolution of such claims was integrally connected with 
normalizing United States' relations with a foreign state. 
"Power to remove such obstacles to full 
recognition as settlement of claims of our 
nationals ..• certainly is a modest implied power of the 
President .•.• No such obstacle can be placed in the way 
of rehabilitation of relations between this country and 
settlements that: 
"I think it is a most interesting [area] in which 
we h~ve accepted the right of ~he Pre~ident, tine 
individual, acting through his diplomatic force, to 
adjudicate and settle claims of American nationals 
against foreign countries. But it is a fact." 
Transmittal of Executive Agreements to Congress: Hearings before 
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 74 
(1971). 
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another nation, unless the historic conception of his 
power and responsibilities .•• is to be drastically 
revised." Id., at 229-230. 
Similarly, Judge Learned Hand recognized: 
"The constitutional power of the President extends 
to the settlement of mutual claims between a foreign 
government and the United States, at least when it is 
an incident to the recognition of that government; and 
it would be unreasonable to circumscribe it to such 
controversies. The continued mutual amity between this 
nation and other powers again and again depends upon a 
satisfactory compromise of mutual claims; the 
necessary power to make such compromises has existed 
from the earliest times and been exercised by the 1 
foreign offices of all civilized nations." 
Ozanic v. United States, 188 F.2d 228, 231 (CA 2 1951). 
Petitioner raises two arguments in opposition to the 
proposition that Congress has acquiesced in this long-standing 
practice of claims settlement by executive agreement. First, it 
suggests that all pre-1952 settlment claims, and corresponding 
court cases such as Pink, should be discounted because of the 
evolution of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Petitioner 
observes that prior to 1952 the United States adhered to the 
doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity, so that absent action by 
the Executive there simply would be no remedy for an United 
States national against a foreign government. When the United 
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States in 1952 adopted a more restrictive notion of sovereign 
immunity, by means of the so-called "Tate'' letter, it is 
petitioner's view that United States nationals no longer needed 
Executive aid to settle claims and that, as a result, the 
President's authority to settle such claims in some sense 
"disappeared". Though petitioner's argument is not wholly 
without merit, it is refuted by the fact that since 1952 1there 
have been at least ten claim settlements by executive agreement. 
Thus, even if the pre-1952 cases should be disregarded, 
congressional acquiescence in settlement agreements since that 
time supports the President's power to act here. 
Petitioner next asserts that Congress divested the President 
of the authority to settle claims when it enacted the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (hereinafter "FSIA"), 28 u.s.c. 
§ 1602 et seq. The FSIA granted personal and subject matter 
jurisdiction in the federal distric~ courts over commercial suits 
brought by claimants against those foreign states which have 
waived immunity. 28 u.s.c § 1330. Prior to the enactment of the 
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FSIA, a foreign government's immunity to suit was determined by 
the Executive Branch on a case-by-case basis. According to 
petitioner, the principal purpose of the FSIA was to depoliticize 
these commercial lawsuits by taking them out of the arena of 
foreign affairs--where the Executive Branch is subject to the 
pressures of foreign states seeking to avoid liability through a 
f 
grant of immunity--and by placing them within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the courts. Petitioner thus insists that the 
President, by suspending its claims, has circumscribed the 
jurisdiction of the United States courts in violation of Article 
III of the Constitution. 
We disagree. In the first place, we do not believe that the 
President has attempted to divest the federal courts of 
jurisdiction. Executive Order No. 12294 purports only to 
"suspend" the claims, not divest the federal court of 
"jurisdiction". As we read the Executive Order, those claims 
not within the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal will "revive" 
and become judicially enforceable in United States courts. This 
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case, in short, illustrates the difference between modifying 
federal court jurisdiction and directing the courts to apply a 
different rule of law. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 
u.s. 1, 103 (1801). The President has exercised the power, 
acquiesced in by Congress, to settle claims and, as such, has 
simply effected a change in the substantive law governing the 
I 
lawsuit. Indeed, the very example of sovereign immunity belies 
petitioner's argument. No one would suggest that a determination 
of sovereign immunity divests the federal courts of 
"jurisdiction". Yet, petitioner's argument, if accepted, would 
have required courts prior to the enactment of the FSIA to reject 
as an encroachment on their jurisdiction the President's 
determination of a foreign state's sovereign immunity. 
Petitioner also reads the FSIA much too broadly. The 
principal purpose of the FSIA was to codify contemporary concepts 
concerning the scope of sovereign immunity and withdraw from the 
President the authority to make binding determinations of the 
sovereign . irnrnuni ty to be accorded foreign states. See Chas T. 
... 
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Main, Int'l v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, slip. op., at 
20; American Int'l Group Inc. v Islamic Republic of Iran, slip 
op., at 30-32. The FSIA was thus designed to remove one 
particular barrier to suit, namely sovereign immunity, and cannot 
be fairly read as prohibiting the President from settling claims 
of United States nationals against foreign governments. It is 
telling that the Congress which enacted the FSIA conside~ed but 
rejected several proposals designed to limit the power of the 
President to enter into. executive agreements, including claims 
settlement agreements. 11 It is quite unlikely that the same 
Congress that rejected proposals to limit the President's 
authority to conclude executive agreements sought to accomplish 
that very purpose sub silentio through the FSIA. And, as noted 
11 The rejected legislation would typically have required 
congressional approval of executive agreements before they would 
be considered effective. See Congressional Oversight of 
Executive Agreements: Hearings on s. 632 and S. 1251 Before the 
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 243-261, 302-311 (1975); 
Congressional Review of International Agreements: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on International Security and Scientific 
Affairs of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong. 
2d Sess. 167, 246 (1976). 
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above, just one year after enacting the FSIA, Congress enacted 
the IEEPA, where the legislative history stressed that nothing in 
the IEEPA was to impede the settlement of claims of United States 
citizens. It would be surprising for Congress to express this 
support for settlement agreements had it intended the FSIA to 
eliminate the President's authority to make such agreements. 
In light of all of the foregoing--the inferences to 1 be drawn 
from the character of the legislation Congress has enacted in the 
area, such as the IEEPA and the Hostage Act, and from the history 
of acquiescence in executive claims settlement--we conclude that 
the President was authorized to suspend pending claims pursuant 
to Executive Order No. 12294. As Justice Frankfurter pointed out 
in Youngstown, 343 u.s., at 610-611, "a systematic, unbroken 
executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and 
never before questioned .•. may be treated as a gloss on 'Executive 
Power' vested in the President by § ·1 of Art. II."· Past practice 
does not, by itself, create power, but "long-continued practice, 
known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption 
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that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its 
consent •••• " United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 469 
(1915). See Haig v. Agee, ___ u.s., at Such practice 
is present here and such a presumption is also appropriate. In 
light of the fact that Congress may be considered to have 
consented to the President's action in suspending claims, we 
cannot say that action exceeded the President's powers. 
Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the means 
chosen by the President to settle the claims of American 
nationals are reasonable. The President has provided an 
alternate forum, the Claims Tribunal, which is capable of 
providing meaningful relief. The Solicitor General also suggests 
that the provision of the Claims Tribunal will actually enhance 
the opportunity for claimants to recover their claims, in that 
the Agreement removes a number of jurisdictional and procedural 
impediments faced by claimants in United States courts. Brief 
for United States at 13-14. Although being overly sanguine about 
the chances of United States claimants before the Claims 
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Tribunal would require a degree of naivite . which should not be 
demanded even of judges, the Solicitor General's point cannot be 
discounted. Moreover, it is important to remember that we have 
already held that the President has the statutory authority to 
nullify attachments and to transfer the assets out of the 
country. The President's power to do so does not depend on his 
provision of a forum whereby claimants can recover on those 
claims. The fact that the President has provided such a forum 
here means that the claimants are receiving something in return 
for the suspension of their claims, namely, access to an 
international tribunal before which they may well recover 
something on their claims. Because there does appear to be a 
real "settlement" here, this case is more easily analogized to 
the more traditional claim settlement cases of the past. 
Just as importantly, Congress has not dissapproved of the 
action taken here. Though Congress has held hearings on the 
Iranian Agreement itself,l2 Congress has not enacted legislation, 
Footnote(s) 12 appear on following page(s). 
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or even passed a resolution, indicating its displeasure with the 
Agreement. Quite the contrary, the relevant Senate Committee has 
stated that the establishment of the Tribunal is "of vital 
importance to the United States." s. Rep. No. 97-71, 97th Cong., 
1st Sess. 5 (1981) .13 We are thus clearly not confronted with a 
situation in which Congress has in some way resisted the exercise 
of presidential authority. 
Finally, we reemphasize the narrowness of our decision. We 
do not decide that the President possesses plenary power to 
settle claims, even as against foreign governmental entities. As 
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stressed, "the sheer 
magnitude of such a power, considered against the background of 
12 See Hearings on the Iranian Agreements Before the Senate 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981); 
Hearings on the Iranian Assests Settlement Before the Senate 
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1981); Hearings on the Algerian Declarations Before the 
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981). 
13 Contrast congressional reaction to the Iranian 
Agreements with congressional reaction to a 1974 Executive 
Agreement .with Czechoslovakia. There the President sought to 
settle over $105 million in claims against Czechoslovaka for 
$20.5 million. Congress quickly demonstrated its displeasure by 
enacting legislation requiring that the Agreement be 
renegotiated. See Lillich, supra, at 839-40. Though Congress 
has shown itself capable of objecting to executive agreements, it 
has rarely done so and has not done so in this case. 
r 
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the diversity and complexity of modern international trade, 
cautions against any broader construction of authority than is 
necessary." Chas T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power 
Authority, slip. op., at 22. But where, as here, the settlement 
of claims has been determined to be a necessary incident to the 
resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between our country 
and another, and where, as here, we can conclude that Congress 
acquiesced in the President's action, we are not prepared to say 
that the President lacks the power to settle such claims. 
CHAM BERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.;:~nt:;tUmt l!}tturt o-r llft ~ttl ~IIUf9' 
~a.s:fri:nghm. ~. <q. 2.0gtJ!.~ 
June 29, 1981 
Re: No. 80-2078 Dames & Moore v. Regan 
Dear Harry: 
/ 
Thank you for your letter of June 29th, with its 
suggestions for possible changes in the opinion. As you 
might imagine, we are in something of a mad scramble right 
now, trying to tailor the opinion to the votes taken at 
Conference this morning, but my tentative views on your 
suggestions are as follows: 
1. Since I would not necessarily reach the same result 
without at least implicit congressional approval, I would 
prefer leaving line 9 on page 36 as is. 
·2. I agree with your suggestion relative to line 10 on 
page 47, and that should appear in the next draft to be 
circulated. 
3. I think you are quite right that we are now 
concerned with a deposit in the Bank of England, and I 
propose to change the opinion to so state. I would prefer 
not- to elaborate any more than necessary as to how the bank 
funds were transferred, though if you feel strongly on the 
point and have language to suggest I will certainly consider 
it. 
4. With respect to Orvis, I had thought that a "once 
over lightly" touch was best for the case. Orvis did not 
have a license, and given the sharp contrast between the 
decisions in Orvis and Zittman I would prefer to give as 
little analysis to these cases as possible, since the 
present case does not turn upon them. I will try to work 
into the last sentence of footnote 5 on page 22 some 
modifications along the line you suggest. 
5. I think I have quite consistently maintained that 
the "delegation doctrine", as you refer to it, has a 
•.. 
'··' 
different reach in foreign affairs than it does in domestic 
affairs. I think the Court so stated in United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S,. 304, 319-320 (1936), 
while at the same time making it clear that such delegation 
might not be upheld in a purely domestic matter. Since we 
have chosen to rest the "suspension of claims" neither on 
the delegation contained in § 1732 nor in IEEPA, but simply 
refer to them along with a host of similar congressional 
instances of acquiescence in the exercise of Presidential 
power in a certain area, I think the language is consistent 
with Jackson's statement in Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637, 
cited on page 33. If you have any modifications to suggest, 
I would of course be happy to consider them. 
6. I felt after the Conference vote that there was 
neither a majority to place direct reliance on § 1732 nor on 
IEEPA for the "suspension" of the suits, and therefore 
attempted to conform the opinion to the views of the 
Conference. I am pleased to think that you believe I 
succeeded. 
7. The opinion will conclude with a statement that the 
mandate shall issue forthwith. 
Sincerely, ~· 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
P.S~ On further pondering your letter, with respect to 
paragraph 4, I would certainly be willing to go so far as to 
say in the last sentence of footnote 6 on page 22: 
"An attachment so obtained is in every sense 
subordinate to the President's powers under the 
IEEPA." 
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C H AMBERS OF 
.JU S TICE w .. . .J. B R ENNAN, .JR. June 29, 1981 
f 
RE: No. 80-2078 Dames & Moore v. Regan 
Dear Bi 11: 
Confirming what I said at conference this morning 
I am happy to join your really splendid opinion. I 
understand that you intend to incorporate Byron's first 
suggestion in his letter of June ·26, and I very much 
favor that. 
Again my thanks and congratulations upon a great 
job. 
Sincerely, 
t/1) . , 
/~ ·· LL 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 






JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~np-rtutt <!fcurt of Urt ~b' ~hdte 
Jfaeltittgt~ ~. <!f. 2ll~'l' 
Re: No. 80-2078 - Dames and Moore v. Regan 
Dear Bill: 
I am generally with you and offer the following minor 
suggestions for your last minute consideration: 
1. As is John, I, too, am concerned about the words 
"crucial to our decision" in line 9 on page 36. I would go 
along with his "strongly supporting our decision" alternative 
suggestion. 
2. I also agree with John's suggestion, relative to line 
~ 10 on page 47, and the omission of five words in that line. 
3. At the top of page 11 reference is made to the coming 
deposit in a security account in the Algerian Central Bank. I 
thought we were now concerned with a deposit in the Bank of .· 
England. Should some explanation be made, perhaps by way of 
footnote, as to how this change came about? 
4. This comment relates to footnote 5 on page 22. I 
would have preferred an explicit statement that the attachment 
in Orvis was valid only as a means of obtaining jurisdiction 
over the foreign debtor. The footnote's last sentence state-
ment that a post-freeze attachment "may determine the relation-
ships between the creditor and the foreign debtor" is true only 
in a limited number of circumstances. Since the President may 
override a post-freeze attachment, and since the FSIA forbids 
the use of attachments for the purpose of obtaining jurisdic-
tion, it is doubtful that an attachme nt will be of much use in 
determining the rights and liabilities of the parties. It 
would be of use only if the President simply decided to lift 
the freeze without invoking any of his other powers under the 
Emergency Act, leaving the foreign country free to withdraw its 
a s sets unless r e strained by an attachment. 
The statement in Orvis that a post-freeze attachment 
"determined relationships between creditor and enemy debtor," 
345 u.s., at 186-187, was the source of petitioner's claim in 
this c a se that the Preside nt had no powe r to invalidate its 
a tt a chment. By repeat i ng th a t statement, I th i nk we may be 
cr e ating conf usion. 
/ 




5. I am somewhat concerned about the material, particu-
larly . the first 2 sentences, that follow the citation of Haig 
v. A~ee on page . 33. Given your views on the delegation 
doctr1ne in general, I was a little surprised by the presence 
of those sentences. More importantly, however, I have no idea 
where such a rule could lead. As of now, I think the statement 
of that rule is unnecessary to the decision in this case, in 
view of the clear history of congressional approval of claims 
settlements set forth subsequently in the Dpinion. I would be 
much happier if those sentences could be deleted. 
6. I am pleased that the opinion places no direct 
reliance on § 1732. 
7. Should the opinion conclude with a statement that the 




Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
··--
June 29 , 1981 
Re: 80-2078 - Dames & Moore v. Regan 
Dear Bill, 
I congratulate you and thank you for a 
fine job accomplished in a remarkably short 
time. · 
It seems to me that the first suggestion 
in Byron's letter to you of June 26 is correct, 
and I hope you will incorporate it. With this 
single qualification , you can count on my 
joining your opinion if I am still a Member 
of the Court , when it is announced . 
Sincerely yours , 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS O F' 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~ttprttttt Qicnrt of tlrt ~tb iltaftg 
.. u!p:ngton. ~. Qf. ' 2llp~~ 
June 29, 1981 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 80-2078 Dames & Moore v. Regan 
In light of today's conference and the various 
correspondence, I have the fol~ing cha~es to make: 
I am happy to make the first and third of the changes 
suggested in John's letter of June 26, but prefer not to 
make the second. 
Pages 25-26, and n. 6, are deleted. The following is 
added as a new footnote on page 24, line 6: 
Although petitioner concedes that the 
President could have forbidden attachments, it 
nevertheless argues that once he allowed them he 
permitted claimants to acquire property interests 
in their attachments. Petitioner further argues 
that only the licenses to obtain the attachments 
were made revocable, not the attachments 
themselves. It is urged that the January 19, 
1981, order revoking all licenses only affected 
petitioner's right to obtain future attachments. 
We disagree. As noted above, the regulations 
specifically provided that any attachment is null 
and void "unless licensed", and all licenses may 
be revoked at any time. Moreover, common sense 
defies petitioner's reading of the regulations. 
The President could hardly have intended 
petitioner and other similarly situated claimants 
to have the power to take control of the frozen 
assets out of his hands. 
- 2 -
Our construction of petitioner's attachments 
as being "revocable," "contingent," and "in every 
sense subordinate to the President's power under 
the IEEPA," in effect answers petitioner's claim 
that even if the President had the authority to 
nullify the attachments and transfer the assets, 
the exercise of such would constitute an 
unconstitutional taking of property in violation 
of the Fifth Amendment absent just compensation. 
We conclude that because of the President's 
authority to prevent or condition attachments, and 
because of the orders he issued to this effect, 
petitioner did not acquire any "property" interest 
in its attachments of the sort that would support 
a constitutional claim for compensation. 
I have attached new pages, essentially old pages 25-26, 
including a new footnote, to appear at the end of the 
opinion. 
Sincerely, / . 
~/ 
v 
we do not think it is appropriate at the present time to 
address petitioner's contention that even if the President had 
a. .. .J.,~ 
the authority to suspend all claims pending in United States 
A. 
courts such action would constitute an unconstitutional taking in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution in the absence of just compensation.! Both 
petitioner and the Government concede that the question of 
whether the suspension of the claims constitutes a taking is not 
ripe for review. Brief of Petitioner at 34, n. 32~ Brief of the 
United States at 65. Accord Chas. T. Main Int'l., Inc. v. 
Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, Slip Op., at 23-24~ American 
Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Slip Op., at at 
34-38. However, this contention, and the possibility that the 
President's actions may effect a taking of petitioner's property, 
makes ripe for adjudication the question whether petitioner will 
have a remedy at law in the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act, 
28 u.s.c. S 1491, in such an event. That the fact and extent of 
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the taking in this case is yet speculative is inconsequential 
because "there must be at the time of taking 'a reasonable, 
certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation.'" 
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 u.s. 102, 124-125 
(1974), quoting Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 
U.S. 641, 659 (1890); Cities Service Co. v. McGrath, 342 u.s. 
330, 335-336 (1952); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental 
Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 94, n.39 (1978). 
It has been contended that the "treaty exception" to the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, 28 u.s.c. § 1502, might 
preclude the Court of Claims from exercising jurisdiction over 
any takings claim the petitioner might bring. At oral argument, 
however, the Government conceded that S 1502 would not act as a 
bar to petitioner's action in the Court of Claims. Transcript of 
Oral Arg. at 39-42, 47. We agree. See United States v. Weld, 
127 u.s. 51 (1888); United States v. Old Settlers, 148 u.s. 427 
(1893); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 889 (Ct. 
Cl. 1976). Accordingly, to the extent petitioner believes it has 
- 3 -
suffered an unconstitutional taking by any of the President's 
actions discussed here today, we see no jurisdictional obstacle 
to an appropriate action in the United States Court of Claims 
under the Tucker Act. 
The judgment of the District Court is accordingly affirmed, 
and the mandate shall issue forthwith. 
13/ Though we conclude that the President has settled 
petitioner's claims against Iran, we do not suggest that the 
settlement has terminated petitioner's possible taking claim 
against the United States. We express no views on petitioner's 
claims that it has suffered a taking. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE W>< . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
t 
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June 29, 1981 
RE: No. 80-2078 Dames & Moore v. Regan 
Dear Bi 11: 
j 
Your proposed changes outlined in your memorandum of 
June 29 and enclosure are satisfactory to me. 




cc: The Conference 
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
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June 29, 1981 
Re: 80-2078 - Dames & Moore v. Regan 
Dear Bill: 
Your changes are entirely acceptable to me and I 
therefore join your opinion, except for the discussion 
of the Court of Claims jurisdiction in Part v. I have 
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From : Mr. Justice Stevens 
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Recirculated: __________ _ 
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring . 
In my judgment the possibility that requiring this 
petitioner to prosecute its claim in another forum will 
constitute an unconstitutional "taking " is so r emote that I would 
not address ·the jurisdictional question considered in Part V of 
the Court's opinion . However, I join the remainder of the 
opinion . 
·~~ ., 
June 29, 1981 ' 
• :Of 
80-2078 Dames ' Moore v. Regan 
Dear Bill: 




of your fine opinion and of the remarkable way in which you 
produced it on such short notice. 
The changes you have made in response to the 
majority vote at Conference this morning with respect to 
attachments prevent, however, my joining your opinion in its 
entirety. Accordingly, I am circulating a brief opinion 
concurring and dissenting in part. 
I must add, just for my own personal satisfaction, 
that if the honor of the United States had not been pledged, 
I would have nao great difficulty in sustaining the validity 
of the Agreements of Algiers. Having been coerced by the 
terrorist conduct of Iran in seizing and holding American 
diplomats for ransom, the United States certainly was not 
legally bound by these agreements. They would have been 
voida6Ie, I think, in the courts of any country that had a 
civilized legal system as well as before the International 
Court of Justice. Having said this, I agree that the 
President had authority to enter into these agreements. 
We all are much indebted to you and I hope that 
your severe discomfort over the weekend was merely a natural 
reaction to the great pressure under which you have worked. 
The bracing air of New England should be restorative. 
•!J 
~.: \' 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/ss 








JUSTICE POWELL, concurring and dissenting in part. 
I join the Court's opinion except its decision 
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the recent case of Agins v. Tiburon, u.s. (1980) . 




JUSTICE POWELL, concurrinq and dissenting in part. 
I join the Court's opinion except its decision 
that the nullification of the attachments effected no taking 
of property interests giving rise to a claim for 
compensation. This presents a separate question from 
whether the settlement of claims may constitute a taking of 
private property for public use requiring compensation. I 
would leave each type of "taking" claim for resolution on a 
case-by-case basis in actions before the Court of Claims. 
Even though the Executive Orders purported to make all 
attachments conditional, there is a substantial question 
whether these Orders by imposing restrictions on the timely 
exercise of legal rights, may not in themselves have 
effected a taking. Moreover, the circumstances involved in 
the hundreds of pending claims are not known to this Court. 
2. 
In my opinion, therefore, today's decisions with respect to 
attachment is premature. 
As I understand the Court's opinion with respect 
to the suspension and settlement of claims, I am in 
agreement. The opinion makes clear under the Agreements of 
Algiers* that some valid claims, against Iran and its 
instrumentalities, may not be adjudicated at all by the 
Arbitral Tribunal, and that others may not be paid in full. 
The Court holds that claims not so adjudicated or not fully 
paid may be asserted in the Court of Claims, the 
jurisdiction of what this Court acknowledges, and will be 
recognized by the United States as a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment for a public purpose upon a showing that the 
*We recognize these Agreements because they pledged the 
honor of the United States of America. The Agreements would 
not be binding under any rule of civilized law as they were 
coerced by Iran's lawless sei.zure of American diplomats. 
·, 
3. 
government's action created loss or damage with respect to 
the assertion of a valid claim, he just claims of a 
relatively few persons, subject to the jurisdiction of our 
courts, may not be appropriated by government as "bargaining 
chips" to further foreign policy goals on behalf of the 
nation, without providing just compensation.* The 
extraordinary powers of the President and Congress upon 
which our decision today rests cannot, in the circumstances 
of this case, displace the Bill of Rights. 
*As held in Ar_mstrong V:• United States, 364 u.s. 40, 49 
(1959): 
"The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private 
property shall not be taken for public use 
without just compensation was designed to bar 
government from forcing some people along to 
bear public burdens, which, in all fairness 
and justice, should be borne by the public as 
a whole." 
This basis of the "taking clause" was reaffirmed unanimously 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring and dissenting in 
I join the Court's opinion except its decision 
that th~ nullification of the attachments did not effect a 
taking of property interests giving rise to claims for 
just compensation. Ante, at , n. 6. The nullification 
of attachments presents a separate question from whether 
the suspension and proposed settlement of claims against 
Iran may constitute a taking. I would leave both "taking" 
claims open for resolution on a case-by-case basis in 
actions before the Court of Claims. The facts of the 
hundreds of claims pending against Iran are not known to 
this Court and may differ from the facts in this case. I 
therefore dissent from the Court's decision with respect 
to attachments. The decision may well be erroneous,l and 
lEven though the Executive Orders purported to make 
attachments conditional, there is a substantial quest ion 
whether the Orders themselves may have effected a taking 
by making conditional the attachments that claimants 
against Iran otherwise could have obtained without 
condition. Moreover, because it is settled that an 
attachment entitling a creditor to resort to specific 
property for the satisfaction of a claim is a property 
2. 
it certainly is premature. 
I agree with the Court's opinion with respect to 
the suspension and settlement of claims against Iran and 
its instrumentalities. The opinion makes clear that some 
claims may not be adjudicated by the Claims Tribunal, and 
that others may not be paid in full. The Court holds that 
parties whose claims are not adjudicated or not fully paid 
may bring a "taking" claim against the United States in 
the Court of Claims, the jurisdiction of which this Court 
acknowledges. The Government must pay just compensation 
when it furthers the nation's foreign policy goals by 
making "bargaining chips" of claims held by a relatively 
few persons and subject to the jurisdiction of our 
courts.2 The extraordinary powers of the President and 
right compensable under the Fifth Amendment, Armstrong v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960), Louisville Bank v. 
Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935), there is a question whether 
the revocability of the license under which petitioner 
obtained its attachment suffices to render revocable the 
attachment itself. See Marschalk Co. v. Iran National 
Airlines Corp., No. 79 Civ. 7035 (CBM) (June 11, 1981). 
2 As the Court held in Armstrong v. United States, 3 6 4 
u.s. 40, 49 (1960): 
"The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private 
property shall not be taken for a public use 
without just compensation was designed to bar 
3. 
Congress upon which our decision rests cannot, in the 
circumstances of this case, displace the Just Compensation 
Clause. 
Government from forcing some 
bear public burdens which, in 
justice, should be borne by 
whole." 
people alone to 
all fair ness and 
the public as a 
The Court unanimously reaffirmed this basis of the Just 
Compensation Clause in the recent case of Agins v. City of 

















~- • u- Justice Powell 
~om·. mJ,.- . 
,jUN 2 9 1981 
Circulated:-----------
Recirculated : - ---
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring and dissenting in 
I join the Court's opinion except its decision 
that the nullification of the attachments did not effect a 
taking of property interests giving rise to claims for 
just compensation. Ante, at , n. 6. The nullification 
of attachments presents a separate question from whether 
the suspension and proposed settlement of claims against 
Iran may constitute a taking. I would leave both "taking" 
claims open for resolution on a case-by-case basis in 
actions before the Court of Claims. The facts of the 
hundreds of claims pending against Iran are not known to 
this Court and may differ from the facts in this case. I 
therefore dissent from the Court's decision with respect 
to attachments. The decision may well be erroneous,l and 
lEven though the Executive Orders purported to make 
attachments conditional, there is a substantial question 
whether the Orders themselves may have effected a taking 
by making conditional the attachments that claimants 
against Iran otherwise could have obtained without 
condition. Moreover, because it is settled that an 
attachment entitling a creditor to resort to specific 
property for the satisfaction of a claim is a property 
2. 
it certainly is premature. 
I agree with the Court's opinion with respect to 
the suspension and settlement of claims against Iran and 
its instrumentalities. The opinion makes clear that some 
claims may not be adjudicated by the Claims Tribunal, and 
that others may not be paid in full. The Court holds that 
parties whose claims are not adjudicated or not fully paid 
may bring a "taking" claim against the United States in 
the Court of Claims, the jurisdiction of which this Court 
acknowledges. The Government must pay just compensation 
when it furthers the nation's foreign policy goals by 
making "bargaining chips" of claims held by a relatively 
few persons and subject to the jurisdiction of our 
courts.2 The extraordinary powers of the President and 
right compensable under the Fifth Amendment, Armstrong v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960), Louisville Bank v. 
Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935), there is a question whether 
the revocability of the license under which petitioner 
obtained its attachment suffices to render revocable the 
attachment itself. See Marschalk Co. v. Iran National 
Airlines Corp., No. 79 Civ. 7035 (CBM) (June 11, 1981). 
2As the Court held in Armstrong v. United States, 364 
u.s. 40, 49 (1960): 
"The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private 
property shall not be taken for a public use 
without just compensation was designed to bar 
3. 
Congress upon which our decision rests cannot, in the 
circumstances of this case, displace the Just Compensation 
Clause. 
Government from forcing some 
bear public burdens which, in 
justice, should be borne by 
whole." 
people alone to 
all fairness and 
the public as a 
The Court unanimously reaffirmed this bas is of the Just 
Compensation Clause in the recent case of Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225, 260-261 (1980). 
lfp/ss 6/29/81 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
The Court's opinion makes clear under the 
Agreements of Algiers* that some valid claims, against Iran 
f 
and its instrumentalities, may not be adjudicated at all by 
the Arbitral Tribunal, and others may not be paid in full. 
I join the Court's opinion on the understanding that claims 
not so adjudicated or not fully paid may be asserted in the 
Court of Claims, the jurisdiction of which this Court 
acknowledges, and will be recognized by the United States as 
*We recognize these Agreements because they pledged the 
honor of the United States of America. The Agreements would 
not be binding under any rule of civilized law as they were 
coerced by Iran's lawles~ seizure of American diplomats. 
2. 
a taking under the Fifth Amendment for a public purpose to 
the extent such a claim has not been paid in full. The just 
claims of a relatively few persons, subject to the 
jurisdiction of our courts, may not be appropriated by 
government as "bargaining chips" to further foreign policy 
goals on behalf of the nation, without providing just 
( 
compensation.* The extraordinary powers of the President 
and Congress upon which our decision today rests cannot 
... 
displace the Bill of Rights. 
*Here pick up a quote from Agins. 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Bnm:1an 
1Jr. Just "ice Stewart 
Mr. Just .~c e \'.'l:ite 
Ilr . Ju - '·: ~ ,, tt -, r r.:;ball 
. l'~ ,T:' - , .. :~~'llun ........ . ·' 
t.;r. LT i .• .L . _,-:: ";:l- ~n 
Hr. J · • L. '; ("' () v ~ '"'\.,;; R J.v,<:_uist 
From: Mr. Ju~tice Stevens 




SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
~ ' ' • I 
No. 89-2078 
i. ) . \.... . ~. t 
p~rr~es & Moqr~1 PetiVoner,l On Writ of Certiorari to th~ 
· ' ~; · · · United States Court of 
Donald T. Uegan, Secr:etary of Appeals for the Ninth 
· ~he Trea~Sury, et al. Circuit. 
[June -, 1981] 
J usTICE STEVENS, concurring. 
In my judgment the possibility that requmng this peti-
tioner to prosecute its claim in another forum will constitute 
an unconstitutional "taking" is so remote that I would not 
address the jurisdictional question considered in Part V of the 
the Court's opinion. However, I join the remainder of th~ 
• - . •' . . . • I 
opm10n. 
Dear Bill: 
This refers to your letter concerning the 
certified questions in Marschalk. 
It seems to me that the proper disposition would 
be to dismiss the certified questions, and cite our opinion 
that should speak for itself. You have written a full and 
informative opinion. I do not think we should answer major, 
substantive questions in monosyllables, any more than we 
should write a syllabus for one of our opinions. My 
recollection is that we have dismissed questions in other 
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t June 30, 1981 
Re: No. 80-2078 - Dames & Moore v. Regan 
Dear Bill: 
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~ttpuuu l!}Olttt ot tltt ~tc ~tate£f 
~ag!p:ngton. tE. <q:. 20~J!.2 
July 1, 1981 
Proposed Order in No. 80-2127Q, Iran National Airlines v. 
The Marschalk Co. 
It is the opinion of this Court that the questions 
certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit must be answered as follows: 
(1}. Yes. See No. 80-2078, Dames & Moore v. 
Regan, Secretary of the Treasury (July 2, 1981}. 
(2}. Yes. See No. 80-2078, Dames & Moore v. 
Regan, Secretary of the Treasury (July 2, 1981}. 
(3}. The President's action in nullifying 
the attachments did not constitute a taking of 
property for which compensation must be paid. We 
dismiss question (3} so far as it concerns whether 
the action of the President in suspending the 
claims constituted a taking of property for which 
compensation must be paid. See No. 80-2078, Dames 
& Moore v. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury (July 
-- 2, 1981}. 
'· 
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No. 80-2127 Iran National Airlines v. The Marschalk Co. 
JUSTICE POWELL,;:diesenting. 
I would dismiss the certificate, citing ~ 
= Q'tl~lpAI1vza: ,.,. J?all!e!3 &. Moore v.'HR .. egan, u.s. 
(1981}, announced today. The Court's opi.nion in that case 
provides 'the only answers that this Court should give to the 
questions certified to us by the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit. Having rendered an opinion on the subject 
of those questions, we should not.,.!!1Sie'tala e. answer them 
in monosyllables nor attempt a syllabus of a portion of the 
Court's opinion. We recently have dismissed certification 
of questions where the Court has addressed the subject of 
the questions in a full opinion. ~Foley, v.
7 
Carter, 
u.s. - (1981). See also United States v. Will, 
u.s. - (1981). 
\ 
STYLISTIC CHANGES TF~OUGROUI 
1st PRINTED DRAFT 
lo: The Chief Ju1t'~e 
Mr. Just1ce Br0nnan 
Mr Ju~t1ce Stewart 
Kr . Justice White 
Mr. JJstice Marshall 
Mr Justtco Blackmun 
Mr Tu~ttce Powell 
Mr . Justice Stevens 
From : Mr . Justice Rehnquist 
C1roulated: _______ _ 
, ',1rculated: _JU_L __ l1981 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATE! 
No. 80-2078 
Dames & Moor~, Petitioner,! On Writ of Certiorari to th~ 
v. United States Court of. 
Donald T. Regan, Secretary of Appeals for the Ninth 
the Treasury, et al. Circuit. 
[June -, 1981] 
JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The questions presented by this case touch fundamentally 
upon the manner in which our Republic is to be governed. 
Throughout the nearly two centuries of our Nation's existence 
under the Constitution, this subject has generated consider-
able debate. We have had the benefit of commentators such 
as John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison writ-
ing in The Federalist Papers at the Nation's very inception, 
the benefit of astute foreign observers of our system such as 
Alexis deTocqueville and James Bryce writing during the first 
century of the Nation's existence, and the benefit of many 
other treatises as well as more than 400 volumes of reports 
of decisions of this Court. As these writings reveal it is 
doubtless both futile and perhaps dangerous to find any epi-
grammatical explanation of how this country has been gov-
erned. Indeed, as Justice Jackson noted, "[a] judge ... may 
be surprised at the poverty of really useful and unambiguous 
authority applicable to concrete problems of executive power 
as they actually present themselves." Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 634 (1952) (concurring 
opinion). 
Our decision today will not dramatically alter this situa-
tion, for the Framers "did not make the judiciary the overseer 
of our government." Id., at 594 (Frankfurter, J., concur-
80-2078-0PINION 
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ring). We are confined to a resolution of the dispute pre-
sented to us. That dispute involves various Executive Orders 
and regulations by which the President nullified attachments 
and liens on Iranian assets in the United States, directed that 
these assets be transferred to Iran, and suspended claims 
against Iran that may be presented to an International 
Claims Tribunal. This action was taken in an effort to com-
ply with an Executive Agreement between the United States 
and Iran. We granted certiorari before judgment in this 
case, and set an expedited briefing and argument schedule, 
because lower courts had reached couflicting conclusions on 
the validity of the President's actions and, as the Solicitor 
General informed us, unless the Government acted by July 
19, 1981, Iran could consider the United States to be in breach 
of the Executive Agreement. 
But before tuming to the facts and law which we believe 
determine the result in this case, we stress that the expeditious 
treatment of the issues involved by all of the courts which 
have considered the President's actions makes us acutely 
aware of the necessity to rest decision on the narrowest possi-
ble ground capable of deciding the case. Ashwander v. TV A, 
297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). This 
does not mean that reasoned analysis may give way to judicial 
fiat. It does mean that the statement of Justice Jackson-
that we decide difficult cases presented to us by virtue of our 
commissions, not our competence-is especially true here. 
We attempt to lay down no general "guide-lines" covering 
other situations not involved here, and attempt to confine the 
opinion only to the very questions necessary to decision of the 
case. 
Perhaps it is because it is so difficult to reconcile the fore-
going definition of Art. III judicial power with the broad 
range of vitally important day-to-day questions regularly de-
cided by Congress or the Executive, without either challenge 
or interference by the Judiciary, that the decisions of the 
80-2078-0PINION 
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Court in this area have been rare, episodic. and afford little 
precedential value for subsequent cases. The tensions pres .. 
ent in any exercise of executive power under the · tri-partite 
system of Federal Government established by the Constitu-
tion have been reflected in opinions by Members of this Court 
more than once. The Court stated in United States v. Cur-
tiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-320 (1926): 
"[W] e are here dealing not alone with an authority 
vested in the President by an exertion of legislative 
power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, 
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole 
organ of the federal government in the field of interna-
tional relations-a power which does not require as a 
basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of 
course, like every other governmental power, must be 
exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of 
the Constitution." 
And yet 16 years later, Justice Jackson in his concurring opin-
ion in Youngstown, supra, which both parties agree brings 
together as much combination of analysis and common sense 
as there is in this area. focused not on the "plenary and ex-
clusive power of the President" but rather responded to a 
claim of virtually unlimited powers for the Executive by 
noting: 
"The example of such unlimited executive power that 
must have most impressed the forefathers was the pre-
rogative exercised by George III. and the description of 
its evils in the Declaration of Independence leads me to 
doubt that they were creating their new Executive in 
his image." 343 U. S. , at 641. 
As we now turn to the factual and legal issues in this case, 
we freely confess that we are obviously deciding only one 
more episode in the never-ending tension between the Presi-
dent exercising the executive authority in a world that pre-
80-2078-0PINION 
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sents each day some new challenge with which he must deal 
and the Constitution under which we all live and which no 
one disputes embodies some sort of system of checks and 
balances. 
I 
On November 4, 1979, the American Embassy in Tehran 
was seized and our diplomatic personnel were captured and 
held hostage. In response to that crisis, President Carter, 
acting pursuant to the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act. 50 U. S. C. ~§ 1701-1706 (Supp. II 1978) (here-
inafter "IEEPA"), declared a national emergency on N ovem-
ber 14, 1979.1 and blocked the removal or transfer of "all 
property aud interests in property of the Government of 
Iran. its instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Cen-
tral Bank of Iran which are qr become subject to the juris-
diction of the United States .... " Executive Order No. 
12170, 44 Fed. Ref.!;. 65279.2 President Carter authorized the 
Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate regulations carrying 
out the blocking order. On November 15, 1979, the Treasury 
Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a regu-
lation providing that "[u]nless licensed or authorized ... any 
attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, 
1 Title 50 U. S. C. § 1701 (a) (Supp. II 1978) Rtate~ that ilw }>resi-
dent's authority under the Act "ma~r be exercised to deal with nn~· unu~ual 
and extraordinary threat, which ha~ its source in whole or iu sub-
stantial part outside the United States, to the nationnl security, foreign 
policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national 
tJmergency with re~pect to such threat." Petitioner docs not challenge 
Presid(•nt Carter's declaration of a national emergency. 
2 Titlc 50 U.S. C. §1702(a)(l)(B) (Supp. II 1978) empower;:; the 
PreRident to: 
"inveHtigate, n·gulate, direct and eompel, nullify, void. prevent or wohibit, 
any acquisition, holding, withholding, u~e, transfer, withdrawn! , tran~:>]Jorla­
tion, importation or exportation of, or draling in, or exerci:sing an~' right, 
power, or privilege with rc;;pect to, or tran;;artions involving, any prop-
erty iu which any foreign country or a national thereof has any 
interest. " • !' 
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or other judicial process is null and void with respect to any 
property in which on or since [November 14. 1979] there 
existed an interest of Iran." 31 CFR § 535.203 (e) (1980). 
The regulations also made clear that any licenses or authori-
zations granted could be "amended, modified, or revoked at 
any time." 31 CFR § 535.805 (1980).8 
On November 26, 1979, the President granted a general 
license authorizing certain judicial proceedings against Iran 
but which did not allow the "entry of any judgment or of any 
decree or order of similar or analogous effect .... " 31 CFR 
§ 535.504 (a) (1980). On December 19. 1979. a clarifying 
regulation was issued stating that "the general authorization 
for judicial proceedings contained in § 535.504 (a) includes 
pre-judgment attachment." 31 CFR § 535.418 (1980). 
On December 19, 1979. petitioner Dames & Moore filed 
suit in the United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California agai11st the Government of Iran, the Atomic 
Energy Organization of Iran, and a number of Iranian ballks. 
In its complaint, petitioner alleged that its wholly owned 
subsidiary, Dames & Moore International. S. R. L .. was a 
party to a written contract with the Atomic Energy Organi-
zation. and that the subsidiary's entire interest in the con-
tract had been assigned to petitioner. Under the contract, 
the subsidia.ry was to conduct site studies for a proposed 
nuclear power plant in Iran. As provided in the terms of 
the contract, the Atomic Energy Organization terminated the 
agreement for its own convenience on June 30, 1979. Peti-
tioner contended, however, that it was owed $3,436,694.30 
plus interest for services performed under the contract prior 
to the date of termination.4 The District Court issued orders 
8 31 CFR § 535.805 (1980) providr~ in full: "Thr provi~ion of this 
part and any rulings, licrnsrs, in~tructions, ordrrs, or forms is.~11ed thcrc-
undPr may be Hmrnded, modified, or revoked at mt~' time." 
4 The contract stated that any dispute incapable of resolution by agn•c-
mcnt of the parties would be submitted to conciliation aml that, if either· 
party wa::s unwilling to. accept the results of conciliation, "the matter lihalf 
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of attachm('nt directed against woperty of the defendants, 
and the property of certain Iranian banks was then attached 
to sc>cure any .iudgmPnt that might be entered against them. 
On January 20. 1081. thr Americans hrlcl hostage were re-
}('asrd by Iran pursuant to an Agrerment entered into the day 
before and embodied in two Declarations of tlw Democratic 
and Popular Republic of Algeria. Declaration of the Gov-
ernment of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 
(App. to Pet. for C'ert .. at 21-20). and Declaration of the 
Gov('rnmcnt of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Al-
geria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Govern-
ment of th(' Unitrcl State's of Am('rica and the Government 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran ( App. to Pet. for Cert .. at 30-
35). The Agreement stated that 11it is the purpose of [the 
United States and Iran l ... to terminate all litigation as 
between the Government of each party and the nationals of 
the other. and to bring about the settlement and termination 
{)f all such claims through binding arbitration." App. to 
Prt. for C'ert .. at 21-22. In furtherance of this goal. the 
Agreement called for the establishment of an Iran-United 
~tates C'laims Tribunal which would arbitrate any claims not 
~ettlcd 'vithin 6 months. Awards of the Claims Tribunal arc 
to be "final and binding" and "enforceable ... in the courts 
t>f any nation in accordance with its law." !d., at 32. Under 
the Agreement. the United States is obligated: 
"to terminate all legal proceedings in United States 
eourts involving claims of United States persons and in-
stitutions against Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify 
be decidPd fhiHll~· by rt>~ort to the comts of Iran ." Pet. for CNt. , at 7, 
n. 2. In itR complaint, which WI\R based on breach of contmrt 11nd related 
theories, petitionrr 11llq~ed that it had sought a mPPting with the Atomic 
Enrrg~' Organization for pmposeR of sdtling mattf'r~ rPlating to the ron-
tmct but 1hnt thE' Organization "hllR continually J10stponed [thf'l meE>ting 
and obviou~ly clors not intend that it tnkr place." Complaint i11 DamPs 
d: Moo1'e v. Atomic Energy 01'ganization of Iran, No. 79-04918 LEW 
(Px) (CD Cal.), at ,[27. 
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all attachments and judgments obtained therein, to pro-
hibit all further litigation based on such claims, and to 
bring about the termination of such claims through bind-
ing arbitration." Id., at 21-22. 
In addition, the United States must "act to bring about the 
transfer" by July 19, 1981, of all Iranian assets held in this 
country by American banks. Id., at 24-25. One billion dol-
lars of these assets will be deposited in a security account in 
the Bank of England, to the account of the Algerian CC'ntral 
Bank, and used to satisfy awards rendered against Iran by 
the Claims Tribunal. Ibid. 
On January 19, 1981, President Carter issued a series of 
Executive Orders implementing the terms of the Agreement. 
Executive Order Nos. 12276-12285, 46 Fed. Reg. 7913-7932. 
These orders revoked all licenses permitting the exercise of 
"any right. power, or privilege" with regard to Iranian funds, 
Sf'curities, or deposits; "nullified" all non-Iranian interests in 
such assets acquired subsequent to the blockiug order of 
November 14, 1979; and required those banks holding Iranian 
assets to transfer them "to the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, to be held or transferred as directed by the Secretary 
of the Treasury." Executive Order No. 12279, 46 Fed. Reg. 
7919. 
On February 24. 1981, President Reagan issued an Exec-
utive Order in which he "ratified" the January 19th Execu-
tive Orders. Executive Order No. 12294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111. 
Moreover, he "suspended" all "claims which may be pre-
sented to Lhe ... Tribunal" and provided that such claims 
"shall have no legal effect in any action now pending in any 
court of the United States." Ibid. The suspension of any 
particular claim terminates if the Claims Tribunal deter-
mines that it has no jurisdiction over that claim; claims are 
discharged for all purposes when the Claims Tribunal either 
awards some recovery and that amount is paid, or determines 
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Meanwhile, on January 27, 1981, petitioner moved for sum-
mary judgment in the District Court against the Govern-
ment of Iran and the Atomic Energy Orgauization, but not 
against the Iranian banks. The District Court granted peti-
tioner's motion and awarded petitioner the amount claimed 
under the contract plus interest. Thereafter, petitioner at-
tempted to execute the judgment by obtaiuing writs of gar-
nishment and execution in state court in the State of Wash-
ington, and a sheriff's sale of Iranian property in \Vashington 
was noticed to satisfy the judgment. However, by order of 
May 28, 1981, as amended by order of June 8, the District 
Court stayed execution of its judgment pending appeal by 
the Government of Iran and the Atomic Energy Organiza-
tion. The District Court also ordered that all prej uclgmt>n t 
attachments obtained against the Iranian defendants be 
vacated and that further proceedings against the bank de-
fendants be stayed in light of the Executive Orders discussed 
above. App. to Pet. for Cert., at 106- 107. 
On April 28, 1981, petitioner filed this action in the Dis-
trict Court for declaratory and inj uuctive relief against the 
United States and the Secretary of the Treasury, seeking to 
prevent enforcement of the Executive Orders and Treasury 
Department regulations implementing the Agreement with 
Iran. In its complaint, petitioner alleged that the actions 
of the President and the Secretary of the Treasury imple-
menting the Agreement with Iran were beyond their statutory 
and constitutional powers and, in any event, were unconsti-
tutional to the extent they adversely affect petitioner's final 
judgment against the Governme11t of Iran and the Atomic 
Energy Organization, its execution of that judgment in the 
State of Washington, its prejudgment attachments, and its 
ability to continue to litigate agaiust the Iranian banks. I d., 
at 1- 12. On May 28, 1981. the District Court denied peti-
tioner's motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissecf 
petitioner's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
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relief could be granted. Id., at 106-107. Prior to the Dis-
trict Court's ruling, the United States Courts of Appeals for 
the First and the District of Columbia Circuits upheld the 
President's authority to issue the Executive Orders and regu-
lations challenged by petitioner. See Chas. 7'. Main Int'l, 
Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Author'ity, - F. 2d -
(CAl 1981); American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic 
of Iran,- U.S. App. D. C.-,- F. 2cl- (1981). 
On June 3, 1981, petitioner filed a notice of appeal from 
the District Court's order, and the appeal was docketed in 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
On June 4, the Treasury Department amended its regulations 
to mandate "the transfer of bank deposits and certain other 
financial assets of Iran in the United States to the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York by noon, June 19." App. to Pet. 
for Cert., at 151-152. The District Court, however, entere<l 
an injunction pending appeal prohibiting the United States 
from requiring the transfer of Iranian property that is sub-
ject to "any writ of attachment, garnishment, judgment, levy, 
or other judicial lien" issued by any court in favor of peti-
tioner. Id., at 168. Arguing that this is a case of "impera-
tive public importance," petitioner then sought a writ of 
certiorari before judgment. Pet. for Cert., at 10. See 28 
U. S. C. § 2101 (e); this Court's Rule 18 (1980). Because 
the issues presented here are of great significance and demand 
prompt resolution, we granted the petition for the writ, 
adopted an expedited briefing schedule, and set the case for 
oral argument on June 24, 1981. - U. S. - (1981). 
II 
The parties and the lower courts confronted with the in-
stant questions have all agreed that much relevant analysis 
is contained in Youngstown Sheet & 'l'ube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U. S. 579 (1952). Justice Black's opiuion for the Court in 
that case, involving the validity of President Truman's effort 
to seize the country's steel mills in the wake of a nationwide 
' 
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strike, recognized that "ft]he President's power, if any, to 
issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or 
from the Constitution itself." !d., at 585. Justice Jackson's 
eoncurriug opinion elaborated in a general way the conse-
quences of different types of interaction between the two 
democratic branches in assessing presidential authority to 
act in any given case. When the President acts pursuant 
to an express or implied authorization from Congress, he 
exercises not only his powers but also those delegated by 
Congress. In such a case the executive ~ction "would be 
supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest 
latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persua-
sion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it." Id., 
at 637. When the President acts in the absence of congres-
sional authorization he may enter "a zone of twilight in 
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in 
which its distribution is uncertain." I d., at 637. In such a 
case the analysis becomes more complicated, and the validity 
of the President's action. at least so far as separation of 
powers principles are concerned, hinges on a consideration 
of all the circumstances which might shed light on the views 
of the Legislative Branch toward such action , including "con-
gressional inertia, indifference or quiescence." Ibid. Finally, 
when the President acts in contravention of the will of Con-
gress, "his power is at its lowest ebb," and the Court can 
sustain his actions "only by disabling the Congress from act-
ing upon the subject." I d., at 637- 638. 
Although we have in the past and do today find Justice 
Jackson's classification of executive actions into three gen-
eral categories analytically useful, we should be mindful of 
Justice Holmes' admonition , quoted by Justice Frankfurter in 
Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 597 (concurring opinion), that 
"The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish 
a11d tlivide fields of black and white." Springer v. Philip-
pine Islands , 277 U. S. 189, 209 (1928) (dissenting opinion) . 
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Justice Jackson himself recognized that his three categories 
represented "a somewhat over-simplified grouping," 343 U. S., 
at 635, and it is doubtless the case that executive action in 
any particular illstance falls, not neatly in one of three 
pigeon-holes, but rather at some point along a spectrum run-
ning from explicit congressional authorization to explicit con-
gressional prohibition. This is particularly true as respects 
cases such as the one before us, involving responses to inter-
national crises the nature of which Congress can hardly have 
been expected to anticipate in any detail. 
III 
In nullifying post-November 14, 1979, attachments and 
directing those persons holding blocked Iranian funds and se-
curities to transfer them to the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York for ultimate transfer to Iran, President Carter cited five 
sources of express or inherent power. The Government. how-
ever, has principally relied on § 1702 of the IEEP A as au-
thorization for these actions. Section 1702 (a) ( 1) provides 
in part: 
"At the times and to the extent specified in section 1701 
of this title, the President may, under such regulations 
as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, 
or otherwise--
"(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit-
"(i) any transactious in foreign exchange, 
"(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, 
through, or to any banking institution, to the extent that 
such transfers or payments involve any interest of any 
foreign country or a national thereof, 
"(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or secu-
rities, and 
"(B) investigate. regulate, direct and compel, nullify, 
void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, with-
holding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, impor-
12 
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tation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any 
right, power or privilege with respect to, or transactions 
invol viug, any property in which any foreign country or 
a uational thereof has any interest; 
"by any person. or with respect to any property, subject 
to the jurisdiction of the United States." 
The Government contends that the acts of "nullifying" the 
attachmeuts and ordering the "transfer" of the fro~eu assets 
are specifically authorized by the plain language of the above 
statute. The two Courts of Appeals that have considered the 
issue agreed with this contention. In Chas. T. Main lnt'l, 
Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, supra, the Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit explained: 
"The President relied on his IEEP A powers in N ovem-
ber 1979, when he 'blocked' all Iranian assets io this 
country, and again in January 1081, vrhen he 'nullified' 
interests acquired in blocked property, and ordered that 
}Jroperty's transfer. The President's actions, in this re-
gard, are in keeping with the language of IEEP A; ini-
tially he 'prevent[ed] and prohibit[ed]' 'transfers' of 
Iranian assets; later he 'direct[ed] and compelllecl]' the 
'transfer' and 'withdrawal' of the assets. 'nullify[ing]' 
certain 'rights' and 'privileges' acquired in them. 
"Main argues that JEEP A does not supply the Presi-
dent with power to override judicial remedies, such as 
attachments and injunctions, or to extinguish 'interests' 
in foreign assets held by United States citi~ens. But we 
can find no such limitation in TEEP A's terms. The lan-
guage of IEEPA is sweeping and unqualified. 1t pro-
vides broadly that the President may void or nullify the 
'exercising [by any person ofl any right, power or privi-
lege with respect to ... any property in which any for-
eign country has any interest ... .' 50 U. S. C. ~ 1702 
(a) (1) (B)." - ]'. 2d, at - (emphasis iu original). 
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In American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
supra, the Court of Appea1s for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit employed a similar rationale in sustaining President 
Carter's action: 
"The Presidential revocation of the license he issued 
permitting prejudgment restraints upon Iranian assets is 
an action that falls within the plain language of the 
IEEPA. In vacating the attachments, he acted to 'nul-
lify [and] void ... any ... exercising any right, power, 
or privilege with respect to . . . any property in \vhich 
any foreign country ... has any interest ... by any per-
son ... subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. ' '' 
-F. 2d, at- (foot11ote omitted). 
Petitioner contends that we should ignore the plain lan-
guage of this statute because an examination of its legislative 
history as well as the history of ~ 5 (b) of the Trading With 
the Enemy Act (hereinafter "TWEA"). 50 U. S. C. App. 
~ 5 (b), from which the pertinent language of ~ 1702 is di-
rectly drawn, reveals that the statute was 11ot intended to 
give the President such extensive power over the assPts of a 
foreign state during times of national emergency. According 
to petitio11er, once the President instituted the November 14, 
1979, blockiug order, ~ 1702 authorized hilll "only to continue 
the freeze or to discontinue controls." Brief for Petitioner, at 
32. 
We do not agree and refuse to read out of~ 1702 a1l mean-
ing to the words "transfer," "compel," or "11ullify." Nothing 
in the legislative history of either ~ 1702 or § 5 (b) of the 
TWEA requires such a result. To the contrary, we think 
both the legislative history and cases interpreting the TWEA 
fully sustain the broad authority of the Executive when act-
ing Wlder this cougressional grant of power. See, e. g., Orvis 
v. Brownell, 345 U. S. 183 (1953)." Although Congress in-
0 Petitioner argue~ that under the TWEA thr Prc·~ident wa~ givPn two 
powen;: (1) t he power tempontrily lo freeze or blork the trant~ fcr of for-
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tended to limit the President's emergency power in peace-
time, we do not think the changes brought about by the 
enactment of the IEEP A in any way affected the authority 
of the President to take the specific actions taken here. We 
likewise note that by the time petitioner instituted this ac-
tion, the President had already entered the frecr.e order. 
Petitioner proceeded against the blocked assets only after the 
Treasury Department had issued revocable licenses authoriz-
ing such proceedings and attachments. The Treasury regu-
lations provided that "unless licenserl" any attachm<'IlL is 
null and void, 31 CFR § 535.203 (e). anrl aU lic<'nses "may 
be amended, modified, or revoked at any time." 31 CFR 
eign-owned assets; and (2) the power summarily to srize aud perulaueully 
vc;.;l title lo foreign-owned assets. It is rontt•nded that on]~· tlu• "\'(·sting" 
provi~ions of the TWEA gave the Pre::;ident the power Pf' l'1!1mwnlly to 
dispose of asl:lets and when Congress enacted the JEEPA in 107'i it Jllll'-
po,.;cfully did not grant the President this power. According to pd it ioucr, 
the nullification of the attarhments Hnd the tmn~fer of the a,;~('~~ will p(·r-
mauently di::>posr of the as::;ets and would not even be j)(•rmi,;::;iule uuder 
the TWEA. We disagree. Although it is true the TEEPA dof's 
not give the Prrsideut thr power to "n•st" or to tnkc· title lo th(• a;:f'ets, 
it doc::; not follow that the President i;.; not authorizrd UJI(kr both the 
IEEPA and thP TWEA to othrrwise permmwntl~, cti~po~e of the n~~d~ 
in the manner done here. Petitioner err~ in a:-;snmiug that the only pOW('!' 
granted by the language used in both§ li02 and § 5(b) of th<' TWEA i:; 
the power trmporarily to freeze HSSPtf'. AH noted above, IIH· plain lnn-
guage of the statute de fie~ such a holding. SPrtion 1702 nut horize~ the 
Pre::;ident to "direct and compel" the "tran~frr , withdrn\\'al , trau~porta-
tiou , ... or exportation of ... any property in which any foreign 
country ... has any intere~t .... " 
We likcwi~r reject the c·ontention that Orvis v. Bmwnell. 845 F. S. 1~3 
(HJ5~), and Zittman \'. McGrat-h, 341 U. S. 446 (1951), grant petitiou(•r 
the right to rrtain its attachmPnt;; on the Iranian n~;;rts . To tiH• rontrary, 
we think Orvis supportR tlw prOJJOsition that an Amrriran C"lnimant may 
11ot u:;e an at tachmrnt that i~ subjrct to n. rrvocabl<' liernf'r and that ha:; 
been obtnined after the entry of a frerze ordrr to limit in all~ · way the 
actions lhc President may take under § 1702 resprrting t hr frozen a~:-;l'ts. 
An attachment ;,;o obtained i1:1 in every sense subordinate to the Pre:sident'l:f 
power under the JEEP A. 
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§ 535.805. As such, the attachments obtained by petitioner 
were specifically made subordinate to further actions which 
the President might take under the JEEP A. Petitioner was 
tm notice of the contingent nature of its interest in the frozeu 
assets. 
This Court has previously recognized that the congressioual 
purpose in authorizing blocking orders is "to put control of 
foreign assets in the hands of the President .... " Propper 
v. Clark , 337 U. S. 472, 493 (1949). Such orders permit the 
President to maintain the foreign assets at his disposal for 
use in negotiating the resolution of a declared national emer-
gency. The frozen assets serve as a "bargaining chip" to be 
used by the President when dealing with a hostile country. 
Accordingly, it is difficult to accept petitioner's argument be-
cause the practical effect of it is to allow individual claimants 
throughout the country to minimize or wholly eliminate this 
"bargaiui11g chip" through attachments, garnishments or simi-
lat· encumbrances 011 property. Neither the purpose the 
statute was enacted to serve nor its plain language supports 
such a result.6 
6 Although petitioner concede~ that the Pre~idcnt could have forbidden 
attachmeuts, it neverthele~s argues that once he allowed them the PrP:-;ideut 
permitted claimant~ to acquire property intN·r:<ts in t hl'ir :II ta('hlllt·llt H. 
Petitioner further argues that only thr lirru~es to obtaiu tlw attaclnueut ~ 
were madr rpvocable, not the attarhmrnt~ themHrln·~ . Tt i" urged that the 
January 19, 1981, order revoking nil licrn H<'~ oul.' · affect<'d pl'titiouer 'l>' 
right to obtain future attachment:-;. We di~agrre. A" not<·d :tbovt', the 
regulations ~ Jwcifically providPcl that any H t taelnn<·nt i~ null and void 
"unlC'~~ Jicen~ed ," and all lict>n:;ps may be revoked at any tim<·. Morc-
ovt·r, common Hense defies petitionrr's reading of thr l'<'gnlal ions. The 
Pn·:;iclent could hardly have intPndcd petitioner and ol her "imilarly Hitu-
atecl claimants to have the power to take control of the frozl'n a::;:;et l' out 
of hb hantk 
Our con~tru ction of petitioner '::; attarhmf'nts as lH'ing- " rrvoenhle," "con-
tingent ," aud "in Pvery sen:;e :;uburclinaiP to tlH' PrP~<idrnt '" pow<•r under 
the IEEPA," in effect answer:; petitionPr'H rlaim that <'\·en if thr PrP;;i-
deut had the authot:ity to nullify the attachments ami tnm"fcr the <l:;:;el ::;, 
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Because the Prcsiden t's action in nullifying the attach~ 
ments and ordering the transfer of the assets was taken pur-
suant to specific congressional authorization. it is "supported 
by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of 
judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would 
rest heavily upon any who might attack it." Youngstown, 
343 U. S., at 637 (Jackson. J .. concurring). Und0r the cir-
cumstances of this case, we cannot say that pctition0r has 
sustained that heavy burden. A contrary ruling would mean 
that the Federal Government as a whole lacked the power 
exercised by the President, see id., at 636- 637, and that we ( Qt_.,\vt r'V"'j--
are not prepared to say. 
IV 
Although we have concluded that the TREPA eom;titutes 
specific congressional authorization to the Prcside11 t to 11ullify 
the attachments and order the transfer of Trania11 assets, there 
remains the question of the President's authority to suspend 
claims pending in American courts. Such claillls have, of 
course, an existe11ce apart from the attachments which ac-
companied them. ln t0rminating these claims through Ex-
ecutive Order No. 12294. the PresidPnt purported to act under 
authority of both the lEEPA and 22 U. S. C. ~ 1732, the 
flo-called "Hostage Act." 7 App. to Pet. for Cert., &t 52. 
the exercise of ~uch would constitute an uncon~titutional takilll/: of JH'OJWrly 
in violation of the Fifth AmenclrnE'nt ::tbHrnt juHt compt·n~atiou. We cou-
<:ludc that bccau~e of the PrPsidt?nt'H nuthorit:v lo ]>!'(•vent or condition 
~ttadunent::;, Hlld because of the ord('l'~ hP iHHU('rl to this (•fft•<·l. j)l'litium:r 
did not acquire any "property" iuterl:'~t in it~ attaelunPnt~ ol' the ~ort that 
would support a ron~titutional claim for compen~ation. 
7 .T udge Mikva, in his ~eparatp opinion in A mer-iran Jut' I Group, Iuc. v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran,- U.S. App. D. C.-,-,- F. 2<1-,-
(lUlU) , argued that the monikPr "HoHtag<· Ar·t" wa~ lll'wly-<·oinPtl fur 
purpo:,;e~ of thi::; litigation. Suftire il to ~ay that wr fo<'ll>' 011 tlw language 
of 22 U. S. C. § 17a2, not any ;;hurl-hand dr~cript ion of il. Sec Shnkc-
apcare, Homeu and Juliet, II, ii, 43 ("What'::; in a name?"). 
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We conclude that although the IEEPA authorized the nul-
lification of the attachments, it cannot be read to authoriz:e 
the suspension of the claims. The claims of American citi-
zens against Iran are not in themselves transactions .involving 
Iranian property or efforts to exercise any rights with respect 
to such property. An in personam lawsuit. although it might 
eventually be reduced to judgment and that judgment might 
be executed upon, is an effort to establish liability a11d fix 
damages and does not focus on any particular property within 
the jurisdiction. The terms of the IEEPA therefore do not 
authorize the President to suspend claims in American courts. 
This is the view of all the courts which have considered the 
question. Chas. '1'. Main lnt'l, Inc. v. Khuzestau Water & 
Power Authority, - F. 2d, at -; American Int'l Group, 
Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,- F. 2d, at-, n. 15; The 
Marschalk Co., Inc. v. Iran National Airlines, - F. Rupp. 
-, - (SDNY 1981); Electronic Data Systems v. Social 
Security Organization of Iran,- F. Supp. -, - (ND Tex. 
1981). 
The Hostage Act, passed in 1868, provides: 
"Whenever it is made known to the President that any 
citizen of the United States has been unjustly deprived 
of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign 
government, it shall be the duty of the President forth-
with to demand of that goverwn<·ll t the reasous of such 
imprisonment; and if it appears to be wrongful and in 
violation of the rights of American citize11ship. the Pres-
ident shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen. 
and if the release so demanded is uureasonably delayed 
or refused, the Presiclen t shall use such moans, uot 
amouuting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and 
proper to obtain or effectuate the release; and all the 
facts and proceedings relative thereto shall as soon a's 
practicable be commuuieatecl by the President to Con-
gress." 22 U. S. C. § 1732. 
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We arc reluctant to conclude that this provision constitutes 
specific authorization to the President to suspend claims iu 
American courts. Although the broad language of the Hos-
tage Act suggests it may cover this case. there are several 
difficulties with such a view. The legislative history illdi-
cates that the Act was passed in response to a situation unlike 
the recent Iranian crisis. Congress in 1868 was concerned 
with the activity of certain countries refusing to recognize 
tho citizenship of naturalized Americans traveling abroad, and 
repatriating such citizens against their will. See, e. g., Cong. 
Globe 4331, 40th Coug., 2d Sess. (1868) (Sen Fe~:>senden); 
id., at 4354 (Sen. Conuess); see also 22 U. S. C. ~ 1731. 
'These countries were noL interested in rrturnillg the citizens 
in excha11ge for any sort of ransom. This also explains the 
reference in the Act to imprisonment "in violation of the 
rights of American citizenship." Although the Iranian hos-
tage-taking violated internatioual law and common decency, 
the hostages were not seized out of any refusal to recognize 
their American citizenship-they were seized precisely be-
cause of their American citizenship. The legislative history 
is also somewhat ambiguous on the question whether Con-
gress contemillated presidential action such as that illvolved 
here or rather simply reprisals directed against the offending 
foreign country and its citizens. See. e. g., Cong. Globe 4205, 
40th Cong.,' 2d Sess. (1868); American Int'l Group, Inc. v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, supra, at- (opinion of Mikva, J.). 
Concluding that neither the IEEPA nor the Hostage Act 
constitutes specific authorization of the President's action sus-
pending claims, however, is not to say that these statutory 
provisions are entirely irrelevant to the question of the valirl-
ity of the President's action. We think both statutes highly 
relevant in the looser sense of indicating congressional ac-
ceptance of a broad scope for executive action in circum-
stances such as those presented in this casr. As noted above 
in Part III, supra, at 12-13, the lEEPA rlekgates broad au-
thority to the President to act in times of national emergency 
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wi~h respect to property of a foreign country. The Hostage 
Act similarly indicates congressional willingness that the 
President have broad uiscretion when responding to thf' hos-
tile acts .of foreign sovereigns. As Senator Williams, drafts-
man of the language eventually enacted ItS the Hostage Act, 
put it: 
"If you propose any remedy at all. you must invest 
the executive with some discretion. so that he may apply 
the remedy to a case as it may arise. As to England or 
France he might adopt one policy to relieve a citizen 
imprisoned by either one of those countries; as to the 
Barbary powers, he might adopt another policy; as to 
the islands of the ocean aHother. With different coun-
tries that have different systems of government he might 
adopt different means." Cong. Globe 4359, 40th Cong .. 
2d Sess. ( 1868). 
Proponents of the bill recognized that it placPd "a loose dis-
cretion" .in the President's hands. id., at 4238 (Sen. Stewart), 
but argued that "[s]omething must be intrusted to the Exec-
utive" and that "l t]he President ought to have the power to 
do what the exigencies of the case require to rf'scue [a] citizen 
from imprisonment." !d., at 4233, 4357 (Sen. Williams). 
An original version of the Act, which authorized the Presi-
dent to suspend trade with a foreign country and even arrest 
citizens of that country in the United States in retaliation, 
was rejected because "there may be a great variety of cases 
arising where other and different means would be C'qually 
effective and where the end desired could b<> accomplished 
without resorting to such da11gerous and violent measures." 
!d., at 4233 (Sen. Williams). 
Although we have declined to conclude that the IEEP A or 
the Hostage Act directly authorizes the Pn.'sident's suspen-
sion of claims for the reasons noted. wp cannot ignore the 
general tenor of Congress' legislation in this area in trying to 
determine whether the President is acting alone or at least 
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with the acceptance of Congress. As we have notecl, Con-
gress ca1mot anticipate and legislate with regard to every pos-
sible action the President may find it necessa_ry to take or 
every possible situation in which he might act. Such failure 
of Congress specifically to delegate authority does not. "espe-
cially ... in the areas of foreign policy and national security," 
imply "congressional disapproval" of action taken by the 
Executive. Haig v. Agee,- U.S.-,- (1981). On the 
contrary, the enactment of legislation closely related to the 
question of the President's authority in a particular case 
which evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad 
discretion may be considered to "invite" "measures 011 inde-
pendent presidential responsibility," Youngstow11, 343 U. S. , 
at 637 (Jackson , J., concurring). At least this is so where 
there is 110 contrary indication of legislative intent and when. 
as here, there is a history of congressional acquiescpuce in 
conduct of the sort engaged in by the President. It is to 
that history which we now turn. 
Not infrequently in afi'airs between nations, outsta11ding 
claims by nationals of one country against the government of 
another country arc "sources of friction" between the two 
sovereigns. U11ited States v. P'ink, 315 U. S. 203, 225 (194:2 ) . 
To resolve these difficulties. nations have often en tercel into 
agreements settling the claims of their respective uationals. 
As one treatise writer puts it, iuternational agreements st>t-
tling claims by nationals of one state against the govemmeu t 
of another "arc established international practice reftectillg 
traditional intemational theory." L. Henkin. Foreign Afi'airs 
and the Constitution 262 (1972). Consistent with that prin-
ciple, the United States has repeatedly exercised its sover-
eig11 authority to settle the claims of its nationals agaillst 
foreign countries. Though those settlements havr some-
times been made by treaty. there has also been a longstanding 
practice of settling such claims by executive agreement with-
I~ 
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out the advice anrl consent of the Senate.8 Under such agree-
ments, the President has agreed to renounce or extiuguish 
claims of United States nationals against foreign govern-
ments in return for lump sum payments or the establishment 
of arbitration procedures. To be sure, many of these settle-
ments were encouraged by the United States claimants them-
selves, since a claimant's only hope of obtaining any payment 
at all might lie in having his government negotiate a diplo-
matic settlement on his behalf. But it is also u11disputed 
that the "United States has sometimes disposed of the claims 
of citizens without their consent. or even without consultation 
with them, usually without exclusive regard for their inter-
ests, as distiuguished from those of the nation as a whole." 
Henkin, supra, at 263. Accord, The Restatement (Second) 
of the Foreign Relations Law of the Uuited States § 213 
(1965) (President "may waive or settle a claim against a for-
eign state ... even without tlH' consent of the [injured] 
national"). It is clear that the practice of settliHg claims 
continues today. Since 1952. the President has entered into 
at least 10 bi11ding settlemm1ts with foreigu nations, includ-
ing an $80 million settlement with the People's Republic of 
China.9 
8 At lea~l :since the case of the "Wilmington Packet" iu 1799, Pre~iclents 
have exercised the power to settle claimR of United StatPs nationals by 
executive agreement. See Lillich, Thr Gravel Amendtrwllt to tlw Trade 
Reform Act of 1Y74, 69 Am. J . Int'l L. 837, 8H (Hl75). Iu fact. during 
the pt•riod of 1817-1917, "no fcwrr than eight~· rxec11tive agrec·mc•nts 
were entrred into uy the United Statr~ lookillg to th(• liqHidation ol' elaim::; 
of it:; citizens." McClure, International Exc•cut ivc Agn·Pment~ 5:3 (1941). 
See also 14M. Whiteman, Digest of International Lnw 2-!7 (HJ70). 
9 Tho~e agreement:; are 30 U. S. T. 1957 (1H79) (PcopiP'~ Hl'puulic 
of China); 27 U. S. T. 3993 (1976) (Peru); '27 U. S. T. 4214 (1976) 
(Egypt); 25 U. S. T. 227 (1974) (Peru); 24 F. S. T . 522 (1Y7:3) 
(Hungary) ; 20 U. S. T. 2654 (1969) (Japan); ](j U. S. T. 1 (1965) 
(Yugo::;lavia) ; 14 U. S. T . 969 (1963) (Bulgaria); 11 U.S. T. 1Y53 
(1960) (Poland) ; 11 U. , T. 317 (1960) (Hnmania) . 
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Crucial to our decision today is the conclusion that Con-
gress has implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement 
by executive agreement. This is best demonstrated by Con-
gress' enactment of the International Claims Settlement Act 
of 1949, 22 U. S. C. § 1621 el seq., as amended (1980). The 
Act had two purposes: (I) to allocate to United States na-
tionals funds received in the course of an executive claims 
settlement with Yugoslavia. and (2) to provide a procedure 
whereby funds resulting from future settlements could be 
distributed. To achieve these ends Congrf'ss created the In-
ternational Claims Commission. now the Foreign (']aims Set-
tlement Commission. and gave it jurisdictio11 to make fiual 
and binding decisions with respect to claims by United States 
nationals against settlement funds. 22 U. S. C. § 1623 (a). 
By creating a procedure to bnplement future settlement 
agreements. Congress placed its stamp of approval on such 
agreements. Indeed, the legislative history of the Act ob-
served that the United States was seeking settlements with 
countries other than Yugoslavia and stated that the bill "coli-
templates that settleme11ts of a similar nature are to be made 
in the future." H. R. Rep. No. 81-770, 81st Cong., 1st Scss., 
4, 8 (1949). 
Over the years Congress has frequently amended the Inter-
national Claims Settlement Act to provide for particular 
problems arising out of settlement agreements, thus demon-
strating Congress' continuing acceptance of the President's 
claim settlement authority. With respect to the Executive 
Agreement with the People's Republic of China, for example, 
Congress established an allocation formula for distribution 
of the funds received pursuant to the Agreement. 22 U. S. C. 
§ 1627. As with legislation involving other executive agree-
Inents, Congress did not question the fact of the settlement 
or the power of the President to have concluded it. In 1976, 
Congress authorized the Foreign Claims Settlement Commis-
sion to adjudicate the merits of claims by United States na-
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tionals against East Germany, prior to any settlement with 
East Germany, so that the Executive would "be in a better 
position to negotiate an adequate settlement . . . of these 
claims." S. Rep. No. 94-1188, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 
(1976); 22 U. S. C. § 1644b. Similarly, Congress recently 
amemled the Iu ternational Claims Settlement Act to facil-
itate the settlement of claims against Vietnam. 22 U. S. C. 
§ 1645; ~ 1645a (5). The House Report stated that the pur-
pose of the legislation was to establish an official inventory of 
losses of private U11ited States property in Vietnam so that 
recovery could be achieved "through direct Government-to-
Government negotiation of private property claims." H. R. 
Rep. No. 96-915. 96th Cong., 2d Sess .. 2-3 (1980). Finally, 
the legislative history of the IEEPA further reveals that Con-
gress has accepted the authority of the Executive to elltcr 
in to settlement agreements. Though th<' JEEP A was en-
acted to lJroviuc for some limitation on thP President's emer-
gency powers, Congress stressed that "nothing in this Act is 
intended to interfere with the authority of the President to 
[block assets 1. or to impede the settlement of claims of 
United States citizens against foreign couutries." S. Rep. 
No. 95-466, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1977); 50 U. S. C. 
§ 1706 (a) ( 1) .10 
10 Iuueed, CongrC:'ss has eonAiRtrn11~· failed to oh.iC:'<·t to this lon~t-standiHg 
practice of rlaim settlement by execu1in' agrrl•nwnt, even whE:'ll it has 
had an opportunit~· to do so. In 1972. Cougn•,.;,.; eHtE:-rtained kgi~lalion 
relating to congre~l:iional over;;ight of NIU:h ngn·C:'nH·ntK. But Congre;-;,.; took 
only limited action, requiring that the trxt of ~ignifieant exPcutivu agree-
ment!:! be tranl:imith•d to Congresi'. 1 U. S. C. § 112b. In Haig v. Agee, 
- U. S.- (1981), wr noted that "Dr~pite the long~lamlinf! and offi-
cially promulgated view that 1he Exr('utiw lw~ the powPr lo withhold 
passportl:i for rem;uns of national i'e<·urity, Cm1gre.'s in 1978, 'though it 
once again enactC:'d Jrgislation relating to pa~:<JlOt'i::<, lt'ft complell'ly un-
touclwd the broad rule-making authority granted in the em·liPr Act.'" 
ld., at 20, quoting Zemel v. R'ttsk, 381 U. S. 1, 12 (1965). Likewise lu 
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In addition to congressional acquiescence in the President's 
power to settle claims, prior cases of this Court have also 
recognized that the President does have some measure oi 
power to enter into executive agreements without obtaining 
the advice and consent of the Senate. In United States v. 
Pink, 315 U. S. 203 (1942), for example. the Court upheld 
the validity of the Litvinov Assignment. which was part of an 
Executive Agreement whereby the Soviet Union assigned to 
the United States amounts owed to it by American nationals 
so that outstanding claims of other American national~:; could 
be paid. The Court explained that the resolution of such 
claims was integrally connected with normalizing United 
States' relations with a foreign state. 
"Power to remove such obstacles to full recognition 
as settlement of claims of our nationals ... certaiuly is 
a modest implied power of the President. . . . No such 
obstacle can be placed in the way of rehabilitation of 
relations between this country and another nation , unless 
the historic conception of his power and responsibil-
ities ... is to be drastically revised." Id., at 229- 230. 
Similarly, Judge Learned Hand recognized: 
"The constitutional power of the President extends to 
the settlement of mutual claims between a foreign gov-
tl1is case, CongresR, though legislating in the area, lws left "untoud1ed" the 
authority of the President to enter into settlemrnt agreements. 
'I'he lcgi~lntive hi::;tory of 1 U. S. C. § 112b further reve<tls that Con-
gress lws ac·rcptc·cl the· Pre::;iclent 's authority to settle claims. During the 
11cnrings ou tiH · hill, Senator Case, the sponsor of the Act, stated with 
r espect to executive rlaim ~eltlemrntfl that: 
"I think it is ft most intere::;ting fa rca l in which W(' llavc [l(•('rptt>d tile 
right of tht> President, one iuclividual, acting through hifl diplomatic 
force, to adjudicate aucl ~cttlc claims of Arncriean nntional~ agaiu~t fort·ign 
counlriP~. But it is H fu ct." 
Tran~mitlal of E xecutive Agrcemruts to Congrrss : HearingH bt' forc thC' 
Sena te Committee on Foreign Relatioilll, 92.d Cong., l :sL Scss., 74 (1971) . 
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ernment and the United States, at least when it is an 
incident to the recog11itiou of that government; and it 
would bP unreasonable to circumscribe it to such contro-
versies. The continued mutual amity between this na-
tion and other powers again and again depends upon a 
satisfactory compromise of mutual claims; the necessary 
power to make such compromises has existed from the 
earliest times and been exercised by the foreign offices of 
all civilized nations." Ozanic v. United States, 188 F. 2d 
228, 231 (CA2 1951). 
Petitioner raises two arguments in opposition to the ptopo-
sltion that Congress has acquiesced in this longstandiHg pmc-
tice of claims settlement by executive agre<.'ment. First. it 
suggests that all pre-1952 settlement claims, and correspond-
ing court cases such as Pink, should be discounted because of 
the evolution of the doctrine of sovereign immuuity. Peti-
tiouer observes that })rior to 1952 the United States adhered 
to the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity. so that absent 
action by the Executive there simply would be uo remedy for 
an United States national against a foreign gowrnment. 
When the Uuited States in 1952 adopted a more restdctive 
notion of sovereigu immunity, by means of the so-called 
"Tate" letter, it is petitioner's view that Fnited States na-
tionals no longer needed Executive aid to settle claims ami 
that, as a result. the President's authority to settle such 
claims in some sense "disappeared." Though petitioner's ar-
gument is not wholly without merit, it is refuted by the fact 
that since 1952 there have been at least 10 claims settlements 
by executive agreement. Thus, even if the pre-1952 cases 
should be disregarded, congtessional acquiescence in settle-
ment agreements since that time supports the President's 
power to act here. 
Petitioner next asserts that Congress divested the President 
Qf th~ ~uthority to s~ttl~ cl~im~ when it enacted the Foreign 
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Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (hereinafter "FSIA"), 28 
U.S. C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq. The FSIA gTanted personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction in the federal district courts over 
commercial suits brought by claimants against those foreign 
states which have waived immunity. 28 U. S. C. ~ 1330. 
Prior to the enactment of the FSIA, a foreign government's 
immunity to suit was determined by the Ex<'cutive Branch 
on a case-by-case basis. According to petitioner, the prin-
cipal purpose of the FSIA was to depoliticizc these commer-
cial lawsuits by taking them out of the arena of foreign af-
fairs-where the Executive Branch is subject to the prt-ssures 
of foreign states seekiug to avoid liability through a graut of 
immunity-and by placing them within the exclusive juris-
diction of the courts. Petitioner thus insists that the Presi-
dent, by suspending its claims. has circumscribed the jurisdic-
tion of the United States courts in violation of Art. Ill of the 
Constitution. 
We disagree. In the first place, we do not believe that 
the President has attempted to divest the federal courts of 
jurisdiction. Executive Order No. 12294 purports only to 
"suspend" the claims. not divest the federal court of "juris-
diction." As we read the Executive Order, those claims not 
within the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal will "revive" 
and become judiciaJly enforceable in United States courts. 
This case, in short. illustrates the difference between modify-
ing federal court jurisdiction and directing the courts to apply 
a different rule of law. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 
5 U.S. 1, 103 (1801). The President has exercised the power, 
acquiesced in by Congress. to settle claims and, as such. has 
simply effected a change in the substantive law governing the 
lawsuit. Indeed. the very example of sovereign immunity 
belies petitioner's argument. No one would suggest that a 
determination of sovereign immunity divests the federal 
courts of "jurisdiction." Yet, petitioner's a.r·gument, if ac-
cepted, would have required courts prior to the enactment 
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of the FSIA to reject as an encroachment on their jurisdiction 
the President's determination of a foreign state's sovereign 
immunity. 
Petitioner also reads the FSIA much too broadly. The 
principal purpose of the FSTA was to codify contmnporary 
concepts concerning the scope of sovereign immunity and 
withdraw from the President the authority to make binding 
determinations of the sovereign immunity to be accorded for-
eign states. See Chas. T. Main lnt'l, Inc. v. Khuzestau Water 
& Power Authority,- F. 2d, at-; A-merican Int'l Group, 
Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,- F. 2d, at-. The FSfA 
was thus tlesigued to remove one particular barrier to suit, 
namely sovereign immunity, and cannot be fairly read as 
prohibiting the President from settling claims of United 
States nationals against foreign governments. It is telling 
that the Congress which enacted the FSIA considere<l but 
rejectetl several proposals designed to limit the power of the 
President to enter in to executi vc agreements, incl11ding claims 
settlement agreements.11 It is quite unlikely that the same 
Congress that rejected proposals to limit the President's au-
thority to conclude executive agreements sought, to accom-
plish that very purpose sub silentio through the FSIA. And, 
as noted above, just 1 year after enacting the FSIA, Con-
gress enacted the IEEPA, where the legislative history 
stressed that nothing in the JEEP A was to impede the sPt-
tlement of claims of United States citizens. It wonld be 
surprising for Congress to express this support for settlement 
11 The rejected legi~htlion would typically have rt>quire<.l eoHgre;;sioHal 
approval of executive agret>llii'JltH before 1 hey would be co11~idered ef-
fectivr. Set> Congrt>~sional Over~ight of Exccn1iw Agreemeut~: Hl•ariug~ 
on S. 632 nnd S. 1251 hPfore tlw Subc·ommit tep on Setmratiou of Powers 
of 1hc Senate Committet- on the .Judiciar~·, 94th Cong., ht Se~~., 243-261, 
302-311 (1975): Congr!'~~ional R<·view of Interuutioual Agreement~:;: 
Hem·ing,; before 1ht> Subl'onunittrP 011 IJtt('l'national Sermity and Scientific 
Affairs of 1he House Committee on lntcmational Relations, 94th Coug., 
2cl Se~s., 167, 246 (1976). 
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agreements had it intended the FSIA to eliminate the Presl~ 
dent's authority to make such agreements. 
In light of all of the foregoing- the inferences w be drawn 
from the character of the legislation Congress has e11acted 
in the area. such as the JEEP A and the Hostage Act. and 
from the history of acquiescence in executive claims settle-
ment-we conclude that the President was authorized to sus-
pend pending claims pursuant to Executive Order Ko. 12294. 
As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in Youngstowo, 343 F. S. 
at 610-611, "a systematic. unbroken executive practice, long 
pursued to the knowledge of Congress and never before ques-
tioned . . . may be treated as a gloss on 'Executive Power' 
vested i11 the President by ~ 1 of Art. II." Past practice 
does not, by itself, create power, but "long-conti11ued prac-
tice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a 
presumption that the faction l has been [taken] in pursuance 
of its consent .... " United States v. Midwest Oil Co ., 230 
U. S. 459, 469 (1915). See Haig v. Agee,-- U. S., at -, 
-. Such practice is present here and such a presumption 
is also appropriate. In light of the fact that Congress may 
be considered to have consented to the President's action in 
suspending claims. we cannot say that action exceeded the 
President's powers. 
Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that thE' means 
chosen by the President to settle the claims of American 
nationals provided an alternate forum, the Claims Tribunal. 
which is capable of providing meaningful relief. The Solici-
tor General also suggests that the provision of the Claims 
Tribunal will actually enhance the opportunity for claimants 
to recover their claims,' in that the Agreement removes a Hum-
ber of jurisdictional and procedural impediments facPd by 
claimants in Uuited States courts. Brief for United Stat<'S, at 
13- 14. Although being overly sangui11e about the chances of 
United States claimants before the Claims Tribunal ·would 
require a degree of naivete which shoulu not be uemandl'd 
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even of judges, the Solicitor Gen('rals' point cannot be dis-
count<>d. MorC'over, it is importaJJt to remember that we 
have already held that the President has the statutory author-
ity to nullify attachments and to transfer the assets out of 
the country. The President's power to do so does not clepeml 
on his provision of a forum whereby claimants can recowr on 
those claims. The fact that the PresiclC'nt has provided such 
a forum here means that the claimants are receiving some-
thing in retum for the suspension of th('ir claims. namely. ac-
cess to an intematioual tribunal beforC' which they may well 
recover something on their claims. BecausC' thpre uoes ap-
pear to be a real "settlement" here. this case is more easily 
analogized to the more traditional claim settlemcHt cases of 
the past. 
Just as importantly, Congress has not uisapproved of the 
action taken here. Though Congress has held hearings on 
the Iranian Agreement itself/~ Congress has 110t enacted leg-
islation, or eve11 passed a resolution, indicating its displeasure 
with the AgrePment. Quite the contrary, the relevant Sen-
ate Committee has stated that the establishme11t of the Tri-
bunal is "of vital importance to tlw United States." S. Rep. 
No. 97-71, 97th Cong., 1st Scss., 5 (1981). 1 ~ We are thus 
12 SPc Heari11g~ ou the Iraniun AgrPement~ heforP the Seuatr C'onHnitlee 
on Forf:'ign Relation~. 97th Cong .. bt Sess. (1981); Hearing~ on 1hl' Iran-
ian A~~c:st~ Settlement before the Sl'nate C'ommitP<·r 011 Bnnkiug, Honsi11g 
nnd Urban Affair:;, 97th Cong., 1~t SP~s. (lflR1): HParing~ on lh<' Al~eriatt 
Declnrutions before the Hou~;e Committee on ForPigu Affairs, 9ith Coug., 
M Se:s~. (HJ81) . 
13 ContrHst congre::;sional reaction to tlw Irnuia11 Agn.>(''llH·nt~ with coJJ-
gre~~;ioual reactiou to a 1973 Executive Agreem('nt witl1 Cz<'cho:;lol'akia. 
There tlw Pre~ident :;ought to sPttle ovrr $105 million in claime ngain;;t 
CzechoJ;lovakiu for $20.5 million. Congre:;s quickly demon~trated its di~­
plra~ure by euactiug legi;;lation requiring thnt thr Agreement be n·lwgoti-
aled. See Lillich, supra, at 839-840. Though Congre~s has ~hown itf'('lf 
capable of objecting to executive agreement:;, it has rarely done ;;o ami 
bas not d.one so in this ca:;e, 
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clearly not confronted with a situation in which Congress has 
in some way resisted the exercise of presidential authority. 
Finally, we re-emphasize the narrowness of our decision. 
We do not decide that the President possesses plenary power 
to settle claims, even as agaiust foreign governHwntal rn-
tities. As the C'ourt of Appeals for the }"'irst Circuit stressed, 
"the sheer magnitude of such a power. consid<'rcd against the 
background of the diversity and complexity of modem intPr-
national trade, cautions against any broader· construction of 
author·ity than is necessary." Chas. T. Ma-in btl'l, inc. v. 
Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, - F. 2<1. at - . But 
where, as here. the settlement of claims has been determined 
to be a necessary incident to thr rPsolution of a major foreign 
policy dispute between our country and anoLh(•r. aml where, 
as here, we can conclude that Congress acquiesced in th e 
Presideut's action , we are not prepared to say that the Presi-
dent lacks the power to settle such claims. 
v 
We do not think it appropriate at the presonL tinw Lo ad-
dress petitioner's contention that the SUSJ>Pnsion of claims. if 
authorizeu , would constitute a taking of property in violation 
of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
in the absence of just compensation.14 Both J)(>titionPt' aud 
th e Government concede that thr question whc•ther tht> sus-
pension of the claims constitutes a taking is 110t ri1>e for re-
view. Brief for Petitioner. at 34. n. 32; Brief for Fnitecl 
States, at 65. Accord, Chas. T. Main Tnt 'l, f11c. v. Khuzestan 
Water & Power Authority, supra, at - ; American lnt'l 
Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of !ran , - F. 2cl . at - . 
However, this contention, and the possibility that th e Pre!:li-
14 Though we coucluue that the T'rei:iiucnt has scttl<'u Jwlitiutu~ r ·,. l'laiws 
agaiusL Iran , we do not ~ugge;; t that the ~ettl ernmt Jw,. lenuiHall'd peti-
tioner':; poH;; ible taking claim againi:i t the Uuited tital e:;. We exprc;;s 110 
view::; on petitioner '::; claimi:i that it ha:; ~;uffered a taking. 
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dent's actions may effect a taking of petitioner's property, 
makes ripe for adjudication the question whether IWtitioMr 
will have a remedy at law iu the Court of Claims under the 
'ruckf>r Act, 28 U. S. C. § 14\:H, in such an event. That the 
fact and extf'nt of the taking in this case is yet speculalive 
is inconsequrntial because "there must be at thr time of tak-
ing 'a reasonable, certain and adequate provision for ohtain-
ing compensation.'" Reyional Rail Reorganizat·ion Act 
Cases, 410 U. S. 102, 124-125 (1974), quoting Cherokee Na-
tion v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641, 659 (1890); 
Cities Serv·ice Co. Y. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330. 335- 336 (1952); 
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 
U. S. 59, 94. n. 39 (1978). 
It has been conteuded that the "treaty exception " lo the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, 28 U. S. C. § 1502, might 
]>reclude the Court of Claims from exercising jurisdiction ovet' 
any takings claim the petitioner might bring. At oral argu-
mcn t, however, the Government conceded that § 1f>02 woulcl 
not act as a bar to petitioner's action in the Court of Claims. 
rrr. of Oral Arg., at 39-42, 47. We agree. See United States 
v. Weld, 127 U. S. 51 (1888); United States v. Old Settlers, 
1M~ U. S. 427 (1893); H1.lghes Aircraft Co. v. Uuited States, 
534 F. 2d 889 (Ct. Cl. 1976). Accordingly, to the· extent }Wti-
tioner believes it has suffered an UIICOilStitutional taking uy 
the suspension of the claims. we sec no jurisdictional obstacle 
to an appropriat(' action in the U11ited States Court of Claims 
under the Tucker Act. 
The judgment of the District Court is accordingly affirmed, 

















!rom:· lr. Justice Powell 
JUl \ 198, 
Beeiroula~ed: -----· 
No. 80-2127 Iran National Airlines v. The Marschalk Co. 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom Justice Marshall and 
Justice Stevens join, dissenting. 
I would dismiss the certificate, citing Dames & 
~Moo~e v. Regan, u.s. (1981), announced today. The 
Court's opinion in that case provides the only answers that 
this Court should give to the questions certified to us by 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Having 
rendered an opinion on the subject of those questions, we 
should not answer them in monosyllables nor attempt a 
syllabus of a portion of the Court's opinion. We recently 
have dismissed certification of questions where the Court 
has addressed the subject of the questions in a full 
opinion. Foley v. Carter, 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED S'fXT~ ioe ste n 
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Dames & . Moore, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to tho 
v. United Sta s 1 ·c: urt ~'" of 
Donald T. Regan, Secretary of Appeals for the Ninth 
the Treasury, et al. Circuit. 
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JusTICE PowELL, concurring and dissentiug in part. 
I join the Court's opinion except its decision that the 11 ulli-
fication of the attachments did not effect a taking of property 
interests giving rise to claims for just compensation. Ante, 
at -, n. 6. The nullification of attachments presents a 
separate question from whether the suspension and proposed 
settlement of claims against Iran may constitute a taking. 
I would leave both "taking" claims open for resolution on a 
case-by-case basis in actions before the Court of Claims. The 
facts of the hundreds of claims pending against Ira11 are not 
known to this Court and may differ from the facts in this 
case. I therefore dissent from the Court's decision with re-
spect to attachments. The decision may well be erroneous/ 
and it certainly is premature. 
1 Even though the Executive Orders purported to make atta<'lnneuts 
conditional, there i~:> a subi:)hlfltinl question wlwtlwr the Onl<·r~ t!H'msclves 
may have effected a taking by mnking co!H.litional the ntta('hmt'nt::; that 
claimants aginst Iran otherwi10e could have obtained without condition. 
Moreover, becau::;e it i;,; ,;ettled that an att1whmrnt entitling n creditor to 
resort to specific property for the satisfaction of n claim i~> a property 
right compcn;,;able under the Fifth Amcuclnwnt, Arm.strung v. United 
State.s, 364 U. S. 40 (1960), Louisville Bank v. Uadfvrd, 295 U. S. 555 
(1935), there i~ a quei:)tion whether the revoeaLilit.'· of the lieens<· uudt•r 
which petitioner obtained it;,; attachment ~uffict•::; to rendt'r rC'vocaule the · 
attachment it,;elf. See Mm·schalk Co. v. Iran Natioual Airliue.s Corp.,. 
No. 71:.1 0iv. 7035 (C.BM) (June 11, 1981) . 
1981 
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I agree with the Court's opinion with respect to the sus.:.· 
pension and settlement of claims against Iran and its iustru-
men tali ties. The opinion makes clear that some claims may 
uot be adjudicated· by the Claims Tribunal, and that others 
may not be paid in full. · The Court holds that parties whose 
valid claims are not adjudicated or not fully paid may bring 
a "taking" claim against the United States in the Court of 
Ctaims, the jurisdiction of which this Court acknowledges. 
The Government must pay just compensation when it fur-
thers the Nation's foreign policy goals by using as "bargain-
ing chips" claims !"awfully held by a relatively few persons 
and. subJect to the jurisdiction of our courts.2 The extraordi-
nary powers of the President and Congress upon which our· 
d.ecision rests cannot, in the circumstances of this case, dis-
piace the Just Coin'pensation Clause of the Constitution. 
2 A'/5 the Court held in Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 
(1960): 
"The Fifth Amendment'~ guarantee that private property shall not be 
tHkcn for a public u~c without just compemmtion wa;; designed to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdeu;; which, 
in all fairue::;;:; aud ju~tice, l:ihould be borue by the public Hl:i a whole." 
The Court un;wi.mou:;ly reaffirmed this under::;tanding of the J"w;t Com-
pensation Clau::;e in the recent ca::;e of Agins v. City of 'l'iburon, 447 U. S. 
225, 26o-2ul (1980). 
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JusTICE PowELL, concurring and dissentiug in part. 
I join the Court's opiniou except its decision that the u ulli-
ficatiou of the attachments did not effect a taking of property 
interests giving rise to claims for just compensation. Ante, 
at -, n. 6. The nullification of attachments presents a 
separate question from whether the suspension aud proposed 
settlement of claims against Iran may constitute a taking. 
I would leave both "takiug" claims opeu for resolution on a 
case-by-case basis in actions before the Court of Claims. The 
facts of the hundreds of claims pending against Iran are not 
known to this Court and may differ from the facts iu this 
case. I therefore dissent from the Court's decision with re-
spect to attachments. The decision may well be erroneous/ 
and it certainly is premature. 
1 Even though the Executive Orders pmportecl to make atta!'!mwnts 
conditional, there is a sub~tantinl queHtion whrtlwr tlw Or<l<·r~ them~l'lves 
may have effected a taking by making conditional the attaehnwnt~ that 
claimants aginst Iran othrrwi~e could have obtained without cuudition. 
Moreover, becautie it is settled that an attaduneut entitling a creditor to 
resort to specific property for the ~ati~factiou of a rlaim is a property 
t·ight compewsnble under the Fifth Amcndm<·nt, Annstnmo v. United 
States, 364 U. S. 40 (1960), Louisville Bau!.; v. Radford, 295 U. f:l. 555 
(1935), there is a quetition whether the revo<·abilit.\· of the licl·u:s(• undrr 
which petitioner obtnined it:s attarhment :sufficeti to rendrr rcvucaule the · 
attachment it::;elf. See M arschallc Co. v. Iran N atiottal Airline~ CorJJ.t·· 
No. 7!:1 t:iv. 7035 (CBM) (June 11, 1081) . 
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I agree with the Court's opinion with respect to the sus:.-
pension and settlement of claims against Iran and its iustru-
meutalities. 'fhe opit1ion makes clear that some claims may 
not be adjudicated by the Claims Tribunal, and that others 
may not be paid in full. The Court holds that parties whose 
valid claims are not adjudicated or not fully paid may bring 
a "taking" claim against the United States in the Court of' 
CI'aims, the jurisdiction of which this Court acknowledges. 
'i'he Government must pay just compensation when it fur-
thers the Nation's foreign policy goals by using as "bargain-
ing chips" claims lawfully held by a relatively few persons 
and. subJect to the jurisdiction of our courts.2 The extraordi-
nary powers of the President and Congress upon which our· 
d-ecision rests cannot, in the circumstances of this case, dis-
piace the Just Coinlpensation Clause of the Constitution. 
2 As the Court held in A1'1nstrony v. United States, 304 U. S. 40, 49 
(1960): 
"The Fifth Amendment'~ guarantee that private property f<hall not be 
taken for a public u~c without ju~t comppn~ation Wllti c)p:;igned to bar 
Oovermneut from forcing some JWO]Jie alone to bPar public burden~ which, 
in all fairut'~~ aucl jutitice, ~hould be borue by the public a:; a whole." 
The Court uuanimou;,;ly reaffirmed thi~; undt'f:;tauding of the JuJ:it. Com-
pemmtiou Clau~e in the recent ca:se of Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 
225, 260-261 (19!;0). 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAm 
No. 80-2078 
Dames & Moore, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to th~ 
v. United States Court of 
Donald T. Regan, Secretary of Appeals for the Ninth 't ~./l-1~ A j 
the Treasury, et al. Circuit. / · ~ tJ ____ :._v
1 
[June -, 1981] ~/-
JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. ~ 
The questions presented by this case touch fundamentally ~ 
upon the manner in which our Republic is to be governed.~ ~ 
Throughout the nearly two centuries of our Nation's existence __, ., A 1 , 
under the Constitution, this subject has generated consider-...----/'~~ 
able debate. We have had the benefit of commentators such ~ ~./"L 
as John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison writ- ~ /'-- · --- - - • 
ing in The Federalist Papers at the Nation's very inception, 
the benefit of astute foreign observers of our system such as 
Alexis deTocqueville and James Bryce writing during the first 
century of the Nation's existence, and the benefit of many 
other treatises as well as more than 400 volumes of reports 
of decisions of this Court. As these writings reveal it is 
doubtless both futile and perhaps dangerous to find any epi-
grammatical explanation of how this country has been gov-
erned. Indeed, as Justice Jackson noted, "[a] judge ... may 
be surprised at the poverty of really useful and unambiguous 
authority applicable to concrete problems of executive power 
as they actually present themselves." Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 634 (1952) (concurring 
opinion) . 
Our decision today will not dramatically alter this situa-
tion, for the Framers "did not make the judiciary the overseer 
of our government." Id., at 594 (Frankfurter, J ., concur-
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ring). We are confined to a resolution of the dispute pre-
sented to us. That dispute involves various Executive Orders 
and regulations by which the President nullified attachments 
and liens on Iranian assets in the United States, directed that 
these assets be transferred to Iran, and suspended claims 
against Iran that may be presented to an International 
Claims Tribunal. This action was taken in an effort to com-
ply with an Executive Agreement between the United States 
and Iran. We granted certiorari before judgment in this 
case, and set an expedited briefing and argument schedule, 
because lower courts had reached conflicting conclusions on 
the validity of the President's actions and, as the Solicitor 
General informed us, unless the Government acted by July 
19, 1981, Iran could consider the United States to be in breach 
of the Executive Agreement. 
But before turning to the facts and law which we believe 
determine the result in this case, we stress that the expeditious 
treatment of the issues involved by all of the courts which 
have considered the President's actions makes us acutely 
aware of the necessity to rest decision on the narrowest possi-
ble ground capable of deciding the case. Ashwander v. TV A, 
297 U. S. 288. 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). This 
does not mean that reasoned analysis may give way to judicial 
fiat. It does mean that the statement of Justice Jackson-
that we decide difficult casf's presented to us by virtue of our 
commissions, not our competence-is especially true here. 
We attempt to lay down no general "guide-lines" covering 
other situations not involved here, and attempt to confine the 
opinion only to the very questions necessary to decision of the 
case. 
Perhaps it is because it is so difficult to reconcile the fore-
going definition of Art. III judicial power with the broad 
range of vitally important day-to-day questions regularly de-
cided by Congress or the Executive, without either challenge 
or interference by the Judiciary, that the decisions of the 
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Court in this area have been rare, episodic, and afford little 
precedential value for subsequent cases. The tensions pres .. 
ent in any exercise of executive power under the tri-partite 
system of Federal Government established by the Constitu-
tion have been reflected in opinions by Members of this Court 
more than once. The Court stated in United States v. Cur-
tiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 319- 320 (1926) : 
"["T] e are here dealing not alone with an authority 
vested in the President by an exertion of legislative 
power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, 
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole 
organ of the federal government in the field of interna-
tional relations-a power which does not require as a 
basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which , of 
course, like every other governmental power, must be 
exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of 
the Constitution." 
And yet 16 years later, Justice Jackson in his concurring opin-
ion in Youngstown, supra, which both parties agree brings 
together as much combination of analysis and common sense 
as there is in this area, focused not on the "plenary and ex-
clusive power of the President" but rather responded to a 
claim of virtually unlimited powers for the Executive by 
noting: 
"The example of such unlimited executive power that 
must have most impressed the forefathers was the pre-
rogative exercised by George III. and the description of 
its evils in the Declaration of Independence leads me to 
doubt that they were creating their new Executive in 
his image." 343 U. S., at 641. 
As we now turn to the factual and legal issues in this case, 
we freely confess that we are obviously deciding only one 
more episode in the never-ending tension between the Presi-
dent exercising the executive authority in a world that pre-
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sents each day some new challenge with which he must deal 
and the Constitution under which we all live and which no 
one disputes embodies some sort of system of checks aud 
balances. 
I 
On November 4, 1979, the American Embassy in Tehran 
was seized and our diplomatic personnel were captured and 
held hostage. In response to that crisis, President Carter, 
acting pursuant to the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act. 50 U. S. C. ~~ 1701-1706 (Supp. II 1978) (here-
inafter "IEEP A"), dE-clared a national emergency on N ovem-
ber 14, 1979.1 and blocked the removal or transfer of "all 
property and interests in property of the Government of 
Iran. its instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Cen-
tral Bank of Iran which are qr become subject to the juris-
diction of the United States .... " Executive Order No. 
12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65279.2 President Carter authorized the 
Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate regulations carrying 
out the blocking order. On November 15, 1979, the Treasury 
Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a regu-
lation providing that "[u]nless licensed or authoriL~ed ... any 
attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, 
1 Title 50 U. S. C. § 1701 (a) (Supp. II 1978) states that ihe Presi-
deut's authority under the Act "may be exercised to deal with any unmmal 
and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or in sub-
etantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign 
policy, or economy of the United States, if the PrPsident declares a llational 
~mergcncy with respect to such threat." Pctitiouer doc~ not challenge 
President Carter'R declaration of a nationnl emergency. 
2 Title 50 U. S. C. § 1702 (a) (1) (B) (Supp. II 1978) empowers the 
!~resident to: 
"investigate, rf'gulate, direct and compel. rmllif~·, void , prevent or l>rohibit, 
any acquisition , holding, withholding, use, tran~fcr, withdrawal, trnn~porta­
tion, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exerci~ing <Ill~' right, 
JJowcr, or privilege with re~pect to, or tran~actions involving, auy prop-
erty iu which any foreign country or a . national thereof has auy 
interc::;t. " " !' 
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or other judicial process is null and void with respect to any 
property in which on or since rNovember 14. 1979] there 
existed an interest of Iran." 31 CFR § 535.203 (e) (1980). 
The regulations also made clear that any licenses or authori-
zations granted could be "amended, modified, or revoked at 
any time." 31 CFR § 535.805 (1980).9 
On November 26, 1979, the President granted a general 
lice11se authorizing certain judicial proceedings against Iran 
but which did not allow the "entry of any judgment or of any 
decree or order of similar or analogous effect .... " 31 CFR 
§ 535.504 (a) (1980). On December 19, 1979. a clarifying 
regulation was issued stating that "the general authorization 
for judicial proceedings contained in ~ 535.504 (a) includes 
pre-judgment attachment." 31 CFR ~ 535.418 (1980). 
On December 19, 1979, petitioner Dames & Moore filed 
suit in the United States District Court for the C'eutral Dis-
trict of California against the Government of Iran, the Atomic 
Energy Organization of Iran, and a number of Iranian ballks. 
In its complaint, petitioner alleged that its wholly owned 
subsidiary, Dames & Moore International. 8. R. L., was a 
party to a written co11tract with the Atomic Energy Organi-
zation, and that the subsioiary's entire interest in the con-
tract had been assigned to petitioner. Under the contract, 
the subsidiary was to conduct site studies for a proposed 
nuclear power plant in Iran. As provided in the terms of 
the contract, the Atomic Energy Organization termiuated the 
agreement for its own convenience on June 30, 1979. Peti-
tioner contended, however, that it was owed $3,436,694.30 
plus interest for services performed under the contract prior· 
to the date of termination.4 The District Court issued orders 
9 31 CFR § 535.805 (1980) providrH in full: "The provi~ion of this 
part aml nuy ruling:;, licenRr,, iu~tructions, ordrrs, or forms i~~ued there-
under may bP arnrnded, modifird, or revokc•d nt all~' time•." 
4 The contract stated 1 hat any disputr incapable of rr~olution by agrrc-
mcnt of ihe parti<"S would be ;;ulnnittrd to conriliHlion nJI(I that, if either 
party was unwilljng to. accept the result:; of comiliation, "the matter ,;hall' 
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of attaclm1('nt directed against property of the defendants, 
and the property of certain Iranian banks was then attached 
to srcure any judgment that might be entered against them. 
On January 20. 1981. tlw Americans held hostage were re-
leasrd by Iran pursuant to an Agreement entered into the day 
before and embodied in two Declarations of the Democratic 
and Popular Republic of Algeria. Declaration of the Gov-
ernment of thr Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 
(App. to Prt. for Cht., at 21-20). and Declaration of the 
Government of thr Democratic and Popular Republic of Al-
geria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Govern-
ment of the 1Tnitrd States of America and the Government 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran ( App. to Pet. for Cert .. at 30-
35). The Agreement stated that "it is the purpose of [the 
United States and Iran 1 ... to terminate all litigation as 
between the Government of ('ach party and the nationals of 
the other. and to bring about the settlement and termination 
of all such claims through binding arbitration." App. to 
Pet. for Cert .. at 21-22. In furtherance of this goal, the 
Agreement called for tlw establishment of an Iran-United 
~tates Claims Tribunal which would arbitrate any claims not 
settled \vithin 6 months. Awards of the Claims Tribunal are 
to be "final and binding" and "enforceable ... in the courts 
flf any nation in accordance with its law." !d., at 32. Under 
the Agreement, the United States is obligated: 
"to t('rminate all legal proceedings in United States 
eourts involving claims of United States persons and in-
stitutions agai11st Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify 
bP dr<'ickd finnll~· by fP>'ort to the conrts of Iran ." Pet. for CPrt. , nt 7, 
n. 2. In itR complaint, which war: bnRrd on breach of contrnr1 and related 
throries , prtitionrr nllrgrd 1hat it hnd sought a mPPting with thP Atomic 
Energy Organiza1ion for purpoRr8 of srttling mattrrs rrlnting to the ron-
tract but tha1 thr Organization "hn~ continually postponed [the·! mePting 
and obviou;:;ly does not intPnd that it take place." Compluiut in Dames 
d; Moore v. Atomic Energy Orgauization of hau, No. 79-04918 LEW 
(Px) (CD Cal.), at ,f27. 
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all attachments and judgments obtained therein, to pro~ 
hibit all further litigation based on such claims, and to 
bring about tho termination of such claims through bind-
ing arbitration." I d., at 21-22. 
In addition, the United States must "act to bring about the 
transfer" by July 19, 1981, of all Iranian assets helcl in this 
country by American banks. Id., at 24-25. One billion dol~ I 
lars of these assets will be deposited in a security account in 
the Bank of England, to the account of the Algeria11 Cc11tral 
Bank, aiHl used to satisfy awards rendered against Iran by 
the Claims Tribunal. Ibid. 
On January 19, 1981, President Carter issued a series of 
Executive· Orders implementing the terms of the Agreement. 
Executive Order Nos. 12276-12285, 46 Feel. Reg. 7913-7932. 
These onlcrs revoked all licenses permitting the exercise of 
"any right, power, or privilege" with regard to Iranian funds, 
securities, or deposits; "nullified" all non-Iranian interests in 
such assets acquired subsequent to the blocking order of 
November 14, 1979; and required those banks holdiug Iranian 
assets to transfer them "to the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, to be held or transferred as directed by the Secretary 
of the Treasury." Executive Order No. 12279, 46 Fed. Reg. 
7919. 
On February 24. 1981, President Reagan issued an Exec-
utive Order in which he "ratified" the January 19th Execu-
tive Orders. Executive Order No. 12294. 46 Fed. Reg. 14111. 
Moreover, he "suspended" all "claims which may be pre~ 
se11 ted to the ... Tribunal" and provided that such claims 
"shall have no legal effect in any action now pending in any 
court of the United States." Ibid. The suspension of any 
particular claim terminates if the Claims Tribunal deter-
mines that it has no jurisdiction over that claim; claims are 
discharged for all purposes when tho Claims Tribunal either 
awards some reeovery and that amount is paid, or determines 
that no recovery is due. Ibid. 
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Meanwhile, on January 27, 1981, petitioner moved for sum-
mary judgment in the District Court against the Govern-
ment of Iran and the Atomic Energy Orgaui;.:ation. but not 
against the Iranian banks. The District Court granted peti-
tioner's motion and awarded petitioner the amount claimed 
under the contract plus interest. Thereafter, petitioner at-
tempted to execute the judgment by obtailling writs of gar-
nishment and execution in state court in the State of Wash-
ington, and a sheriff's sale of Ira11iau property in Washington 
was noticed to satisfy the judgment. However, by order of 
May 28, 1981, as amended by order of June 8, the District 
Court stayed execution of its judgment pending appeal by 
the Government of Iran and the Atomic Energy Organiza-
tion. The District Court also ordered that all prejudgment 
attachments obtained against the IraniaJl defendants be 
vacated and that further proceedings against the ba1lk de-
fendants be stayed in light of the Executive Orders discussed 
above. App. to Pet. for Cert .. at 106- 107. 
On April 28, 1981. petitioner filed this action in the Dis-
trict Court for declaratory and injunctive relief agaiust the 
United States and the Secretary of the Treasury. seeking to 
prevent enforcement of the Executive Orders and Treasury 
Department regulations implementing the Agreement with 
Iran. In its complaint, petitioner alleged that the actions 
of the President and the Secretary of the Treasury imple-
menting the Agreement with Iran were beyond their statutory 
and constitutional powers and, in any event, were unconsti-
tutional to the extent they adversely affect petitioner's final 
judgment against the Government of Iran and the Atomic 
Energy Organization, its execution of that judgment in the 
State of Washington, its prejudgment attachments, and its 
ability to continue to litigate against the Iranian banks. !d., 
at 1- 12. On May 28, 1981, the District Court ueuied peti-
tioner's motion for a preliminary injunction anu dismissed 
petitioner's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
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relief could be granted. !d., at 106-107. Prior to the Dis-
trict Court's ruling. the United States Courts of Appeals for' 
the First and the District of Columbia Circuits upheld the 
President's authority to issue the Executive Orders and regu-
lations challenged by petitioner. See Chas. 1'. Af ain lnt'l, 
Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, -F. 2cl-
(CAl 1981); American lnt'l Group, Inc. v. l:,;lamic Republic 
of Ira'n, - U. S. App. D. C. -,-F. 2d- (1981). 
On June 3, 1981, petitioner filed a notice of appeal from 
the District Court's order, and the appeal was docketed in 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
On June 4, the Treasury Department amended its regulations 
to mandate "the transfer of bank deposits aud certain other 
financial assets of Iran iu the United States to the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York by noon, June 19." App. to Pet. 
for Cert., at 151- 152. The District Court, however, entered 
an injunction pending appeal prohibiting the United States 
from requiring the transfer of Iranian property that is sub-
ject to "any writ of attachment, garnishment, judgment. levy, 
or other judicial lien" issued by any court in favor of peti-
tioner. Id., at 168. Arguillg that this is a case of "impera-
tive public importance," petitioner then sought a writ of 
certiorari before judgment. Pet. for Cert., at 10. See 28 
U. S. C. § 2101 (e); this Court's Rule 18 (1980). Because 
the issues presented here are of great significance and demand 
prompt resolution, we granted the petition for the writ , 
adopted an expedited briefing schedule, and set the case for 
oral argument on June 24, 1981. - U. S. - (1981). 
II 
The parties and the lower courts confronted with the in-
stant questions have all agreed that much relevant analysis 
is contained in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U. S. 579 ( 1952). Justice Black's opiuiou for the Court in 
that case, involving the validity of President Truman's effort 
to seize the country's steel mills in the wake of a nation wide 
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strike, recognized that "[t]he President's power, if any, to 
issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or 
from the Constitution itself." !d., at 585. Justice Jackson's 
eoncurring opinion elaborated in a general way the conse-
quences of different types of interaction between the two 
democratic branches in assessing presidential authority to 
act in any given case. When the President acts pursuant 
to an express or implied authorization from Congress, he 
exercises not only his powers but also those delegated by 
Congress. In such a case the executive ~ction "woul<.l be 
supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest 
latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persua-
sion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it." !d., 
at 637. When the President acts in the absence of congres-
sional authorization he may enter "a zone of twilight in 
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in 
\Yhich its distribution is uncertain." I d., at 637. In such a 
case the analysis becomes more complicated, and the validity 
of the President's action. at least so far as separation of 
powers principles are concerned, hinges on a consideration 
of all the circumstances which might shed light on the views 
of the Legislative Branch toward such action, including "con-
gressional inertia, indifference or quiescence." Ibid. Finally, 
when the President acts in contravention of the will of Con-
gress, "his power is at its lowest ebb." and the Court can 
sustain his actions "only by disabling the Congress from act-
ing upon the subject." !d., at 637-638. 
Although we have in the past and do today find Justice 
Jackson's classification of executive actions into three gen-
eral categories analytically useful, we should be mindful of 
Justice Holmes' admonition, quoted by Justice Frankfurter in 
Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 597 (concurring opinion) , that 
"The great ordinances of the Constitution do not E~stablish 
and divide fields of black and white." Springer v. Philip-
pine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 209 (1928) (dissentiug opinion). 
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Justice Jackson himself recognized that his three categories 
represented "a somewhat over-simplified grouping," 343 U. S., 
at 635, and it is doubtless the case that executive action in 
any particular iJJstance falls, not neatly in one of three 
pigeon-holes, but rather at some point along a spectrum run-
ning from explicit congressional authorization to explicit con-
gressional prohibition. This is particularly true as respects 
cases such as the one before us, involving responses to inter-
national crises the nature of which Congress can hardly have 
been expected to anticipate in any detail. 
III 
In nullifying post-November 14, 1979, attachments and 
directing those persons holding blocked Iranian funds and se-
curities to transfer them to the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York for ultimate transfer to Iran, President Carter cited five 
sources of express or inherent power. The Government, how-
ever, has principally relied on § 1702 of the IEEP A as au-
thorization for these actions. Section 1702 (a) ( 1) provides 
in part: 
"At the times and to the extent specified in section 1701 
of this title, the President may, under such regulations 
as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, 
or otherwise-
"(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit-
"(i) any transactio11s in foreign exchange, 
"(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, 
through , or to any banking institution, to the extent that 
such transfers or payments involve any interest of any 
foreign country or a national thereof, 
u(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or secu-
rities, and 
u(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, 
void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition. holding, with-
holding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, impor-
12 
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tatim1 or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any 
right, power or privilege with respect to, or transactions 
involving, any property in which any foreign country or 
a national thereof has any interest; 
"by any person. or with respect to any property, subject 
to the jurisdiction of the United States." 
The Government contends that the acts of "nullifying" the 
attachments and ordering the "transfer" of the froz:en assets 
are specifically authorized by the plain language of the above 
statute. The two Courts of Appeals that have considered the 
issue agreed with this contention. In Chas. T. Main lnt'l, 
Inc. v. Khuzestan "J!Vater & Power Authority, s'upra, the Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit explained: 
"The President relied on his JEEP A powers in N ovem-
ber 1979, when he 'blocked' all Iranian assets ill this 
country, and again in January 1981. when he 'nullified' 
interests acquired in blocked property, and ordered that 
property's transfer. The President's actions, in this re-
gard, are in keeping with the language of JEEP A; ini-
tially he 'prevent[ed] and prohlbit[ed]' 'transfers' of 
Iranian assets; later he 'direct[edl and compelJled]' the 
'trallsfer' and 'withdrawal' of the assets. 'nullifyling]' 
certain 'rights' and 'privileges' acquired in them. 
"Main argues that IEEPA does not supply the Presi-
dent with power to override judicial remedies, such as 
attachments and injunctions, or to extinguish 'interests' 
in foreign assets held by United States citizens. But we 
caH find no such limitation in IEEPA's terms. The lan-
guage of JEEP A is sweeping and unqualified. It pro-
vides broadly that the President may void or nullify the 
'exercising [by any person ofl any right. pov,·er or privi-
lege with respect to ... any property in which any for-
eign country has any interest .... ' 50 U. S. C. ~ 1702 
(a) (1) (B)." - F. 2d, at - (emphasis .iu original). 
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In American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
supra, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit employed a similar rationale in sustainiug President 
Carter's action: 
"The Presidential revocation of the license he issued 
permitting prejudgment restraints upon Irauian assets is 
an action that falls within the plain la11guage of the 
IEEPA. In vacating the attachments, he acted to 'nul-
lify [and] void ... any ... exercising any right. power, 
or privilege with respect to ... any property in which 
a11y foreigu country ... has any interest ... by any per-
son ... subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.'" 
-F. 2d, at - (footnote omitted). 
Petitioner contends that we should ignore tho plain lan-
guage of this statute because an examination of its legislati vc 
history as well as the history of ~ 5 (b) of the Trading With 
the Enemy Act (hereinafter "TWEA"), 50 U. S. C. App. 
§ 5 (b), from which the pertinent language of ~ 1702 is di-
rectly drawn, reveals that the statute was not intended td 
give the President such extensive power over the assets of a 
foreign state during times of national emergency. According 
to petitioner, once the President instituted the Xovember 14, 
1979, blocking order, ~ 1702 authorized him "only to coutiuue 
the freeze or to discontinue controls." Brief for Petitioner, at 
32. 
We do not agree and refuse to read out of~ 1702 all mean-
ing to the words "transfer," "compel," or "nullify." Nothing 
in the legislative history of either ~ 1702 or ~ 5 (b) of the 
TWEA requires such a result. To the contrary, we think 
both the legislative history and cases iBterpretiug the TWEA 
fully sustain the broad authority of the Executive wheu act-
ing under this congressional grant of power. See, e. y., Orv·is 
v. Brownell, 345 U. S. 183 (1953).G Although Congress in-
0 Petitioner arguel:l that unrler the TWEA thr Pn·~ident was givrn two 
powers: (1) the power temporarily to freeze or bloc·k the tran:sfcr of for-
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tended to limit the President's emergency power in peace-
time, we do not think the changes brought about by the 
enactment of the IEEP A in any way affected the authority 
of the President to take the specific actions taken here. We 
likewise note that by the time petitioner instituted this ac-
tion, the President had already entered the frerze order. 
PetitioHer proceeded against the blocked assets only after the 
Treasury Department had issued revocable licPnsrs authoriz-
ing such proceedings and attachments. The Treasury regu-
lations provided that "unless licensed" any attaehmrn t is 
null ancl void, 31 CFR § 535.203 (e). and all licrnscs "may 
be amended, modified, or revoked at any time." 31 CFR 
eign-owued assets; nnd (2) the power summ:rrily to srizc :llld permanently 
vc;;t title to foreign-owned a~::;et~. It is contrnded that onl~· tlw "vestiug" 
provi::;ion~ of the TWEA gave the Pre~ident the powrr ]Jf'I'1IIW1mtly to 
diopo::;c of a::;~et~ and when Congr<'l:ll:l enacted the JEEl' A iu 1!177 it pur-
po~cfully did not grant the Pre~idrnt thi~ power. According to pditioncr, 
the nullificatiou of the attarhment~:J and th~· trau~fer of the a,;~('[fl will p<·r-
lllllllf'!ltly diHpo::;P of the n~:;~rts and would uot even be pt>rmi~;-;iule undl'r 
the TWEA. We disagree. Although it i~:J true thr TEEPA dors 
nut give the President t!JP power to "vrst" or to tnke till<' io the u~~<-t ::;, 
it tloes not follow that the President i;; uot nut horizrd UJI(kr both the 
IEEPA aud tht> TWEA to othPrwi~e pNrnanrntl)' di~po~e of tlw as~d :; 
in the manner done here. PE'titioner err~ iu a~snming that the only powc·r 
granted by the language used in both § 1702 and § 5 (b) of t h<' TWEA j:,; 
the power trmporarily to frE'eze assets. As noted abovr, tiH· plHin lan-
guage of the statute dE'fi<'H such a holding. SPrtion 1702 anthorizr~ the 
President to "direct and compel" the "tran~<frr, withdrawal. tran:;porta-
tiou, ... or exportation of ... any property in which any foreign 
eountry ... ha~ any inten·~t. ... " 
We likcwi~l' reject the contf'ntion that Orvi11 v. B1'0u•nell. :345 F. S. lR3 
(1953), am! Zittman v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 446 {1951), gnwt pctitimH·r 
thr right, to rrtain its attachment:; on the Irnninn ns~rt:::;. To t hP c·onlrar), 
Wl' think Orvi11 SUJlportl' the prupo::;ition that an Anwrican c·lnim:mt may 
11ot u~e au attaehmrnt that i~ ~nbjed to a. rrYorabh· licrn~r and that hm; 
bePn obtaiu<-d after the entry of a freeze ordrr to limit in any WH) the 
actions the f>re;,ident may take under § 1702 resjwrting thr frozen a~<sds. l 
An attaclnueut so obtained is in every sense subordinate to the Prc~idcut's 
power untlcr the IEEP A. 
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§ 535.805. As such, the attachments obtained by petitioner 
were specifically made subordinate to further actions which 
the President might take under the IEEPA. Petitioner was 
tm notice of the contingent nature of its interest in the frozen 
assets. 
This Court has previously recognized that the congressional 
purpose in authorizing blocking orders is "to put control of 
foreign assets in the hands of the President .... " Propper 
v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472, 493 (1949). Such orders permit the 
President to maintain the foreign assets at his disposal for 
use in negotiating the resolution of a declarccl national emer-
gency. The frozell assets serve as a "bargaining chip" to be 
used by the President when dealing with a hostile country. 
Accordingly, it is difficult to accept petitioner's argument be-
cause the practical effect of it is to allow individual claimants 
throughout the country to minimize or wholly eliminate this 
"bargaiuiug chip" through attachments, garnishments or simi-
lar encumbrances on property. Neither the purpose the 
statute was enacted to serve nor its plain language supports 
such a result.6 
0 Although petitioner concedes thnt the Pre~iclent could have forbiddm 
attachment::;, it neverthele::;s argues that once he allowed them tlw PreHidenL 
JWrmitted claimants to acquire property int<'re~t~ in their :~tln<"hnH·ntH. 
Petitioner further argueH that only thr lirrn~eR to obtain th<· altachmc•nt:,: 
were made revocable, 1101 the attarhmentH tlwmHrln·l'. Tt i~ mgc·d that the 
January 19, 1981, order revoking Hll licen~P~ on]~· atfcct<•d p<'tilimiC'r'~ 
right to obtain future nttachmentH. We di~agrre. A~ noll'd :1hove, the 
regulation;; ~pecifically providPd that :uw atta('hnwnt i~ null and void 
"uu]p~,; lic<'n;;ed," and all licPn~e;; may he revoked nt nny I illle. More-
over, common sense defies petitioner'~ reading of thr rl'gulat iom:. The 
Pn•::~ident could hardly have intruded petitioner and other 1<imi larly Rilu-
aled claimantb lo have the power to take control of the frozen a:;:;ct:; out 
of hi~ hautl~. 
Our eou~tructiou of petitioner':; nttachme>nts as being "rrvo('ahle," "coli· 
tingeut," and "in l'Wry sen:;e wbordinatr to t lw Pre~<id<•nt'~ power uml<·r 
the IEEPA," i11 effect auswer:; petitioner'~< rlaim that ('ven if th<' Pre::~i­
dcnt had the authotity to nullify the attachments and lran~fer lhc a:;set;,;, 
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Because the President's action in nullifying the attach~ 
ments and ordering the trausfer of the assets was taken pur-
suant to specific congressional authorization. it is "supported 
by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of 
judicial interpretation. allCI the burden of persuasion would 
rest heavily upon any who might attack it." Youngstown, 
343 U. S., at 637 (Jackson. J., concurring). Und0r the cir-
cumstances of this case, we cannot say that petitioner has 
sustained that heavy burden. A contrary ruling would mean 
that the Federal Government as a whole lacked tlt<:• power 
exercised by the President, see id., at 636--637, aJHl that we I Ov\~t 1'~ 
are not prepared to say. 
IV 
Although we have concluded that tlw IREPA eom;titutes 
specific congressional authorization to the President to nullify 
the attachments and order the transfer of Irania11 assPts. there 
remains the question of the President's authority to suspelHl 
claims pending in American courts. Ruch claims have, of 
course, an existence apart from the attachments which ac-
companied them. In terminating theS(' claims through Ex-
ecutive Order No. 12294. the President purported to act under 
authority of both the TEEPA and 22 U. S. C. § 1732, the 
Mo-called "Hostage Act." 7 App. to Pet. for Cert., at 52. 
the exercise of ::;uch would con::;titute an uncon~titntional taki11g of vrop<>rty 
iH violation of the Fifth Amendment nb>:ent j11~l compPll~tdion. We toll-
dude that bccau~P of the Pre~idPnt'::; authorit~· to prcvc111 or <:omlition 
att uchm(•nts, and bccau::;e of the ordrrH he i~~uPrl I o I his effPcl. pclitiom:r 
did not acquire any "property" intere~t in it~ <lltnehmPnt~ of the ~ort that 
would SUI>porL a con~titutional claim for compen~atiou. 
7 .Judge Mikva, in hilS ~eparatp opinion in American lnt'l Gruup, lnc. v. 
Islamic Republic of lrau,- U.S. App. D. C.-,-,- F . 2d -,-
(l!:!Hl), urgued that the moniker "Ho~tag;c• Act" wa~ Jll'wl~·- eoinl'tl for 
purpo::>CIS of thi~S litigation. Sutfir-e it to i'n~· that W(' fol"n~ 011 th1• luugHage 
of 22 U. S. C'. § 1732, not any short-hand de~cript ion of it. ::-lee ::-lhakc-
spcare, Hom eo and Juliet, II, ii, 43 ("What'::; in a name?") . 
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We conclude that although the IEEPA authorized the nul· 
lificatiOll of the attachmellts, it cannot be read to authorize 
the suspension of the claims. The claims of American citi· 
zens against Iran are not in themselves transactions involving 
Iranian property or efforts to exercise any rights with respect 
to such property. An in personam lawsuit. although it might 
eventually be reduced to judgment and that judgment might 
be executeu upon, is an effort to establish liability alld fix 
damages all!] does not focus on any particular property within 
the jurisdiction. The terms of the IEEPA therefore do not 
authorize the President to suspend claims in American courts. 
This is the view of all the courts which have coJu;idered the 
question. Chas. 1'. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & 
Power Authority, - F. 2d, at -; American Int'l Group, 
Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,-- F. 2d. at-, JJ. 15; 'l'he 
Marschalk Co., Inc. v. Ira'll National Airlines, - F. Supp. 
- , - (SDNY 1981); Electronic Data Systems v. Social 
Security Organization of Iran,- F. Supp. -,- (ND Tex. 
1981). 
The Hostage Act, passed in 1868, provides: 
"Whenever it is made k11own to the PresiclenL that any 
citizen of the United States has Leen unjustly deprived 
of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign 
government, it shall be the duty of the President forth-
with to demand of that govenlmPnt the reasons of such 
imprisonment; and if it appears to be wrongful and in 
violation of the rights of American citizenship, the Pres-
ideJJt shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen. 
and if the release so demanded is unreasonably delayed 
or refused , the President shall use such means, 110t 
amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary anJ 
proper to obtain or effectuate the release: anJ all the 
facts and proceedings relative thereto shall as soon as 
practicable be communicated by the President to Con-
gress." 22 U. S. C. § 1732. 
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We are reluctant to conclude that this provision constitutes 
specific authorization to the President to suspend claims in 
American courts. Although the broad language of the Hos-
tage Act suggests it may cover this case. there are several 
difficulties with such a view. The legislative history indi-
cates that the Act was passed in response to a situation unlike 
the recent Iranian crisis. Congress in 1868 was concerned 
with the activity of certain countries refusing to recognize 
the citizenship of naturalized Americans traveling abroad, aud 
repatriating such citizens against their will. Sec, e. g., Cong. 
Globe 4331, 40th Con g .. 2d Sess. ( 1868) (Sen F<•ssenden) ; 
id., at 4354 (Sen. Conness); see also 22 U. S. C. ~ 1731. 
These countries were not interested in returning the citize11s 
in excha11ge for any sort of ransom. This also explaius the 
reference in the Act to imprisonment "in violation of the 
rights of American citizenship." Although the Iranian hos-
tage-taking violated international law and common decency, 
the hostages were not seized out of any refusal to recognize 
their American citizenship-they were seized precisely be-
cause of their American citizenship. The legislative history 
is also somewhat ambiguous on the question whether Con-
gress contemplated presideHtial action such as that involved 
here or rather simply reprisals directed against the offending 
foreign couu try and its citizens. See. e. g., Con g. Globe 4205, 
40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1868); American Int'l Group, Inc. v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, supra, at- (opinion of Mikva, J.). 
Concluding that neither the IEEPA nor the Hostage Act 
constitutes specific authorization of the President's actio11 sus-
pending claims, however, is not to say that these statutory 
provisions are entirely irrelevant to the quE:'stion of the valid-
ity of the President's action. We think both statutes highly 
relevant in the looser sense of indicating congressiollal ac-
ceptance of a broad scope for executive action in circum-
stances such as those presented in this casr. As noted above 
in Part III, supra, at 12-13, the TEEPA <lelcgates broad au-
thority to the President to act iu times of national emergency 
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:with respect to property of a foreign country. The Hostage 
Act similarly indicates congressional willingness that the 
President have broau discretion when responding to the hos-
tile acts of foreign sovereigns. As Senator Williams, drafts-
man of the language eventually enacted as th ' Hostage Act, 
put it: 
"If you propose any remedy at all. you must invest 
the executive with some discretion. so that he may apply 
the remedy to a case as it may arise. As to England or 
France he might adopt one policy to relieve a citizen 
imprisoned by either one of those countries; as to the 
Barbary powers, he might adopt another policy; as to 
the islands of the ocean another. With different coun-
tries that have different systems of government he might 
adopt different means." Cong. Globe 4359, 40th Cong .. 
2cl Sess. (1868). 
Proponents of the bill recognized that it placed "a loose dis-
cretion" in the President's haHds. id., at 4238 (Sen. Stewart), 
Lut argued that "[s]omethiug must be intrusted to the Exec-
utive" and that "[tlhe President ought to have the power to 
do what the exigencies of the case require to rescue [a] citizen 
from imprisonment." Id., at 4233, 4357 (Sen. Williams). 
An original version of the Act, which authorized the Presi-
dent to suspend trade with a foreign country and even arrest 
citizens of that country in the United States in retaliation, 
was rejected because "there may be a great variety of cases 
arising where other and different means would be equally 
effective and where the end desired could be accomplished 
without resorting to such dangerous and violent measures." 
ld., at 4233 (Sen. Williams). 
Although we have declined to conclude that the IEEP A or 
the Hostage Act directly authorizes the President's suspen-
sion of claims for the reasons noted. we cannot ignore the 
general tenor of Congress' legislation in this area in trying to 
determine whether the President is acting alone or at least 
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with the acceptance of Congress. As we have 11oted, Con-
gress cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every pos-
sible action the President may find it necessary to take or 
every possible situation in which he might act. Such failure 
of Congress specifically to delegate authority does not. "espe-
cially ... in the areas of foreign policy and national security," 
imply "congressional disapproval" of action taken by the ~ S ~ o--\_....-
Executive. Haig v. Agee,- U.S.-,- (1981). On the 1&.rrl"\ \ 
contrary, the enactment of legislation closely related to the 
question of the President's authority in a particular case 
which evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad 
discretion may be considered to "invite" "measures ou iHde-
pendent presidential responsibility," Y nungstown, B43 U. S. , 
at 637 (Jackson, J. , concurring). At least this is so where 
ther!'l is 110 contrary indication of legislative intent and when. 
as here, there is a history of congressional acquiescence 111 
conduct of the sort engaged in by the President. It is to 
that history which we now turn. 
Not infrequently in affairs between nations, outsta11diug 
claims by nationals of one country against the government of 
another country are "sources of friction" between the two 
sovereigns. Un-ited States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203, 225 (194:2). 
To resolve these difficulties, nations have often entered into 
agreements settling the claims of their respective nationals. 
As one treatise writer puts it, international agreements set-
tling claims by nationals of one state against the govermneut 
of another "are established international practice reftectillg 
traditional international theory." L. Henkin. Foreign Affairs 
and the Constitution 262 (1972). Consistent with that prin-
ciple, the United States has repeatedly exercised its sover-
eign authority to settle the claims of its nationals agaiust 
foreign countries. Though those settlements have some-
times been made by treaty, there has also been a longstandiHg 
practice of settling such claims by executive agrcemeut with-
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out the advice and consent of the Senate.8 Under such agree-
ments, the President has agreed to renounce or extinguish 
claims of United States nationals against foreign govern-
ments in return for lump sum payments or the establishment 
of arbitration procedures. To be sure, many of these settle-
ments were encouraged by the United States claima11ts them-
selves, since a clairnaut's only hope of obtaining any payment 
at all might lie iu having his government nE:'gotiate a diplo- l 
matic settlement on his behalf. But it is also u11disputed 
that the "Uuited States has sometimes disposed of the claims 
of citizens without their consent. or even without consultation 
with them, usually without exclusive regard for their inter-
ests, as distinguished from those of the nation as a whole." 
Henkin, supra, at 263. Accord, The Restatement (Secoud) 
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States ~ 213 
(1965) (President "may waive or settle a claim against a for-
eign state ... even without thE:' consent of the [iujured] 
national"). It is clear that the practice of settliug claims 
continues today. Since 1952. the Presidellt has entered into 
at least 10 binding settlemellts with foreign nations, iuclud-
ing an $80 million settlement with the People's Republic of 
Chiua.0 
8 At lea~t ::;ince the case of the "Wilmington Pacht" i11 17!:J9, PrP~idcnts 
have exercised the power to ~ettle claim~ of UnitPd State~ national:, by 
executive agn•t>ment. See Lillich, The Gravel Amendment to the Trade 
Reform Act of 1974, 69 Am. J. Tnt'] L. 8.'37, R-l-! (H175). In fnd. during 
the pPriod of 1817-1917, "no fewer than eighty ex<·cutive ngrePnH·nts 
were entered into by the United State~ looking to tht• liquidation of claims 
of its citizens." 1\icCiurP, Intemntional Ex<·cutivl' Agn·<·ment~ 53 (1941) . 
See also 14M. Whiteman, Digest of Interna1ional Law :247 (1970). 
9 Those agreernen1:s ure 30 U. S. T. 1957 (1979) ( Peoplt·'~ Hcpublie 
of Chiua); 27 U. S. T . 399:3 (1976) (Peru); 27 lJ. S. T. 4214 (J97f1) 
(Egypt); 25 U. S. T. 227 (1974) (Peru); 2-l l'. S. T. 522 (1973) 
(Hungury) ; 20 U. S. T. 2654 (1969) (J1qmu) ; 16 U. S. T. 1 (1965) 
(Yugoslavia); 14 U. S. T. 969 (1963) (Bulgaria); 11 U. S. T. 1953 
(1960) (Poland); 11 U. S, T. 317 (1960) (Rumania) . 
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Crucial to our decision today is the conclusion that Con-
gress has implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement 
by ext>cutive agreement. This is best demonstrated by Con-
gress' enactment of the International Claims Settlement Act 
of 1949, 22 U. S. C. § 1621 et seq., as amended (1980). The 
Act had two purposes: (1) to allocate to United States na-
tionals funds received in the course of an executive claims 
settlement with Yugoslavia, and (2) to provide a procedure 
whereby fuuds resulting from future sctth,ments could be 
distributed. To achieve these ends Congress created the In-
ternational Claims Commission, now the Foreign Claims Set-
tlement Commission. and gave it jurisdictio11 to make fiual 
and binding decisions with respect to claims by United States 
nationals against settlement funds. 22 U. S. C. § 162:3 (a). 
By creating a procedure to implement future settlelllent 
agreements. Congress placed its stamp of approval on such 
agreements. Indeed, the legislative history of the Act ob-
served that the United States was seeking s<>ttlemen ts with 
countries other than Yugoslavia and stated that the bill "con-
templates that settlements of a similar nature are to be made 
in the future." H. R. Rep. No. 81-770, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 
4, 8 (1949). 
Over the years Congress has frequently amended the Inter-
national Claims Settlement Act to provide for particular 
problems arising out of settlement agreements. thus demon-
strating Congress' continuing acceptance of the President's 
claim settlement authority. With respect, to the Executive 
Agreement with the People's Republic of Chi11a, for example, 
Congress established an allocation formula for distribution 
of the funcls received pursuant to the Agreemt>nt. 22 U. S. C. 
§ 1627. As with legislation involving other executive agree-
ments, Congress did not question the fact of the settlement 
or the power of the President to have concluded it. I11 1976, 
Cougress authorized the Foreign Claims Settlement Commis-
sion to adjudicate the merits of claims by United States na-
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tionals against East Germany, prior to any settlement with 
East Germany, so that the Executive would "be in a better 
positiou to npgotiate an adequate settlement . . . of these 
claims." S. Rep. No. 94-1188, 94th Coug., 1st Sess., 2 
(1976); 22 U. S. C. § 1644b. Similarly, Congress recently 
amended the Iu ternatioual Claims Settlement Act to facil-
itate the settl('mPnt of claims agai11st Vietnam. 22 U. S. C. 
§ 1645; ~ Hi45a (5). The House Report stated that the pur-
pose of the legislation was to establish an official inventory of 
losses of private Fuited States property in Vietnam so that 
recovery could be achieved "through direct Government-to-
Government negotiation of private property claims." H. R. 
Rep. No. 96-915. 96th Co11g., 2d Sess .. 2-3 (1980). Finally, 
the legislative history of the IEEPA further reveals that Con-
gress has accc>pted the authority of the Executive to enter 
into settlement agreements. Though th(' IEEPA was en-
acted to provide for some limitation on th(' President's emer-
gency powers, Congress stressed that "nothi11g in this Act is 
intended to interfere with the authority of the President to 
fblock assets 1. or to impede the settle>ment of claims of 
United States citizens against forcig11 couutries." S. Rep. 
No. 95-466, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1977); 50 U. S. C. 
§ 1706 (a) ( 1) .10 
10 IndP<>d, Congre>s::; has eonRi~tt'ntl~· fnik<l to ohje<'t to this long-~tandi11g 
pruetice of rlaim settlement by ex0eut in· agn•(•Jlll'Jlt, ev0n wiH'll it has 
had au opportunit)' to do so. In l 972. CongrP~~ Pnt<·rtainl'd IPI-(i::-:la t ion 
relating to congre~;;ional oversight of Ruth agr<'t'llH'llf~. But Congre~s took 
only limited nrtion, rrquiring that the text of ~ignifi<"allt rxPeutive agree-
ment~ be trun;;mittpd to Congre;;~. 1 U. S. C. § 112b. Ju Jlaig v. Agee, 
-- U. S.- (19i:il), w0 not0cl that "D~pite the long~tamliug aud ofli-
<:iully promulgated view that the Exe<"utiw lw~ the powPr 1o withhold 
pas:sport, for reaHon~ of national ~e(·urit~·, Cor1gre~~ in Hl78, 'though it 
once again pnart!'d lPgi:slation relating to pa~~port~, left comp](•ft'ly uu-
touched the broad rule-making authority grauted iu the carliPr Ad.'" 
ld., at 20, quoting Zernet v. R,·usk, 381 U. S. 1, 12 (1965). Likewi~e iu 
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In addition to congressional acquiescence in the President's 
power to settle claims, prior cases of this Court have also 
recognized that the President does have some measure of 
power to enter into executive agreements without obtaining 
the advice and consent of the Senate. In United States v. 
Pink, 315 U. S. 203 (1942), for example. the C'ourt upheld 
the validity of the Litvinov Assignment. which was part of an 
Executive Agreement whereby the Soviet Union assig11ed to 
the United Sta.tes amounts owed to it by American uationals 
so that outstanding claims of other American nationals could 
be paid. 'l"'he Court explained that the resolution of such 
claims was integrally connected with normalizing Uuited 
States' relations with a foreign state. 
"Power to remove such obstacles to full recognition 
as settlement of claims of our nationals ... certainly is 
a modest implied power of the President. . . . No such 
obstacle can be placed in the way of rehabilitation of 
relations between this country and another nation, unless 
the historic conception of his power and responsibil-
ities ... is to be drastically revised." ld., at 229-230. 
Similarly, Judge Learned Hand recognized: 
"The constitutional power of the President extends to 
the settlement of mutual claims between a foreign gov-
this case, Congres,, thougl1 lrgisl11ting in the area, has left "untouelJed" the 
authority of the Pre;;ident to enter into settlement agreements. 
'l'he lcgi~lativc hi>~tory of 1 U. S. C. § 112b furthPr revPals that Con-
gre~:,; ha~ accepl(·d the Pre;;idmt':; authority to settle claims. During the 
hearings on tlw bill, Senator CaJ<e, thr sponsor of the Act, stat('d wilh 
reRpPct to executive rlnim f<ettlementR that: 
"I think it is a most intem;ting [nrea] in which we have accepted the 
right of the Pn·sideut, one individual, acting thrm1gh his diplomatic 
force, to adjudicate and l:iettlc claims of Ameri<'an national~ agaiui:it foreign 
COlmtrirl:i. But it is a fuel." 
'fran:;mittal of Executive Agreements to Congre~:;s: Hearings before thu-
Scnatc Committee on :Foreign Relations, 92cl Cong., 1st Sess., 74 (1971) . 
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ernment and the United States, at least when it is an 
incident to the recognition of that government; and it 
would be umeasonable to circumscribe it to such contro-
vcrsie8. The continued mutual amity between this na-
tion and other powers again and again depends upon a 
satisfactory compromise of mutual claims; the necessary 
power to make such compromises has existed from the 
earliest times and been exercised by the foreign offices of 
all civilized nations." Ozanic v. United States, 188 F. 2d 
228, 231 (CA2 1951). 
Petitioner raises two arguments in opposition to the propo-
sition that Congress has acquiesced in this longstanding prac-
tice of claims settlement by executive agreement. First, it 
suggests that all pre-1952 settlement claims, and correspond-
ing court cases such as Pink, should be discounted because of 
the evolution of the doctrim' of sovereign immunity. Peti-
tioner observes that ))rior to 1952 the United States adhered 
to the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity. so that absent 
action by the Executive there simply would be no remedy for 
an United States uational a~ainst a foreign govemment. 
When the Uuited States in 1952 adopted a more restrictive 
notion of sovereign immunity, by means of the so-called 
"Tate" letter, it is petitioner's view that Unitetl States na-
tioHals no longer ueeded Executive aid to settle claims alld 
that, as a result. the President's authority to settle such 
claims in some sense "disappeared." Though petitioner's ar-
gument is not wholly without merit, it is refuted by the fact 
that since 1952 there have been at least 10 claims settlements 
by executive agreement. Thus, even if the pre-1952 caees 
should be disregarded, congressional acquiescence in settle-
ment agreements since that time supports the President's 
power to act here. 
Petitioner next asserts that Conp:ress divested the President 
Qf th(;) ~uthority to settl~ c}ftim~ when it enacted the Foreign 
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Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (hereinafter "FSIA"), 28 
U.S. C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq. The FSIA g-ranted personal and 
subject matter jUI'isdiction in the federal district courts over 
commercial suits brought by claimants against those foreign 
states which have waived immunity. 28 U. S. C. § 1330. 
Prior to the enactment of the FSIA. a foreign government's 
immunity to suit was determinecl by the Exrcutive Branch 
on a case-by-case basis. According to petitioner, the prin-
cipal purpose of the FSIA was to dcpoliticize these commer-
cial lawsuits by taking them out of the arena of foreign af-
fairs-where the Executive Branch is subject to tlw prt'ssures 
of foreign states seeking to avoid liability through a grant of 
immunity-and by placillg them within the exclusive juris-
diction of the courts. Petitioner thus insists that the Presi-
dent, by suspending its claims. has circumscribed the jurisdic-
tion of the United States courts in violation of Art. Ill of the 
Constitution. 
We disagree. In the first place. we do not believe that 
the President has attempted to divest the federal courts of 
j urisdictior1. Executive Order No. 12294 purports only to 
"suspend" the claims, not divest the federal court of "juris-
diction." As we read the Executive Order, those claims not 
within the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal will "revive't 
and become judicially enforceable in United States courts. 
This case, in short. illustrates the difference between modify-
ing federal court jurisdiction and directing the courts to apply 
a different rule of law. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 
5 U.S. 1, 103 (1801). The President has exercised the power, 
acquiesced in by Congress, to settle claims aml, as such, has 
simply effected a change in the substantive law governing the 
lawsuit. Indeed, the very example of sovereign immunity 
belies petitioner's argument. No one would suggest that a 
determination of sovereign immunity divests the federal 
courts of "jurisdiction." Yet, petitioner's argument, if ac-
cepted, would have required courts prior to the enactment 
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of the FSIA to reject as an encroachment on their jurisdiction 
the President's determination of a foreign state's sovereign 
immunity. 
Petitioner also reads the FSIA much too broadly. 'l'he 
principal purpose of the FSIA was to codify conU>mporary 
concepts concerning the scope of sovereign innnuuity aml 
withdraw from the President the authority to make binding 
determinations of the sovereign immunity to be accorded for-
eign states. See Chas. T. Main Tnt'l, lnc. v. Khuzestau Water 
& Power Authority,- F. 2d. at-; American lnt'l Group, 
Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,- F. 2d, at-. The },S[A 
was thus designed to remove one particular banier to suit, 
namely sovereign immunity; and cannot be fairly read as 
prohibiting the President from settliug claims of United 
St,ates nationals against foreign governments. It is telliug 
that the Cougress which enacted the FSIA considered but 
rejected several proposals designed to limit the power of the 
President to enter into executive agreements. incl11ding claims 
settlement agreements.11 It is quite unlikely that the same 
Co11gress that rejected proposals to limit the President's au-
thority to conclude executive agreements sought to accom-
plish that very purpose sub silentio through the FSIA. And, 
as noted above. just 1 year after enacting the FSIA, Con-
gress enacted the IEEPA, where the legislative history 
stressed that nothing in the IEEP A was to impede the s<>t-
tlement of claims of United States citizens. It wonld be 
surprising for Congress to express this support for settlement 
11 The rejected legislation woultl typically have n•quirPd COJH!I't'~~ioual 
approval of executivr agre(·mrut~S before they woulu !Je cou~idered rf-
fective. Ser Con~re~S~Sional Over~Si!l;ht of Executiw Agrernwnt~: Htaring~S 
on S. 632 and S. 1251 ])('fun· flw ~u!Jc·onuniftN· ou St'IJai'Htion of Powers 
of the Senate Commit1PP on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., bt se~~., 243-261, 
302-311 (1975): Congre:::~innal n(•Vi(:'W of Jntemational Agn•(•lll('lltb: 
Hearing~ b(>fore the Sub('ommiltc•p ou Tnt('rnatiomd Serurit.'' and Srit·ntific 
Affnir~ of the House Comlllittee on Iuternational Relations, 94th Cong., 
2d se~~ ., 167, 246 (1976). 
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agreements had it intended the FSIA to eliminate the Presi~ 
dent's authority to make such agreements. 
In light of all of the foregoing-the inferences to be drawn 
from the character of the legislation Congress has enacted 
in the area, such as the IEEP A and the Hostage Act. and 
from the history of acquiescence in executive claims settle-
ment-we conclude tha.t the President was authorized to sus-
pend pending claims pursuant to Executive Order No. 12294. 
As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in Youngslow11, 343 U.S. 
at 610-611, "a systematic, unbroken executive practice, long 
pursued to the knowledge of Congress and never before ques-
tioned ... may be treated as a gloss on 'Executive Power~ 
vested i.u the President by ~ 1 of Art. II." Past practice 
does not, by itself, create power. but "long-contiuued prac-
tice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a 
presumption that the !'action] has been [taken] in pursuance 
of its consent .... " United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 
U. S. 459, 469 (1915). See Haig v. Agee, -- U. S .. at-, 
-. Such practice is present here and such a presmnJ)tion 
is also appropriate. In light of the fact that Congress may 
be considered to have consented to the President's action in 
suspending claims, we cannot say that action exceeded the 
Presideut's powers. 
Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the means 
chosen by the President to settle the claims of American 
natiouals provided an alternate forum, the Claims Tribunal. 
which is capable of providing meaningful relief. The Solici-
tor General also suggests that the provision of the Claims 
Tribunal will actually enhance the opportunity for claimants 
to recover their claims, in that the Agreement removes a uum-
ber of jurisdictional and procedural impeuiments faced by 
claimants in United States courts. Brief for United States. at 
13-14. Although being overly sanguine about the chances of 
Uuited Rtates claimants before the Claims Tribunal would 
require a degree of naivete which should not be demandPd 
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eVl'n of judges, the Solicitor Generals' point cannot be dis-
counted. Moreover, it is .important to remember that we 
have already held that the President has the statutory author-
ity to nullify attachments and to transfer the assets out of 
the country. The President's power to do so does not depend 
on his provision of a forum whereby claimants can recover on 
those claims. The fact that the Presid<>nt has provided such 
a forum here means that the claimants arc receiving some-
thing in return for the suspension of their claims. namely. ac-
cess to an in ternatioual tribunal before which they may well 
recover something on their claims. Because there tloes ap-
pear· to be a real "settlement" here. this case is more easily 
analogized to the more traditional claim settlemcllt cast's of 
the past. 
Just as importantly. Congress has not disapprowd of the 
action taken here. Though Cougress has held hearings on 
the Iranian Agreement itsel£,1'-! Congress has Hot enacted leg-
islation , or eve11 passed a resolutiou. indicating its displeasure 
with the Agreement. Quite the COlJtrary, the relevant Sen-
ate Committee has stated that the establishme11 t of the Tt'i-
buual is "of vital importance to the United States." S. Rep. 
No. 97- 71 , 97th Cong., 1st Sess. , 5 (1981). 13 We are thus 
12 See Hearit1g~ on the Iranian Agreement~ heforP lht> Seuatl• Committee 
on Foreign Relation~, 97th Con g .. l ~t Se~s. (1981) ; Hraring~ on the Trail-
ian A~~e;; t l:i Set t lt>men t before the Sena I e Comm i I PPe on Banking, Hom;i ug 
unci Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., bt Se~s . (Hl~1) ; Ht-aring~ on tlw Algerian 
Dec!Hralions before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cung., 
M Sess. (1981) . 
13 Contra~t eongre~sional reaction to thr Irnui:lll Agr~:>t•ment s with eon-
grc~sional reaction to a 1973 Executive Agreement with CzPchoHlovakia . 
There the Presid(:'nt sought to srttle over $105 million in claim;,; against 
Czecho~lovakia for $20.5 million. Congresl:i quickly demo11~trated it ~ di:,-
plea~ ure by enaeting legi~lation requiring that t hr AgrPemcnt he renegoti-
a ted . Ser Lillich, supra , ut 839-840. Though Congre~s has ~hown i t ~elf 
('apahle of objecting to executive agreements, it has rn reJ~r dune ~o am{ 
bas not doue so in thi~; case .. 
80-2078-0PINION 
30 DAJ\IES & MOORE v. REGAN 
clearly not confronted with a situation in which Co11gr·ess has 
in some way resistRd the exercise of presidential authority. 
Finally, we re-emphasize the narrowness of our decision. 
We do not decide that the President possesses plenary pow<:'I' 
to settle claims. even as against foreign governmental en-
tities. As the C'ourt of Appeals for the First Circuit str<'ssed, 
"the sheer magnituue of such a power. considered against the 
background of the diversity and complexity of modl'l'll inkr-
national trade, cautions against any broader construction of 
authority thau is uecessary." Chas. 'P. Main hd'l, Inc. v. 
Khuzestan Water & Power Authority,- F. 2d. at-. But 
when•, as here, the settlement of claims has been dPtennined 
to be a necessary i11cident to the rPsolution of a major foreign 
policy dispute between our country and anoth(·r, a])(l where. 
as here, we can conclude that Congress aequiesced in the 
President's action, we are not prepared to say that the Presi-
dent lacks the power to settle such claim . 
v 
We do not think it appropriate at the presPnt tiHH' lo ad-
dress petitioner's contention that the suspension of claims, if 
authorized, would constitute a taking of property in violation 
of the Fifth Amendment to the Pnitcd Rtates Constitution 
in the absence of just compensation.11 Both pditionpr· autl 
the Government concede that the question wlwtlwr the sus-
pension of the claims constitutes a taking is not ripe for r·p-
view. Brief for Petitioner. at 34. n. 32; Brief for rnited 
Rtates, at 65. Accord, Chas. '1'. Main Tnt'l, l11c. v. Khuzestan 
Water & Power Authority, supra, at -; ,1mericau lnt'l 
Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of !ran, - F. 2<1, at --. 
However, this contention, and the possibility that the Presi-
14 Though we couclude that the Pre~itleJJt has settled wtitiun\~r·~ ('lairn~ 
agaiusL Iran, we tlu nut snggrst that the ~ettlem<'ut lw~ termiuatl'tl peti-
tioner'::; J>UI'~ible taking claim agaiu::;t the Uuited Sbtes. \Ye expre::;s 110 
views on pl:!litioner 'i::i claim::; that it hm; suffered a takiug. 
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dent's actions may effect a taking of petitioner's property~ 
makes ripe for adjudication the question whether petitio11rr 
will have a remec.ly at law in the Court of Claims unde>r the 
Tucker Act. 28 U. R. C. § 1491, in such a.n event. That the 
fact and extent of the taking in this case is yet speculat,ive 
is inconsequf'ntial because "there must be at the time of Lak-
iHg 'a reasonable, certain anc.l adequate provision for obtain-
ing compensation.'" Regional Rail Reorganization Act 
Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 124-125 (1974), quoting Cherokee Na-
tion v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641, 659 (1890); 
Cities Service Co. v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330. 335- 336 (1952); 
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Bnvironrnental Study Group, 438 
U. R. 59, 94. JJ. 39 (1978). 
It has been contendec.l that the "treaty exception" to the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, 28 U. R. C. ~ 1502, might 
precluc.le the Court of Claims from exercising jurisdiction over 
any takings claim the petitioner might bring. At oral argu-
ment, however, the Government conceded that ~ 1502 would 
not act as a bar to petitioner's action in the C'ourt of C'laims. 
Tr. of Oral Arg .. at 39-42. 47. We agree. Ser United States 
v. Weld, 127 U. S. 51 (1888); United States v. Old Settlers, 
14S U. S. 427 (1893); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 
534 :F'. 2d 889 (Ct. Cl. 1976). Accordingly. to thr Pxtcnt p<"ti-
tioner believes it has suffered an unco11stitutional takiug by 
the suspension of the claims. we sec 110 jurisclictioJlal obstaelc 
to an appropriate action in the United States Court of Claims 
unc.ler the Tucker Act. 
The judgment of the D1stl'ict Court is accordingly affirmed, 
~tH.l the mandate shall issue forth with. 
.! ~J • J 'h' \ .. ' Ct-:itd.' ; '1 ;J{! ;:.: 
tJ.r. Ju:·tl...:u .: :-u:~""~.'ln 
Mr. JutJ t ~ ne Ste·.I.Jarr; 
!ir . Justice ·,j(li tA 
i':Jr. Jus t ice :h:cshall' 
inr . Justice Bl::>..cz:uun 
i-1r . J u.n t ice R::- h!lr:J.ll i a -c' 
.8:r . Jus t i ce Sta'Jons 
lb:'ofn;:· Mr. Justice Powoll 
JUL ~,c.f.l o 
CinmUa~: __________ wol 
ilGcirouletod: 
No. 80-2127 Iran National Airlines v. The Marschalk Co. 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom Justice Marshall and 
Justice Stevens join, dissenting. 
I would dismiss the certificate, citing Dames & 
Moore v. Regan, u.s. (1981), announced today. The 
Court's opinion in that case provides the only answers that 
this Court should give to the questions certified to us by 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Having 
rendered an opinion on the subject of those questions, we 
should not answer them in monosyllables nor attempt a 
syllabus of a portion of the Court's opinion. We recently 
have dismissed certification of questions where the Court 
has addressed the subject of the questions in a full 
opinion. Foley v. Carter, u.s. (1981) • See also 
United St a tes v. Will, u.s. (1981). 
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